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1. Introduction and Overview
The problem of illegal drugs is not contained in producing countries, but represents a global
threat that poses serious challenges to producer, transit and consumer countries. In Colombia,
the struggle for the control of arable land for cultivation of illegal crops and of trafficking
routes has devastating consequences such as homicides, forced displacement and massacres. The
consumption of drugs by millions of users poses challenges to health and educational systems
around the globe. The increasing use of cocaine in the United States 40 years ago spurred
the so-called “war on drugs”, which assumed that hard punishment and law enforcement would
be enough to deter producers, traffickers and consumers from getting involved in the drug
market. A natural place to wage this war was in the producing countries, which in the case
of cocaine are only three: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. This dissertation focuses on Colombia,
where Plan Colombia, the largest anti-drug program in a producing country (Mejia et al.,
2013) was implemented between 2000 and 2008 with large support from the United States.
The program’s primary focus was to tackle drug production, mainly through aerial spraying
and forced eradication of coca crops, but it also included interdiction actions aimed at seizing
drugs and precursor chemicals, destroying processing laboratories and weakening illegal armed
groups, who control trafficking routes. Mejia et al. (2013) estimate the military component of
Plan Colombia to have represented 1.1% of the annual GDP between 2000 and 2008, close to
US $1.1 billion per year.
There has been a reduction in total coca bush cultivation, although its sustainability remains
to be seen. Despite drops in coca cultivation in Colombia from roughly 100.000 hectares in
2007 to 48.000 hectares in 2012, this decrease stopped in 2013, when it showed a 1% increase
with respect to 2012. The question remains whether the efforts are enough in order to prevent
future increases or to sustain the downward trend. In fact, a downward trend had also followed
the highest production peak of 161.000 hectares in 2000 down to 78.000 in 2006, when it again
increased to 99.000 the following year. Out of the 32 coca producing departments in Colom-
bia, 13 have shown a dipping trend, while seven show sharp increases. Moreover, farmers and
traffickers have responded to the policies in different ways, such as using cheaper chemical in-
puts, cultivating smaller plots, growing coca in areas that the state cannot spray (natural parks
and indigenous reserves) or that are hard to detect and changing their trafficking routes. The
compensation between geographical areas and the adaptive behaviors of farmers and traffickers
are signs that the existing drug-supply-reducing policies need to be revised. This was also the
conclusion of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, which declared the global war on drugs as
a failure. Thus, designing policies that do not displace illegality from one geographical point to
its neighbor, or from one illegal activity to another (e.g., illegal mining) will be more successful
in attaining global and sustainable reductions in illegal activities.
This thesis dwells on how to achieve illegal crop reduction and compliance with the law in a
sustainable fashion without exclusively relying on costly punishment, but by focusing on four
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different perspectives: ensuring State legitimacy, fostering a culture of legality, changing atti-
tudes towards illegality, and strengthening mechanisms of community control. The dissertation
is composed of four essays, each one studying one of these perspectives and providing policy
relevant results.
The dissertation that follows uses various analytical techniques (experimental, survey analysis,
secondary data analysis) at different levels of analysis (individual, community, municipality),
which strengthens the general conclusion that when policies not only rely on risk and punish-
ment in order to achieve compliance with the law, but also go beyond and include normative
factors, the sustainability and success of the policies will be more likely. The results discussed
below are of substantial value, at a time when drug policies are being discussed and when the
United Nations General Assembly will be dedicating a special session on how to deal with the
drug problem in 2016. This would set the agenda for answering even more questions. For
instance, testing communication messages outside of the lab in the short and medium term
could help strengthen our understanding on how attitudinal change leads to less illegal crops.
Moreover, evaluating the effect of alternative development after monetary incentives have dis-
appeared and exposure to culture of legality workshops is gone would give a better view of
how sustainable are such interventions in the long term. A more ambitious agenda would look
beyond illegal crops and include other illegal activities that are present in coca-growing areas
to see up to what extent traditional punishment is simply changing the illegal activity that
people engage in, and if the proposed strategies of strengthening culture of legality and state
legitimacy, as well as changing attitudes and empowering communities prevent people from
participating in illegal activities altogether.
Essay 1. When too much punishment decreases legality. The case of coca-reducing
policies in Colombia
The first manuscript studies how an excessive and disproportionate use of enforcement, in this
case aerial spraying of coca crops, can back-fire and undermine engagement in legal activities
that could have been alternatives to illegal crops. Altogether the paper empirically studies
what happens when the principle of proportionality of punishment (i.e., the severity of the
punishment is adequate given the magnitude of the crime) is perceived to be broken. With the
use of one macro aggregate dataset on all coca-growing municipalities in Colombia, and of three
micro datasets with very different groups of farmers that have had very different exposures to
coca crops and state presence, I test whether extreme disproportional use of aerial spraying
reduces the hectares cultivated with legal crops, while proportional spraying induces legal crop
production. This means that I test for the presence of a non-linear relationship between the
punishment (dis)proportionality and the legal crops, whereby proportional punishment levels
induce legal crop cultivation, but disproportional levels crowd it out. I further study the chan-
nels that may have led to such reduction, such as displacement of labor force, environmental/soil
damage and loss of state legitimacy. I argue that the most important channel at play is the
loss of legitimacy, as citizens judge the policy as unfair.
2
The aggregated macro dataset and the dataset with the census of all coffee growers had a panel
structure that allowed me to estimate fixed effect panel models. The two remaining datasets
come from one-time surveys, one implemented by UNODC in a historically important coca
growing region and the other with beneficiaries of Colombia’s biggest alternative development
program. The three farmer-level datasets collect individual information on legal crop production
and are then combined with aggregate levels of aerial spraying at a municipal level. The
UNODC’s sample on coca crop cultivation is an exception and has (credible) individual level
information on coca cultivation. In all these cases it can be assumed that individual productive
decisions on either illegal or legal crops will not determine the magnitude of the spraying policy
in their municipalities. My results from the four available datasets point to a non-linear effect of
punishment on legality: spraying shocks or extreme spraying in relation to the amount of illegal
crops reduce engagement in legal crops, while proportional levels of spraying induce them. I
find that disproportionate spraying also generates displacement, but that it does not explain
the full effect. Moreover, I find that as spraying disproportionality increases, the confidence
that people have in the state’s capacity to solve problems decreases. These results have strong
policy implications for the existing drug policies in place, as extreme use of aerial spraying will
not only not achieve its expected effects in coca reduction, but will alienate the population
from the state and ultimately reduce their investments in legal crops.
Essay 2. How alternative development spills over into more honest communities:
An experimental approach in Colombia
The second essay is joint work with Marcela Ibanez and studies the impact of an alternative
development program on the culture of legality. This program provides farmers that are already
growing coca – or at risk of doing so – with legal productive alternatives, and offers them work-
shops aimed at introducing social capital skills and culture of legality. Success in the program
would be fully achieved if farmers not only stop working with illegal crops during the duration
of the Program, but if their behavior regarding illegality in general is also changed. We test
this by introducing a dishonesty experiment in the middle of a survey that was being imple-
mented in order to evaluate the overall impact of the Forest Warden Families Program (FGB)
in Colombia. This experiment allowed us to observe general cheating patterns for program
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Although the Program was not randomized, it did have a
targeting index built with observable variables (that were shared with us) that determined who
should be treated. Given resource and logistical restrictions not all municipalities were treated
at the same time and the Program was rolled out over time, allowing us looking for the most
similar controls by using the propensity of being treated in the future based on this index.
We find that people that live in areas that have been treated by the FGB alternative develop-
ment program cheated less than those that had not been exposed to it, and find as well that
as exposure to the program increases, dishonesty decreases, supporting our hypothesis that
the culture of legality workshops start changing people’s illegal behavior, but that this process
may take time. We also find two relationships, that even though are not necessarily causal,
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are still interesting. The first is that people that have been exposed to higher magnitudes of
coca crops also cheat more in the experiment, which goes in the direction that when people
live in environments where illegality is the norm, other aspects of life are also affected by this
illegality. The second is that there is a non-linear relationship between poverty and dishonesty,
by which people that are close to the poverty threshold cheat the most, compared to those that
are way below and farther up from the threshold. This suggests that the Program’s focus on
coca reduction and compliance with legality spills over into other realms of ethical behavior and
leads to not only more legal, but also more honest communities. The main policy implication
of this paper is that exposing people to workshops that explain to them the importance of
complying with the law and of playing by the rules changes behavior in a way that suggests
that people will be more ready to stay away from illegal activities in the future. When people
believe in legality and do not act legally solely because of fear, sustainability of drug-reducing
policies is more likely.
Essay 3. Can we fight drugs using communication campaigns? A framed field
experiment in Colombia
The third essay is joint work with Marcela Ibanez and studies how communication messages
can be used in order to change attitudes towards legality and to reduce investments in coca
crops. The main assumption behind this paper is that economic behavior is shaped not only
by economic incentives but also by normative factors that could be potentially altered by being
exposed to persuasive communication messages. This paper uses a framed field experiment in
a historical coca-growing area in the south of Colombia with farmers that live in communities
that grow or have grown coca crops in order to test the effect of persuasive messages as a
strategy to reduce attitudes towards coca, captured by experimental investments in these illegal
crops. Our design varies the salience and the degree of informativeness of the messages that
participants receive, highlighting the particular negative effects that growing coca brings to
their communities. We test four different messages that are true in real life and that were also
mentioned by the farmers in preliminary qualitative workshops in the field; namely that i) coca
brings violence to their communities by increasing homicides, forced displacement and other
violations to human rights, ii) that coca erodes the values of the youth, reduces their interest
in going to school and makes them want to get easy money, iii) that coca has negative impacts
on the environment because of the pesticides and chemicals that are used its production and
iv) that coca increases violence, but now we assign specific values to the increase in homicides,
land mines, displacement, etc. Our experiment replicates real world situations such as the
need for farmers to decide between a legal activity or an illegal crop, the existence of risk of
being caught with coca, the higher profit from coca than from the legal activity and the reality
of negative externalities to the communities in the form of the treatments that we introduced.
Participants decide whether to invest on coca or cattle in ten consecutive rounds without talking
or communicating with other participants, and get paid according to their decisions at the end
of the game.
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We find that the messages that make salient the relation of coca with violence are the ones that
are most effective at reducing investments in coca. Our results suggest that the main mechanism
at play is an attitudinal change towards coca rather than a change in beliefs. Interestingly, we
find that exposure to the experimental treatments translate into lower intentions to cultivate
coca in the future. We conclude that interventions that aim at increasing “awareness” of the
negative effects that coca brings to the communities are a promising policy instrument in the
fight against drugs. Moreover, we believe that by changing attitudes towards working with
illegal crops and by at least changing what people intend to do in the future, the sustainability
of illegal crop reductions is strengthened, as what generates the reduction is not the fear of
punishment, which goes away as soon as the risk goes down, but an overall change in attitudes
that could potentially change the decision-making process that people go through when deciding
to invest in a legal or in an illegal activity.
Essay 4. Changing minds and winning hearts: An experimental approach in Colom-
bia
The last study, joint work with Marcela Ibanez, focuses on how alternative development pro-
grams that pay people to refrain from growing coca alter the underlying social norm regarding
coca and lead to a reduction of the willingness to invest in illegal crops. Additionally, we study
how to trigger the use of internal control mechanisms by the communities themselves, and how
these mechanisms can be either supported or minimized depending on the external enforcement
policies that communities may be bound by. We use a framed field experiment to study the
effectiveness of two types of public policies in achieving legality and also look at their combined
effect when interacted. We focus on policies that activate social norms within communities
and on those that use standard deterrence mechanisms. Our experiment takes place in a coca
growing area in the north of Colombia where we can study the impact of an alternative devel-
opment program on farmers’ willingness to invest in coca and to establish mechanisms of social
control. The Program required communities to organize their own verification committee that
would make sure that the whole community was coca free, which makes this an interesting
characteristic of the Program to investigate further. Our experimental design leaves the risk
of being caught and the size of the punishment constant, but varies the policies that rule each
session’s environment. As with the experiment from the third paper, this experiment replicates
real world decisions and situations, in order to maximize the external validity of our results. We
expose people to five experimental treatments (plus a control group, where there is no risk of
being caught with coca and no punishment): i) external enforcement that punishes only those
that invested in coca, ii) external enforcement that punishes not only those that invested in coca
but other group members, iii) mechanisms of internal control that can be used by participants
to punish other group member’s actions, and two additional treatments that interact internal
mechanisms of control with either individual liability or group liability external enforcement.
Participants decide whether to invest in coca or in cattle in five different rounds, and we intro-
duce a feedback mechanism to ensure that people can find out what other group members did
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in the previous rounds. As in the previous experiment, participants get paid according to their
decisions at the end of the game.
We find that the program enhances coca reduction and increases internal social control. In
turn, internal control mechanisms decrease coca investments among program beneficiaries and
social control is triggered when people observe other group members deviate from legality.
By having exogenous punishment interact with internal compliance mechanisms, we find that
external punishment that makes whole groups liable crowds-out internal control mechanisms;
whereas punishment that makes individuals liable for their actions enhances internal social
control. We conclude that by giving farmers incentives to act legally, there are positive effects
that lead to enhancing compliance and reducing the need to rely explicitly on costly external
punishment. The policy implications from this paper are straightforward: communities can
keep coca investments down and will do so as long as the state only punishes those who break
the law (with manual eradication, for instance) and abstains from punishing the whole group
when only a few are guilty (through aerial spraying of coca crops, for example). This goes back
to the legitimacy discussion mentioned in the first paper, where punishment that seems unjust
discourages compliance with legality.
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2. When too much punishment decreases legality. The case
of coca reducing policies in Colombia
Abstract
States want their people to follow the law. They can either persuade them, sanction
law-breakers, or both. But sanctions do not only alter people’s perception of risks and
costs; they also affect how people view their state and its legitimacy, unleashing a series
of non-economic factors that determine compliance with the law. In fact, when a sanction
is perceived as unjust it may be inefficient in reducing law violations and could crowd-
out legality in other aspects of life. Law scholars warn against violating the principle
of proportionality by exerting extreme punishment in comparison with the magnitude
of the crime, as it may result in the loss of citizen cooperation with the law. I take
one of Colombia’s drug-reducing policies, aerial spraying of coca crops and study the
effect of its disproportionate use on legal crops. My results point to a non-linear effect of
punishment on legality: spraying shocks or extreme spraying in relation to the amount of
illegal crops found reduce engagement in legal crops, while proportional levels of spraying
induce legality. I use four different sources of data to test this relationship: macro data on
all coca growing municipalities in Colombia, and micro data of three very different sets of
farmers, namely coca growers surveyed by the UNODC, farmers that are beneficiaries of
Colombia’s biggest alternative development Program (Forest Warden Families) and coffee
growers in municipalities that have had coca. I find the same results in all four samples
and conclude that when the state overdoes its coercive actions, these can backfire and
crowd out legality.
Keywords: Public Policy, Colombia, illegal behavior, agriculture
JEL Classifications: D78, O13, K42, Q12, O54
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Introduction
Achieving citizen compliance with the law is a primary goal for any state. However, a simple
recipe of increasing costs (risk of being caught and size of punishment) can even back fire
in ways that hinder legality-based development. A balance must be struck between, on the
one hand, signaling that certain behaviors are detrimental to society and should therefore be
punished—the expressive function of the law (Kahan 1997; Bohnet and Cooter, 2003; Cooter,
1988)—and on the other, keeping punishment within reasonable limits as a basic consideration
of fairness: the principle of proportionality (Balmer, 2008; von Hirsch, 1992). I empirically test
this balance using a coca crop-reducing policy (aerial spraying) implemented in Colombia for
over a decade and test whether disproportional doses of punishment crowd out one of the main
legal alternative to coca crops, legal crops.
My main hypothesis is that severe punishment (disproportional punishment) may be perceived
as a violation of the principle of proportionality, changing the way people perceive the state’s
fairness, which could in turn lead to lower levels of general law compliance, captured by a
reduction in investments in legal crops. I study the channels that may lead to such a reduction:
First, legal crops could simply be destroyed when the herbicide is off-target; second, a high
spraying disproportionality could mean that many hectares that are not planted with coca are
sprayed discouraging farmers from planting legal crops in the future; third, the environment
could deteriorate and become unsuitable for agricultural activities; fourth, people are displaced
because of the spraying, reducing the rural labor needed for working with legal crops; and
fifth, legitimacy of the state is diminished and so are any efforts to cooperate and adhere to a
culture of legality by communities that experienced disproportionate spraying. I find that many
channels can be simultaneously at play and find support for the crop damage/ environmental
channel, as well as for the displacement and legitimacy channels.
I test these hypotheses with the use of four different data sources. The first one is a panel macro
dataset covering all coca growing regions of Colombia between 2007 and 2012 and three micro
data sources, the first one being a United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey
carried out in 2012 with coca growers in the Putumayo-Caqueta region, one of Colombia’s
traditional coca growing regions. The second dataset comes from a sample of beneficiaries
surveyed in 2012 for the evaluation of the Forest Warden Families (FWF) Program, Colombia’s
current biggest alternative development program, and the third is a coffee growers’ panel census
between 2007 and 2013 collected by the National Coffee Federation. These three samples
represent very different types of farmers; the first group has been heavily involved in coca
growing and highly exposed to spraying and manual eradication while the second group has
also been involved in coca growing or has been at high risk of getting involved with coca but
has received support from the state to voluntarily change coca for a legal crop. The third group
has focused on coffee and has been exposed to coca and coca crop spraying to a much lesser
degree than the first two. I find that high levels of spraying disproportionality reduce legal crops
but proportional spraying induces legal crops, and these results persist in the micro-datasets
despite huge differences between the three groups. Additional evidence points to the fact that
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this reduction is not due to legal crops being damaged by spraying, but to a conscious decision
of not planting legal crops after a spraying shock has occurred.
This is a novel study in two ways. It is to the best of my knowledge the first study to empiri-
cally test how a policy aimed at reducing an illegal behavior (illegal crops) generates positive
and negative externalities on a closely related legal behavior (legal crops) depending on the
proportionality of the punishment.1 Additionally, even though there are studies that capture
the efficiency (or inefficiency) of coca spraying in reducing coca crops (see studies mentioned
in Section 3), no study looks at the externalities that this policy has on legal crops, which are
the closest legal alternative available to coca for farmers. Thus, this paper contributes to bet-
ter understanding how the law and economic decisions are connected, and how public policies
might have both positive and negative externalities depending on their implementation.
This paper is divided into 7 sections. The next one mentions the general theoretical back-
ground around the balance between crime and punishment followed by a short description of
the Colombian context regarding coca and the aerial spraying policy. Section 4 describes the
data sets used and defines disproportionate spraying and spraying shocks, while section 5 sets
out the methodology for the analysis. Section 6 presents descriptive statistics and empirical
results, and explores possible channels involved in the reduction of legal crops as a result of
intensified spraying. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Crime and punishment theoretical background
The question of how severely a crime should be punished has been largely debated by legal
scholars and political scientists. The law has a deterring function by increasing the costs of
committing a crime, and an expressive function (Kahan 1997; Bohnet and Cooter, 2003; Cooter,
1998), that serves to educate the public by showing what is morally undesirable (Feldman,
2011). But, for the law to be effective in reducing criminal activity it needs to be perceived as
fair and appropriate for their institutions (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998) and just (Jackson et
al., 2012; Tyler, 2006; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Thoumi, 2009; Dahrendorf, 1980).
Severe punishment erodes law abiders’ disposition to obey and changes their moral assessment
of cooperation, as extreme punishment is sometimes seen as a tool to punish certain social
classes or minorities disproportionally (Kahan, 1997). This is in line with Jackson et al. (2012)
who mention that “the experience of procedural unfairness—including disrespectful treatment
and unfair decision making—erodes feelings of shared group membership and with the authority
concerned” (p.1053). Sheffrin and Triest (1991) also find that perceived inequities in the system
lead to lower compliance. Frey and Jegen (2001) mention that when people feel that the
authorities representing the law treat them respectfully and fairly, they comply more (see Tyler
1989, 1997 and 2006 for an extensive empirical evidence on fairness and compliance).
1Thoumi (2009) mentions that authoritarian regimes that exclude certain groups can end up incentivizing
crime, but he does not look at how legal counterparts are crowded out and does not develop any empirical
analysis.
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A basic consideration of fairness is the principle of proportionality (Balmer, 2008; von Hirsch,
1992). Balmer (2008) points out that this principle dates back to the Code of Hammurabi
and the old testament, where “an eye for an eye” sets the argument that the magnitude of the
punishment should be similar to that of the crime. Von Hirsch (1992) gives proportionality
a crucial role in the sanctioning theory, as it gives people a notion of justice and fairness.
According to this author, fairness would be accomplished by avoiding both extremes of severity
and leniency. The link between fairness and trust in the state has also been researched; post-
communist states have shown evidence that the single most important determinant of trust in
institutions was in fact how fair they were perceived by the citizens (Kluegel and Mason, 2004),
and in the US people are concerned about justice as much or even more than about outcomes
(Tyler et al., 1989). Regarding the reduction of coca supply in Colombia, Thoumi (2009)
mentions the need for a very intense spraying campaign in order to effectively get rid of coca
crops, but notes that it would be so disproportional and intense that it would violate democratic
principles. Hence, if disproportionate punishment is used, trust in the governing authorities is
negatively affected, endangering economic outcomes such as investments in productive activities
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). Disproportionate punishment could even be inefficient, as Kahan
(1997) argues that when punishment is applied with high-certainty but low severity it is more
likely to generate a low-crime equilibrium, in contrast with a low-certainty but high-severity
scenario. This high-severity vs. low-severity punishment underlies the coming analysis.
This theoretical background sets the stage for empirically testing the balance between, on the
one hand, raising legality by teaching people what is right and wrong (expressive function of
the law) as well as deterring others by increasing the costs of committing crimes (Becker, 1968),
and on the other, reducing compliance when citizens perceive the principle of proportionality
to be broken when punishment is extreme with respect to the crime.
The Colombian coca context and the spraying policy
Colombia has been a key player in illegal drug markets as one of the world’s largest producers
and exporters of cocaine (UNODC, 2014). A period of rapid coca growth in the 1990’s spurred
an ambitious plan to restrain illegal supply of drugs in Colombia, Plan Colombia. According
to Mejia et al. (2013), of all coca and cocaine-reducing policies implemented (aerial spraying,
manual eradication, control of chemical precursors, detection and destruction of laboratories
and seizures) aerial spraying was by far the most important. In fact, Mejia and Restrepo
(2013) use data from the U.S. General Accountability Office and mention that out of the yearly
U.S. disbursements of around US $593 million per year between 2000 and 2008, 69% went to
eradication programs, without taking into account the initial US$800 million that was disbursed
in 2008 that also went to anti-narcotic programs.
As described by Mejia et al. (2013) aerial spraying is carried out mainly by US contractor planes
who spray mainly Round Up® herbicide on coca fields. The main component of this herbicide
is glyphosate and it includes other ingredients that help it penetrate the plant and destroy it.
Since it is a herbicide, it equally affects coca crops and all other non-genetically modified crops.
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The herbicide is absorbed by the plant’s foliage and thus is only effective in growing plants.
Conversations with authorities and other experts underline the difficulty of spraying only above
coca crops; strong winds and the necessity to spray from higher than recommended heights to
reduce the risk of being shot down increase the probability of the herbicide hitting other crops.
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of coca crops and the two main stick policies that have been used
in the last eleven years up to 2012, mainly aerial spraying and manual eradication. However,
the figure shows that even though there is a downward trend in crops, it still does not show
a decisive trend towards a zero coca scenario and it is not correlated with eradication efforts.
In fact, the UNODC 2014 Colombia drug census finds many areas where coca has fallen in the
absence of spraying.2 It is also important to note that hectares sprayed are always higher than
the end of the year reported coca hectares. This is due first to technical reasons, whereby a
plant is completely killed after being sprayed four times (there are on average four coca harvests
in a year, and each spraying makes sure none of these harvests succeed) and also because some
farmers react to the policy by replanting and protecting coca plants from chemical spraying
damage.3 The fight between protecting the coca bush or replanting it vs. the efforts deployed
by the state to destroy it, is at the heart of this discussion.
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Source: UNODC 2012
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Despite such great efforts, many consider the war on drugs to have failed and to have caused
“devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world” (Global Commission
2An additional point is that even though coca is decreasing, other forms of illegality are increasing, such as
illegal gold mining (Idrobo et al., 2014). Thus, achieving reductions in one form of illegality while another one
emerges leaves a big question mark on the effectiveness of coercive policies seeking to reduce overall illegality.
3Such as washing coca bushes with water after spraying, covering them with a molasses coating or “pruning”
them, an operation where, as described by Mejia and Posada (2008), farmers cut the top of the coca bush and,
since the only part of the plant that is attacked is the leaves, they are able to harvest it one month later.
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on Drug Policy GCDP, 2011, p. 4). This conclusion also stems from the increasing amount of
academic research around the effectiveness of coca-reducing policies. Mejia et al. (2013) use
diplomatic friction with Ecuador as an exogenous variation for spraying in the Southern border
of the country, and find small but significant effects of spraying on coca crop reduction. However,
they can not control for the so called “balloon effect” of migration of crops to other areas and
thus state their result as an upper bound. Reyes (2011) uses an instrumental variables approach
to estimate the effect of spraying on coca crops, finding spraying not only to be ineffective but
also generating an increase in coca crops. Moreno-Sánchez et al. (2003) find that spraying is
ineffective as it leads farmers to crop coca in a more extensive way. Ibanez (2013) uses a unique
micro dataset and finds that even though eradication reduces coca, the elasticity of supply of
these policies is low. Out of all the municipalities in Colombia, 28% have grown coca at least
one year with a persistent character and 52% of coca growing municipalities have done it for
10 years or more, despite state control.
Other studies tackle the negative side effects of this policy on the population. Rozo (2013)
finds that even though spraying decreases illegal coca crops, the socioeconomic conditions of
the population deteriorate and that effects on poverty and health persist even after two years.
Camacho and Mejia (2013) study the externalities of spraying on human health and find nega-
tive effects reflected in dermatological problems and increased abortions. Additional side effects
have been found on other spheres: coca spraying undermines trust in the state and in political
institutions (Garcia, 2011), erodes community strategies to control coca farming by other com-
munity members (Chapter 4) and relates to higher levels of generalized dishonesty (Chapter
2).
So far, none of the models developed to analyze coca growing decisions and effectiveness of coca-
reducing policies take into account the possibility of a non-linear relationship between severity
of punishment and the decision to switch to legal crops. Reyes (2011) assumes that farmers
diversify their crop portfolio and increase other crops when the risks associated with coca are
too high and Clemens (2008) uses legal crops as the alternative counterpart for opium in his
theoretical model of crop farming. Chumacero (2008) develops a general equilibrium model for
production, trafficking and consumption of illegal goods which introduces government actions
to counteract illegal drugs both through increasing risks or increasing punishment, but here
legal crops are modeled to always increase when coca is reduced by any governmental policy.
Bogliciano and Naranjo (2012) also develop a general equilibrium model and even touch on legal
production, but in both cases the authors assume that the reasoning behind choosing coca over
a legal crop depends merely on risk and relative profits.
Some studies go beyond the analysis of risk and relative profit and find evidence that non-
economic and moral aspects shape illegal behavior (Ibanez and Carlsson, 2010; Ibanez and
Martinsson, 2013; Chapter 3; Chapter 4), but they all assume the choice of the legal crop to
be affected by drug-reducing policies only indirectly through their effect on coca, and assume
coca and legal crops to be pure substitutes. Dube and Vargas (2013) study the effect of price
shocks on civil conflict and rule out that coca cultivation increases after a fall in coffee prices,
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strengthening the idea that legal and illegal crops do not necessarily substitute each other. Until
now there is no evidence that farmers do in fact turn to legal crops when risk of punishment
is high, nor that the decision to plant legal crops also depends on the disproportionality of
the “stick” policies directed at illegal crops. This study also contributes to the literature by
expanding our knowledge on additional side effects caused by coca spraying and by giving an
empirical example of how disproportional punishment back-fires.
This study takes place amid a regional debate on the effectiveness of drug policies. Never before
had the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) granted a hearing regarding
the impact of drug policy on human rights, and it happened in March 2014. Bolivia decided to
change its constitution to allow traditional coca use within its territory and Uruguay became
the first country to adopt a legal and regulated cannabis market. The need for debate is such,
that there will be a UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 2016, with
drug policy at center stage and the world’s leaders as discussants. Objective evidence of the




This study draws on two different strands of data; one that focuses on legal crops and another
that covers coca crops, spraying efforts and other conflict-related data in Colombia. I use
aggregate and micro data to tackle both.
Data on annual coca hectares come from the UNODC-SIMCI office in Colombia. They take
satellite pictures on a yearly basis and divide the country in grids of 1km x 1km, which they
then aggregate at a municipal level. The amount of coca hectares reported for a given year
is what is captured in the picture as of December 31, making it a “net” measurement of coca
hectares at the end of the year, after coca growing, coca harvesting, manual eradication, aerial
spraying and replanting took place.
Aerial spraying is the responsibility of the drug enforcement police. The decision on where and
how much to spray is made based on the SIMCI coca figures, but field observation (such as
flights over regions with a coca history or where coca was spotted by satellite pictures) is also
used to capture coca dynamics. I use the spraying data that the anti narcotics police reports
to UNODC-SIMCI for the 2001-2011 period. It was impossible to have access to spraying
information from the 1km by 1km grid, and for this reason I use the municipal levels for both
coca and spraying.
Information on legal crops at a municipal level comes from the Ministry of Agriculture’s annual
agricultural evaluations (EVA) dating all the way back to 1970, but I will focus on the 2007-2012
period, since these are the years in which revised data exists. These agricultural evaluations
cover 1.122 municipalities (nationwide) and most agricultural products, and collect information
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on the hectares planted and harvested, as well as on production. I will focus on harvested areas
as they are the most comparable among products and will only work with crops and not with
forestry or livestock. This information comes annually from a consensus among local experts,
authorities and producer associations, whom, based on their on-field knowledge assess the
amounts planted, harvested and produced of each type of product. They collect information on
transitory products on a half-year basis, and permanent products on an annual basis.4 Even
though each municipality has its own experts (since they have to be local and know the area
very well), there are standardized data collection forms and rules on the way information should
be collected and processed in order to ensure comparability. This allows me to work with a
5-year highly balanced panel dataset that enables the use of fixed effects at a municipality level.
I focus my analysis only on areas that have had coca at least once since 2001 since it is also
here where the spraying policy is applied. Coca growing areas (and consequently areas where
spraying takes place) are not comparable with regions where coca has never been grown,5 since
people can choose to move to areas where coca is grown, possibly due to lower levels of state
presence, easier access to land, or a higher degree of tolerance to the presence of illegal actors,
among other reasons. With this in mind I end up with 112 municipalities that have had coca
at least once, have been sprayed and have information on legal crops. This means that results
here are not representative of the whole country, but only to coca growing regions. Since it is
in these regions where the policy is applied, it is the relevant area of interest. Moreover, these
results are interesting even if they do not speak about the whole country, as understanding how
law enforcement is perceived in illegality-prone areas is key to curbing crime where it abounds.
I use additional secondary information to characterize municipalities in terms of their expo-
sure to armed conflict, and to other variables that can be relevant for agricultural production.
Conflict-related variables such as displacement, homicides, combats and attacks come from
Colombia’s President Office’s Observatory of Human Rights. I include a security threat in-
dex built by the Ministry of Defense, that classifies municipalities in low-middle-high threat,
based on presence of armed groups, combats, homicides, land-mines, and other conflict-related
variables, and also use their information on presence of illegal armed groups (number of com-
batants). This threat-index then classifies municipalities in three groups, red, yellow and green,
from highest to lowest threat. The information regarding population size, population density
and other population variables, as well as the distance of each municipality to a productive ag-
glomeration and land prices comes from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Registrar General’s
4It could be argued that this way of capturing the data is not the best, as each municipality has its
own set of experts that in the end decide the amount of agricultural activity in each municipality. How-
ever, this is the most disaggregated source of information that there is and the most comprehensive of the
country. More information on how the EVAs are collected by the Ministry of Agriculture can be found here:
http://www.agronet.gov.co/agronetweb1/Estad%C3%ADsticas.aspx
5For instance, according to official figures, coca growing areas have 23% less electricity coverage than their
counterparts, have 185% more forest cover, are 50% less densely populated in rural areas, are 67% farther
away from urban clusters, have a 10% lower fiscal performance, were 13% poorer in 2005 as measured by a
multidimensional poverty index than their rural non-coca counterparts, depend 10% more on income transfers
from the capital, have a forced displacement intensity 302% higher than non-coca areas, have 52% less roads
per squared kilometer, have 3 times more the amount of landmine victims, 3.35 more armed actions and 5 times
more combats than non-coca areas, have 444% more FARC presence, 3 times more massacres and a 46% higher
homicide rate than their counterparts.
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Office. I control for institutional quality by including a fiscal performance index calculated by
the government of Colombia that indicates better use of public resources as the index takes on
higher values.
In order to have a micro look on how individuals change their productive decisions when faced
with a macro coca-reducing policy I employ three very different datasets of farmers that are
exposed to various levels of coca growing and spraying, as shown in the results section. The
three samples are described below.
The first group comes from a survey carried out by UNODC-SIMCI with 239 coca growers in the
Putumayo-Caqueta region in Colombia in 2012, in order to estimate the economic structure of
the farms in terms of income, costs and profitability, in areas under the influence of coca crops.
This region has been highly exposed to coca growing but has limited state support to replace
it with legal crops, and is also an area where coca has traditionally been grown and remains as
one of the largest coca producing regions. The survey selection process is as follows: UNODC
has satellite pictures of 1km x 1km grids, and based on them performs a randomized selection of
grids in two steps. First, a 1km x 1km grid is selected and then, within the grid, conglomerates
of two coca farms and two non-coca farms are randomly chosen. Enumerators then go to the
field and look for the farms that appeared in the satellite pictures. This survey is particularly
useful because it offers accurate data on both coca crops and legal crops by individual farmers,
which allows me to use coca involvement information on an individual basis. It also asks farmers
whether their coca crops were damaged by aerial spraying in the past. Thanks to an academic
agreement with UNODC, I was able to introduce a set of questions in this survey, addressing
the issue of state legitimacy by asking people to rank the quality of public utilities and express
their trust in the government’s capacity to solve some problems that are the responsibility of
the state. This allows me to capture if coca spraying shocks reduce state legitimacy, one of the
proposed channels.
The second group comes from a survey conducted in 2012 by Econometria Consultores for the
evaluation of the Forest Warden Families, the current biggest alternative development program
in Colombia. The survey includes 1236 program beneficiaries (who were beneficiaries at the
time of the survey), randomly selected from the seventh wave of the Program,6 and stratified by
municipality. This group is interesting as it allows me to study to what extent punitive measures
—once state support is received— continue to influence the decision to grow legal crops. This
group is different in the sense that they have also been exposed to high levels of coca growing,
but have received the Forest Warden Families Program, which has provided them with money,
workshops and technical assistance in order to replace coca with legal products. The survey is
very comprehensive and includes household information for all household members, as well as
6This was the baseline for an impact evaluation, where also 1210 neighboring controls and 1264 distant
controls were surveyed. The FWF Program built a targeting index for all municipalities in the country based
on observables that define the priority of treating communities within that municipality. Because of resource
constraints the program has been rolled-out since 2006 and in fact, since the evaluation and early 2014, 18%
of the distant control municipalities have been treated. Distant controls were chosen based on this index and
matched with the treatments to find the most similar municipalities. However, I focus only on the beneficiary
group, as I am interested in the behavior of famers that are receiving support to stop growing coca, and although
I also look at the behavior of distant controls, I do not emphasize the differences between both groups.
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productive information for all land plots in terms of products grown, amount of land used for
their production, etc. Even though the survey asks about individual involvement with coca,
not many people answered and responses might also be underestimated, rendering the use of
aggregate coca growing measures as advisable.
The third group is a subsample of coffee growers from the Coffee Information System (SICA
for its acronym in Spanish) from 2007 to 2013. This dataset is a census and has information
on every coffee plot in this period and each plot can be attributed to an individual farmer. It
collects information on total plot area, area planted with coffee, the coffee variety used, and the
age of the coffee crops, among other variables. This dataset is then merged with information on
the type of assistance coffee growers have received from the National Coffee Federation (NCF).
From 2009 onwards I am also able to go beyond the area dedicated to coffee and use coffee
production per plot; this variable comes from a NCF algorithm based on the coffee variety, crop
age, and plot density which determines production on the basis of these characteristics. As I
mentioned before, I only focus on regions that have grown coca in at least one point in time,
so I take a subsample that covers coffee growers living in areas that have grown coca crops
at least once. This leaves me with a panel dataset of 6 periods for 155.278 coffee farmers in
111 municipalities. However, as will be seen in the results section, the levels of coca in coffee
growing regions are particularly low when compared to the rest of the coca growing areas in
the country, making this group interesting to study, since it allows testing my hypothesis that
disproportionate punishment can crowd out investments in legal crops also in places that have
better access to markets and where legal crops are more likely to prosper.
Table 1.1: Description of data sources




Panel: 2007-2012 (legal crops)
UNODC Household Cross-section 2012 239 coca farmers
Forest Warden Families Household Cross-section 2012 1,236 beneficiaries
Coffee growers Farm/Household Panel: 2007-2012 155,278 farmers
Note: In all cases I only use municipalities that have had coca at least once in the available time series
One last point regarding data is that the micro data mentioned has information regarding
productive choices (area allocated to legal products in the case of UNODC and FWF, and
production in the case of coffee growers), but no information on spraying or spraying dispro-
portionality. Only in the case of the UNODC sample I am able to use self-reported involvement
in coca as a control variable, but for the other two I need to use aggregate coca growing levels
on a municipality basis. This means that I will analyze how a macro policy affects individual
decisions. Even though I do not have spraying information available at an individual level, the
way in which the policy is implemented implies that aggregate spraying levels are appropriate
to explain individual investment decisions: first, people can see the planes. Even if they are
not flying right above them, they can easily sense that neighboring plots are being sprayed and
see how many times the plane flies over the same areas. Second, even if they miss the plane,
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the spraying is discussed with neighbors and other farmers on market days or other gatherings.
Third, given the threats facing spraying aircraft, the spraying passes are released above the
recommended height, which reduces the pilot’s capacity to spray only designated areas, and
increases the chances that winds will carry glyphosate to non-intended sites. Ibanez (2013)
uses a similar strategy to circumvent the endogeneity of aggregate eradication on coca-growing
decisions and argues that policies can be treated as exogenous when individual household data
are available, as the decision of one farmer is marginal and does not increase the probability
of being targeted by eradication. Thus, having individual data respond to aggregate levels of
spraying seems to be a plausible solution for tackling endogeneity.
Definitions
This paper studies the effect of spraying disproportionality rather than spraying per se on legal
crops. I define disproportionate spraying as the ratio between spraying in year t and coca
reported by SIMCI in year t − 1, namely SprayingDisproport =SprayingtCocat−1 .
7 Since spraying
decisions are made based on the previous year’s reported coca hectares, it makes sense to use
it as a denominator. When looking at the descriptive statistics it is also clear that spraying
follows coca hectares with a lag of one year, especially in the years with high coca growing
levels.
I also use a dichotomous definition of disproportionality and call it a spraying shock, which
I define as 1 for all those that are above the mean of the spraying disproportionality and 0
for those that are at the mean or below. The main reasons behind choosing the mean are:
first, when looking at the macro data the median of spraying disproportionality is 1.4, whereas
the mean is almost three times higher. Those above the mean comprise 22% of the sample,
so choosing an ever higher threshold would leave a very small amount of observations in this
group. Additionally, the mean falls around 4, which coincides with the amount of times the
authorities say they need to spray one field in order to really kill the plant. Therefore, those
above the mean are also above the “necessary” amount of spraying for effective coca eradication.
SprayShock =
1 SprayInti > SprayInt0 SprayInti <= SprayInt
The purpose of this study is to test the effect of spraying disproportionality and spraying shocks
on legal crops. I do this with the four groups described in the data section, of which two have a
panel structure and two a cross-sectional structure. In the standard and most common models
of crime more punishment leads to less crime, and the criminal activity is replaced with the
legal activity using a linear relationship. However, my hypothesis is that punishment has an
upper limit that backfires when it is exceeded, or in legal terms, when the punishment ceases
7Low levels of this ratio, in particular those between one and four could be interpreted as proportional. The
point of the name is to show that I am not focusing on spraying per se but on how spraying relates to coca.
Even though higher disproportionality levels would also imply higher probability of being eradicated (risk),
disproportionality cannot be interpreted as such, since the probability of eradication cannot be higher than one.
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to be proportional to the crime. I test this by including a squared-term for the ratio between
the punishment and the crime (disproportionality).
The rationale behind using spraying disproportionality rather than spraying levels is twofold:
first, it captures the disproportion between a punishment and a crime, which is what I argue
leads to a loss of legitimacy, and ultimately to a disregard for legality, as Tyler’s arguments
would predict. Second, spraying follows coca and it is very hard to disentangle the effect of
coca (and subsequently spraying) on legal crops. There is evidence that coca is highly related
with violence and armed conflict (Thoumi, 2009; Diaz and Sanchez, 2004; García, 2011) and
that the armed conflict has a negative impact on agriculture (Arias et al., 2014; Ibanez et al.,
2013; Vasquez, 2010), which makes the identification of the impact of spraying on agriculture
hard to pin down. However, disproportionate spraying captures another dimension that is not
driven by the presence of coca nor is it related to conflict per se, as shown in the results section,
opening the possibility to pin down the effect of a spraying policy’s disproportionate use on
legal crops.
I argue that the effects of spraying disproportionality on legal crops can be interpreted as
causal. First, spraying decisions follow the presence of coca crops and do not take legal crops
into account. In fact, the pairwise correlation between the lag of legal crops and spraying
disproportionality is negligible (0.03) and statistically insignificant at standard significance
levels, making reverse causality unlikely. However, since legal crops could be substituted by coca
(and vice versa) depending on the relative profits and risk of being caught, some endogeneity
could be introduced. In order to correct for this I use spraying disproportionality, which, as
will be seen in the results section, does not follow coca presence. Second, in the two panel
datasets I am able to use a fixed effects model that takes away time-invariant unobservables
that might affect the decision to plant legal crops. Worrisome unobservables such as a region’s
soil quality, altitude, geographic location, overall institutional presence (which changes very
slowly over time) and unobservable characteristics that attract people to coca growing areas
are accounted for. Third, I restrict my analysis to areas that have seen a coca field at least
once in the available years, as mentioned above. Areas where coca has never been grown are
structurally different and at first sight incomparable with areas with coca. Therefore, if I only
focus on coca regions, these unobserved differences that make coca growing possible in some
areas are equal for all municipalities in the analysis, and are differenced out.8 Fourth, I exploit
lags in the panel models and, as a result, can test whether any spraying disproportionality
experienced in the past affects current legal crops. Fifth, in addition to macro crop data I use
micro sources of data with individual production decisions, which do not determine policy but
on the contrary, potentially adapt to it. The use of three very different groups of people to
test the effect is in itself a robustness test, and further reduces any potential bias in the sense
8As a robustness check I estimated a Heckman selection model and used the inverted mills ratio as an
independent variable in macro data models to control for self-selection and the results remain the same. I
estimated one Heckman model per year to ensure that the mills ratio did not disappear with the fixed effects.
The inverted mills ratio is not significant in any of the specifications. I do not use this specification as the
main result as the inverted mills ratio is highly correlated with some explanatory variables creating potential
multicollinearity problems.
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that individual responses to policy exposure are exogenous. Sixth, I have a rich set of control
variables that control for the driving factors behind the decisions to work with legal crops.
I run all specifications in two versions, one with the continuous disproportionate spraying as the
explanatory variable, and one with the spraying shock as the independent variable of interest.
The first captures how small changes in proportionality affect legal crops and the introduction
of the squared term allows me to estimate possible turning points. The shock captures the effect
of simply having been exposed to higher spraying as necessary. The aggregate data and coffee
grower census employ a fixed effects approach and exploit lags in spraying disproportionality
and shocks, whereas the UNODC and FWF samples are cross-sections. I present the models
used for each group below.
Panel Data Specification
I will describe the general specification for the aggregate macro information and then will
explain how this same set up is used for each micro sample. As mentioned, I have five year
panel data with aggregated data on both spraying disproportionality and legal crops and I use
the following fixed effects model to capture the effect of the former on the latter:
Yit = α+ β1Iit + β2I
2
it + β3Iit−1 + β4I
2
it−1 + β5Iit−2 + β6I
2
it−2 + β7Xit + ηt + µi + εit (1)
where Yit represents the harvested legal crop hectares,9 expressed as natural logarithm for ease
of interpretation in municipality i in year t.10 Iit and I2it are the linear and squared terms of
spraying disproportionality as defined above. I include two lags of disproportionate spraying to
capture the persistence of the effect or the moment when the effect emerges. It could be possible
that people planted their crops at the beginning of the year and experienced spraying later on
and thus did not react immediately. Xit captures time-varying municipal control variables
that should be present in an agriculture output model such as rural and urban population
densities, percentage of rural population in municipality, land prices and institutional quality.
In this vector I also include lagged coca crops and the lagged change in coca crops, also in
natural logarithms.11 Variables such as distance to markets, size of the municipality, area
devoted to national parks, altitude and soil quality are time invariant and thus fall out with
the municipality fixed effects. ηt and µi are time and municipality fixed effects respectively,
and εit is the error term, clustered at the municipality level.
When the spraying shock is used instead of spraying disproportionality the empirical specifica-
tion looks like Equation 2, where Sit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when there
9As a robustness check I also run the same model with the amount of hectares planted as the dependent
variable.
10All the municipalities in the dataset report a value of harvested crops greater than zero, so no observations
are lost when using the natural logarithm.
11The control variables are chosen following agricultural economics production functions, where urban pop-
ulation represents the demand for agricultural products, the rural population density and percentage of rural
population capture the labor supply for agricultural goods and land prices represent the value of the land, a
key production factor in the rural sector. I also include institutional quality as it has been extensively shown to
matter in growth and production models. This variable comes from the National Planning Department, which
has created an institutional quality indicator that takes into account how they manage their finances, savings
and other aspects related to fiscal performance. A small constant is added to coca crops so that the zeroes are
not lost when using the natural logarithm.
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is a spraying shock. As in Equation 1 it is also lagged two periods. These dummy variables cap-
ture spraying disproportionality, after controlling for Ait, the natural logarithm of spraying.12
Y it remains the same, as well as Xit, the fixed effects and the error term.
Yit = α+ β1Sit + β2Sit−1 + β3Sit−2 + β4Ait + β5Ait−1 + β6Ait−2 + β7Xit + ηt + µi + εit (2)
The coffee growers’ subgroup uses the panel specification as Equations 1 and 2. The main change
is that the dependent variable is not areas with coffee but coffee production and productivity
measured as the number of 60kg bags of coffee produced and bags per hectare. This is a much
better indicator of agricultural output which can only be captured with a homogeneous product
like coffee. Control variables include individual plot characteristics such as the area dedicated
to coffee, the coffee variety, the number of farms used for production, the age of the crop,
whether the coffee has been replanted or newly planted, the coffee crop density, and the coffee
growers-rural population ratio in the municipality. I also add individual and time fixed effects
and additionally cluster standard errors at the municipal level.
Cross-Section Specification
The cross section specifications are similar to Equations 1 and 2, but drop the individual fixed
effects and do not use additional lags. The FWF sample is a cross-section collected in 2012.
I use disproportionate spraying in 2011 and the total spraying shocks between 2001 and 2011
as treatment variables for the disproportionality and shock specifications respectively. I use
survey weights for expansion, which are stratified at the municipal level and thus take care of
the intra-municipal correlation. I make sure that the rest of the control variables are at an
individual level so that the only variables at the municipal level are the treatment variables. I
also control for municipal coca levels in 2006, before the Program started. The control variables
included are per capita expenditure per month, perceived land quality, percentage of land with
a title, gender and age of the household head, time spent in the same community, participation
in productive associations, a morality index built to capture culture of legality and moral
perception of coca.13
The UNODC sample is also a cross-section collected in 2012. For the spraying disproportionality
I use the average of the whole period (2001-2011). Unlike FWF which has a national coverage,
this sample is geographically concentrated and using the average spraying disproportionality
captures a better picture than using its value in 2011, which dropped vis-à-vis 2010 and previous
years in this region. The shocks are also captured by the sum of shocks between 2001 and 2011.
Since this survey focused on coca production, I have detailed information on self-reported coca
crops, which gives me the possibility to control for coca at an individual level (I control for
the amount of years each farmer has cultivated coca and for their involvement with processing
12Spraying is included with the caveats above mentioned in mind. The main variable of interest is the shock,
but spraying levels must be controlled for. Once the shock is included, spraying levels play a similar role as
the linear term of the (dis)proportionality variable in the continuos case, and thus can be seen as a robustness
check for the results obtained from the latter. A small constant is added to spaying so that the zeroes are not
lost when using the natural logarithm.
13The questionnaire included a set of questions that asked about people’s justifications for doing immoral
activities such as stealing electricity, not paying for public transportation, among others, and also about their
justifications for working with coca. These questions are combined to form a morality index.
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coca leaves into coca paste or coca base), which is an advantage compared to the other two
micro datasets. I can also control for whether their own crops have been affected by spraying.
Additional controls are age and sex of household heads, holding a title over their land, the self
reported quality of public utilities, trust in authorities, total disposable land and years living
in the farm. Errors are clustered at the municipal level.
Hypotheses
My hypotheses can be formulated in terms of expected coefficients. First, I expect the coefficient
associated with the linear term of spraying disproportionality to be positive (as should be the
coefficient accompanying spraying in Eq. 2). This should capture the commonly assumed
relationship between spraying and coca, whereby increased punishment should induce farmers
to opt out of coca and invest in legal crops. However, I expect this positive relationship to
have an upper limit, and presume the squared term (or the shock variable in Eq. 2) to have
a negative coefficient and reduce the area planted with legal crops, as it captures severe and
disproportionate punishment. Second, the coefficient related to coca could go in two directions.
It could be negative if there is a substitution effect between coca crops and legal crops, especially
if production factors such as labor and land are scarce and fixed; in this case, more coca would
imply less legal crops (negative coefficient). It could be positive if there is resource abundance
or if coca is being closely camouflaged with legal crops in order to avoid detection (planting coca
under banana trees so that the foliage covers the coca plants in the aerial satellite pictures).
The coefficient on spraying in the shock specification should be positive; once the shock is
controlled for, spraying should induce a switch from illegal to legal crops.
Results and discussion
My empirical strategy is set out as follows. First I present a general description of the mu-
nicipalities and the farmers surveyed, followed by descriptive results on spraying, spraying
disproportionality and coca levels and show that at a first sight spraying disproportionality
does not follow coca. I then strengthen these results with a fixed effects model that stresses the
lack of positive correlation between coca and spraying disproportionality. With this evidence
I continue with testing the relationship between spraying disproportionality and legal crops in
the four samples, starting with the aggregate macro data followed by the micro data samples,
ordered from highest spraying disproportionality (UNODC) to lowest (coffee growers).
Characteristics of municipalities and surveyed farmers
Coca-growing municipalities are also legal crop producers. The top ten crops are corn, plantain,
cassava, beans, rice, cocoa, sugar cane, coffee, tomatoes and avocado; these are the same in
non-coca growing municipalities, except that in the latter cold-weather crops such as potatoes
enter the list. In the majority of coca-growing municipalities legal crops account for most of
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the agricultural production; only in 6 municipalities14 the area dedicated to coca is larger than
the area dedicated to legal crops, in the rest, the average area dedicated to coca amounts to
3% of the area used for legal crops. Around 31% of the rural population lives in coca-growing
municipalities, and according to UNODC (2013) 61,700 households are directly involved with
coca. In 2013 coca production amounted to 3% of the agricultural GDP (UNODC, 2014). Table
1.2 presents descriptive statistics of the main independent variables used in the models for coca
growing municipalities.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of coca growing municipalities
mean sd min max
Coca hectares 425.05 1000.80 0 14606
Sprayed hectares 1510.66 2704.42 0 29416
Cultivated area (ha) 32457.84 55398.99 1 696975
Spraying disproportionality 3.73 14.23 0 306
Threat Yellow Zone 0.33 0.47 0 1
Threat Red Zone 0.46 0.50 0 1
Distance to Urban Center (km) 69.72 65.64 0 397
Fiscal Performance Index 58.85 9.31 0 87
Urban Population 14185.78 50945.82 0 615795
Rural Population 11667.85 9540.34 0 85386
Population density in rural area 19.84 30.53 0 357
Num. Armed Actions 1.19 3.18 0 46
Num. FARC 21.08 59.76 0 948
Num. ELN 4.47 11.42 0 115
Num. BACRIM 5.32 15.08 0 144
Num. Combats 3.85 9.61 0 119
Num. Landmines 3.05 8.21 0 111
A description of these variables and their sources can be found in the Appendix
The farmers in the UNODC sample are the most exposed to coca as can be seen in Figure
1.5, and for 58% of the sample, growing coca is their main economic activity. The majority
are male (85%) and most (75%) only have primary education or no education at all. As is the
case in many coca growing areas, half of the sample was born in a different place and migrated
to the region on average 22 years before, which coincides with the initial growth of coca in
these areas around the 80’s. Only 30% have titles over their land. Before migrating, 50% were
farmers, and 60% said they had migrated due to poverty or unemployment, but only 5.5% were
already working with illegal crops. These farmers are still exposed to poor living conditions:
only 3% have access to drinking water and 13.5% to electricity, and even though there are
health facilities, schools and roads in the majority of places, farmers perceive them as very low
quality. The average size of their farm is 13 hectares, but only 1.6 hectares are cultivated with
either permanent or transitory crops.
14These municipalities are situated in the departments of Amazonas, Cauca and Vichada. Amazonas and
Vichada are in or close to the amazon rainforest, which is for environmental reasons not under large-scale
agricultural exploitation. Cauca has become an important coca cultivation hotspot recently.
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The Forest Warden Families have been on average exposed to smaller coca quantities in their
regions, but are also a marginalized population. Most of them (82%) live in dispersed rural
areas, 56% reach their farm through a gravel path, 32% through a gravel road, 10% through a
river, and only 2% access it through a paved road. Only 43% live above poverty15 and 82% have
primary schooling or less. They have also been exposed to high levels of violence, with 26%
of the sample reporting having experienced a violent calamity. The FWF farmers follow the
same productive pattern observed for the aggregate data: 33% grow transitory crops, 18% grow
plantain, 12% grow coffee and 8.6% grow cocoa, and 76% of the households use part of these
crops to feed their family. As is the case for the UNODC sample, only 30% hold a title over
their land. The median FWF farm has two hectares, with one hectare dedicated to productive
activities.
Even though the coffee growers’ census does not collect socioeconomic data on the farmers, it
can be merged with the SISBEN dataset, which collects the socioeconomic information in order
to target beneficiaries for social programs, allowing me to characterize these farmers. Although
this is the population with the least exposure to coca crops and spraying, coffee farmers in
municipalities where coca has been grown are also marginalized, as 91.8% are poor, according
to the ICV. Earnings amount to approximately USD 49 per month and they have studied 3.1
years on average. Farms measure 6.5 hectares, but only 1.2 hectares are actually used to grow
coffee. As in the other two samples, only 29% have a title over their land.
Descriptive evidence
Figure 1.2 shows coca, spraying and spraying disproportionality levels between 2001 and 2011.
Some things are interesting to note from this Figure: spraying follows coca in the expected way
but spraying disproportionality and spraying shocks seem to follow a completely different logic;
they increase until 2007 even though both coca and spraying were decreasing, and they do not
seem to follow coca patterns. Spraying disproportionality and spraying shocks increase until
2007 when they reach a maximum, and decrease thereon, with the exception of 2010. Figure 1.3
shows the geographical distribution of coca, spraying and spraying disproportionality in 2007,
where it is seen that the areas with highest coca hectares coincide with the areas of spraying
but less so with areas with high disproportionality.
15Measured by the ICV, the livelihoods index, a multi-poverty index constructed by the National Planning
Department whose components where asked in the survey.
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Now I turn to legal crops and look at their patterns for all municipalities that have grown coca
at least once, and divide them between those who experience a shock and those who do not.
Figure 1.4 shows that those that experience a shock have on average less legal crops than those
that do not. It is interesting to note that the big fall in legal crop harvested areas in 2009 for
those who experienced a shock followed the year of highest spraying disproportionality. Even
though both groups were decreasing their legal crop areas, those who were exposed to a shock
showed a much steeper decrease than those that were not. It is also quite interesting to note that
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as spraying disproportionality decreases, crops recover for both groups, but it is especially those
exposed to shocks that bounce back remarkably fast. Without claiming causality, this suggests
that increases (decreases) in spraying disproportionality have quite an important lagged effect
on legal crops, especially for those municipalities that have been exposed to spraying shocks.
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Legal Crop Hectares and Disproportionate Spraying by Spraying Shock
As mentioned in the data section, the three micro samples are quite different and this also
shows in the levels of coca, spraying and spraying disproportionality they have been exposed
to. As expected, the UNODC sample has the highest exposure to coca and spraying, because it
surveys farmers that live in the Putumayo-Caqueta region, a historical coca growing area. The
Forest Warden Families sample follows a similar pattern to that of UNODC, but of a smaller
magnitude. The FWF includes coca growing regions and regions at high risk of having coca,
while also focusing on areas that have been recovered by the state in recent years, which explains
the divergence in coca trends with regards to the UNODC sample in the last year. Spraying
disproportionality has also been highest among UNODC and FWF samples. As expected, coffee
growers in municipalities where coca has been grown show lower exposure to coca, spraying
and disproportionality than farmers in the UNODC and FWF samples. These three samples
offer great richness in the analysis, as I can check how farmers’ productive decisions react to
disproportionate spraying in three different environment-related scenarios: very high exposure,
medium-high exposure and low exposure.
25

















































Mean Spraying Disprop. by Sample
Empirical results: macro data
Determinants of spraying, spraying disproportionality and spraying shocks
I first start with exploring the determinants of spraying and spraying shocks. Table 1.3 presents
three regressions: the first column explains spraying, the second spraying disproportionality and
the third spraying shocks, all of them using a fixed effects panel data model for all municipalities
with coca production at some point between 2002 and 2011.16 I follow Reyes’ (2011) logic that
spraying happens within distances where spraying planes can be protected from being shot
down.17 This means that spraying should be highest around urban centers where the state
has more control and low where there is significant presence of illegal armed groups or where
the threat to security is highest (all of these are also correlated with distance up to a certain
extent). I use other variables following Bogliciano and Naranjo (2012) such as coca production,
crime rate and displacement (See Appendix for definitions).
I find that spraying is higher in places where the threat to the state18 is medium and high
(yellow and red zones). In order to be able to include the distance to urban cities in a fixed
effects model, I interact it with the threat to the state index and find that spraying increases
with the distance to an urban center for both yellow and red zones, but decreases when this
distance becomes too large (squared term). Although spraying decisions are made based on
previous year’s coca, I include the lagged change in coca crops and the area cultivated with
16A table with the marginal effects of all the variables included in the regressions can be found in the appendix.
17Reyes uses distance to military bases instead of distance to cities. However, I find that distance to the
closest urban cluster (not necessarily the closest city, but the closest agglomeration as defined by the City System
Mission) has a similar effect to that found in Reyes’ (2011) first stage.
18See Appendix for definition of threat to the state index and its categories.
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coca with a two years lag, in order to avoid problems when estimating the regressions with
spraying disproportionality and spraying shock, where coca in t-1 is the denominator. As was
also seen in the descriptive statistics, an increase in coca crops in the previous year increases
spraying, as expected.19 Increased presence of illegal armed groups FARC, ELN and criminal
groups (BACRIM) also reduces spraying levels. Where combats are not so high spraying is high,
meaning perhaps that where combats are taking place the state is present, trying to recover
its territory from the illegal armed groups. As a result spraying aircraft may be protected by
state forces, but only in those situations in which the intensity of the fight is not extreme.
Spraying disproportionality and a spraying shock do not seem to respond to the same variables,
in fact, some have the opposite effect and the explanatory power of the overall models is quite
low. In the first place, neither disproportionate spraying nor spraying shocks are determined
positively by lagged coca levels; an increase in coca levels is correlated with a smaller probability
of experiencing a shock, suggesting that a shock is not meant to counteract high levels of illegal
crops. Moreover, a spraying shock is not likely to happen in situations where the threat to the
state is high, and if it does, it will take place near the urban center. In contrast to spraying,
presence of the FARC, BACRIM or ELN is not related to a spraying shock. Only combats and
armed actions relate positively to a shock.
I went further into possible differences between those that had experienced a shock and those
that had not, took key variables for agricultural production at their earliest levels (2004 and
before) and looked at whether there were any significant differences between them. I found
no differences between the groups for rural land prices, forced displacement intensity, homicide
rates, rural and urban population sizes, rural population density, roads (in kilometers), primary
roads, number of years growing coca, forest density, distance to urban centers, fiscal perfor-
mance, rural poverty index in 2005, armed actions and presence of ELN and FARC guerrilla
groups.
There a few variables with differences: municipalities that experienced a shock rely four per-
centage points less in transfers from the central government, are 400 meters above sea level
higher, had higher rural poverty in 1993 and are qualified 0.7 points higher in the threat to
the state index that ranges from one to ten. In the models I control for the variables that are
different either as control variables or as fixed effects.
These results show that spraying disproportionality or a spraying shock does not follow the
same logic as spraying, but is rather a phenomenon that is not easy to explain, at least with
the socioeconomic and conflict variables at hand, and seems to include an element of randomness
which could have come from the pilot himself or the flight conditions during the overpass. This
randomness could also be a military intelligence move that I cannot quantify. For the purpose
of this study, this is evidence that supports that a spraying shock is exogenous to the farmers’
legal crop growing decisions.
19I also run a regression including coca in t-1 and find a very strong and positive correlation with spraying
in year t. Running the model with coca (t-1) instead of the changes in levels and the second lag also increases
the overall R2 of the spraying regression to 0.17. This would be the optimal model for explaining spraying but
cannot be used with spraying disproportionality and spraying shocks, since they both have coca in t-1 in the
denominator.
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Table 1.3: Spraying and spraying shocks
(1) (2) (3)
lnSpraying Spraying Disp Spraying Shock
Threat Yellow Zone 15.8922∗∗∗ -29.1304 0.3522
(4.3121) (35.5777) (1.2748)
Threat Red Zone 13.3593∗∗∗ -50.9193 -0.0400
(4.4176) (35.1075) (1.3459)
Threat Yellow Zone × Distance to urban (ln) 6.6377∗∗∗ -10.0316 0.0926
(1.4626) (12.4300) (0.4351)
Threat Red Zone × Distance to urban (ln) 6.5020∗∗∗ -6.2049 0.1243
(1.5434) (12.2493) (0.4748)
Threat Yellow Zone x Distance to urban (ln) 2 -0.7268∗∗∗ 1.1127 -0.0081
(0.1625) (1.3629) (0.0483)
Threat Red Zone x Distance to urban (ln) 2 -0.6934∗∗∗ 0.9737 -0.0076
(0.1705) (1.3674) (0.0524)
lnCoca(t-1)-lnCoca(t-2) 0.4212∗∗ -2.7714 -0.1462∗∗
(0.1814) (1.7583) (0.0576)
ln Coca (t-2) 0.4081 -1.3725∗ -0.2711∗∗∗
(0.3062) (0.7147) (0.0955)
Rural density -0.1301 0.1590 0.0257
(0.2157) (0.2867) (0.0587)
Num. armed actions -0.0045 -0.1472∗ -0.0179∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0840) (0.0078)
Num. FARC 0.0027 0.0052 0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0084) (0.0011)
Num. FARC × Num. FARC -0.0000∗ -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Num. ELN -0.0357∗ -0.0409 0.0003
(0.0205) (0.0372) (0.0035)
Num. BACRIM 0.0320∗∗ 0.0221 0.0066
(0.0157) (0.0372) (0.0040)
Num. BACRIM × Num. BACRIM -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Num. Combats 0.0596∗ 0.0753 0.0033
(0.0339) (0.0602) (0.0104)
Num. Combats × Num. Combats -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Num. Mines 0.0468 0.0779 0.0148
(0.0368) (0.0833) (0.0118)
Num. Mines × Num. Mines -0.0012∗ -0.0010 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0002)
Constant 4.4470 10.6098∗∗ 0.9978
(3.0014) (5.2601) (0.8420)
Observations 251 251 251
Num.Municipalities 107 107 107
R2 Overall 0.02 0.00 0.05
R2 Within 0.26 0.22 0.21
R2 Between 0.03 0.00 0.04
Municipality fixed effect linear models. Clustered standard errors at municipality level in parentheses.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variable definitions in Appendix
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Spraying disproportionality and legal crops at the macro level
Table 1.4 presents the first piece of evidence regarding the effect of disproportionate spraying
on the area harvested with legal crops. The first three columns follow the specification in Equa-
tion 1 that uses the continuous spraying (dis)proportionality variable as the main explanatory
variable, but they differ in the dependent variable used. Since the effects of spraying could
vary depending on the type of crop being used, I test the effects first on all legal crops, on
transitory and on permanent crops. All regressions hint at the same relationship: very high
levels of spraying disproportionality or spraying shocks reduce legal crops, whereas low levels
(or proportional levels) increase legal crops. I find that the relationship has an inverted U
shape,20 where mild levels up spraying induce legal crops, but disproportionate levels reduce
them. Figure 1.6 shows that when spraying disproportionality is above seven, legal crops are
reduced.21 This effect is statistically significant in the second lag for all crops and permanent
crops, and in the first and second lag for transitory crops.
The last three columns use spraying shocks as the main independent variable, as specified in
Equation 2. The signs remain the same and the shock reduces legal crops in year t and in
t-1. The effect of this shock is quite large, as it reduces legal crops in 19.4% in year t and
up to 23.4% one year later. Spraying induces legal crops, as seen with the linear term of the
continuous disproportionality.
There also seems to be a substitution effect between lagged coca increases and legal crops. This
is an expected result as people have a fixed amount of land and they choose between coca and
other crops or activities, or through coca’s close relationship with conflict.
The negative coefficient of the squared disproportionate spraying could mean two things: that
spraying intensity increases legal crops at a decreasing rate or that legal crops decrease after a
turning point. I find evidence for the latter as shown in Figure 1.6 that presents the predicted
margins of the relationship between spraying disproportionality and harvested legal crops.
20I tested a linear and cubic specification as a robustness check. In the linear specification only the first lag
had a negative sign, but none of the spraying disproportionality variables (t, t-1, t-2) were significant. In the
cubic specification I obtained a positive linear term, negative quadratic term (significant in the first lag) and
positive cubic term, but never statistically significant. I remain confident that the quadratic specification is
what best suits the theory of disproportionality.
21 As a robustness check I estimate a Heckman selection model for each year in the period of analysis to
get an inverted mills ratio for the whole period. I then include the inverted mills ratio as a control variable to
control for possible selection effects that may not have been controlled for with the fixed effects and find that
spraying disproportionality reduces legal crops contemporaneously as well as in the second lag for all products
(see Table A1.3 in the Appendix).
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Table 1.4: Legal crops, disproportionality of spraying and spraying shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Transitory Permanent All (Shock) Trans (Shock) Perm (Shock)
Spraying Disp 0.040 0.002 0.033
(0.026) (0.052) (0.030)
Spraying Disp 2 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-1) 0.030 0.071∗ 0.042
(0.037) (0.043) (0.032)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-1) -0.003 -0.005∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-2) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.024)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-2) -0.003∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Spraying Shock -0.215∗∗ -0.221 -0.141
(0.091) (0.154) (0.091)
Spraying Shock (t-1) -0.267∗∗ -0.266∗ -0.019
(0.126) (0.155) (0.146)
Spraying Shock (t-2) 0.053 -0.104 0.175
(0.100) (0.148) (0.128)
ln Spraying (t) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.033 0.075∗
(0.023) (0.036) (0.039)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.057∗ 0.092∗ 0.001
(0.033) (0.049) (0.042)
ln Spraying (t-2) 0.027 0.053 -0.042
(0.032) (0.044) (0.062)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.108∗ -0.116 -0.007 -0.145∗∗∗ -0.129 -0.097∗∗
(0.059) (0.071) (0.041) (0.050) (0.079) (0.042)
ln Coca (t-2) -0.068 -0.074 -0.054 -0.268∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗ -0.136∗
(0.064) (0.095) (0.066) (0.084) (0.121) (0.075)
Product cluster (HHI) 1.836∗∗∗ -2.214∗∗ 1.785∗ 1.416∗∗ -2.625∗∗ 1.529
(0.616) (0.994) (1.031) (0.612) (1.012) (0.954)
ln Rural Land Price (t-1) -0.055 -0.050 -0.034 -0.048 -0.050 -0.019
(0.050) (0.077) (0.041) (0.055) (0.080) (0.043)
Change in Fiscal Performance -0.005 -0.012∗∗ -0.005 -0.005 -0.013∗∗ -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Fiscal Performance (t-1) -0.004 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005 -0.016∗ -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Change in ln Rural Pop -0.248 3.688 -1.353 0.626 3.984 -0.100
(6.574) (6.306) (5.868) (6.267) (5.870) (5.903)
ln Rural Pop (t-1) 0.395 3.161 -1.681 1.356 3.737 -0.205
(6.683) (6.430) (5.839) (6.312) (5.887) (5.894)
Rural density -0.063 -0.449∗∗∗ 0.107 -0.093 -0.391 0.041
(0.158) (0.157) (0.175) (0.192) (0.245) (0.174)
Change in ln Urban Pop 15.339 33.986 17.150 13.542 37.097 15.534
(20.133) (24.122) (22.522) (19.422) (24.912) (21.205)
ln Urban Pop (t-1) 2.828 6.079 3.196 2.359 5.209 2.503
(5.924) (6.106) (4.952) (5.482) (5.164) (4.805)
Proportion rural -2.157 13.276 -1.837 -4.204 8.449 -5.066
(24.972) (24.265) (21.046) (23.562) (21.381) (20.929)
Perc. income from transfers 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -17.217 -80.344∗∗∗ -4.849 -20.041 -75.077∗∗∗ -9.643
(19.222) (24.479) (17.460) (22.849) (23.749) (18.506)
Observations 283 279 283 282 278 282
Num.Clusters 83 82 83 82 81 82
R2 Overall 0.33 0.11 0.08 0.36 0.11 0.11
R2 Within 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.20
R2 Between 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.31 0.15 0.11
Municipality fixed effect linear models. Clustered standard errors at municipality level in parentheses.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variable definitions in Appendix
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Effects of Spraying Disproportionality on ln legal crop hectares
The predicted margins are shown for the majority of the municipalities22 and it is clear that
the turning point is relevant for the analyzed sample. When spraying is between six and ten
times the amount of coca found, the policy starts reducing legal crops. This turning point is
shorter in the first lag of spraying disproportionality: when for each hectare cultivated with
coca six to seven hectares are spayed, the number of hectares cultivated with legal crops in the
next year drops. This figure also shows that the contemporary spraying and the first lag also
behave as expected by the disproportionality concept, but the confidence intervals are too large
for the effect to be statistically significant.
As a robustness test I control for various conflict related variables.23 Results become even
stronger, as disproportionate spraying reduces crops significantly in the first and second lags
(see Table A1.4 in the Appendix). Regarding prices, it is also important to note that there is
no evidence that the reduction of legal crops follows a drop in legal crop prices, as prices for
both coffee and cocoa, the flagship products in alternative development regions, were increasing
in the years of this analysis.24 In terms of coca prices, the relevant price is the fresh coca leaf
price, which has been monitored by UNODC since 2005. This price has remained stable between
2007 and 2011, ranging from 1.2 USD/kg in 2007, to 1.3 USD/kg in 2011. Prices are set by the
illegal armed groups or narcotrafficants in a monopsony-type arrangement, where coca farmers
have no say in setting the price. The stability of this period means that behavioral changes in
2298% of the municipalities analyzed report a spraying disproportionality smaller than 25. I run robustness
checks leaving out municipalities with extreme disproportionality values and the results hold.
23I do not use this as my main specification, since there is a high multicollinearity between coca and conflict
variables, so I leave coca as an explanatory variable in the main specification.
24I have not been able to find information on prices at the municipal level. Prices are aggregated by major
markets, and not enough geographical variation is present in order to include them in the analysis.
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terms of legal crop cultivation do not stem from a change in coca leaf prices. As an additional
robustness check I run the same regression with planted legal crop hectares instead of harvested
area and the effects are the same (see Table A1.5 in the Appendix).
Empirical results: Micro Data
Micro data allow a much stronger test of the spraying disproportionality effect on legal crops,
as the analysis turns to the effect of a global or macro policy on the individual decision to grow
legal crops. In this section I start by presenting the spraying disproportionality effects on the
UNODC surveyed coca growing farmers in the Putumayo-Caqueta region of Colombia in 2012,
followed by the effects on Forest Warden Families, finishing with a look at the effect on coffee
growers.
One thing to keep in mind when analyzing the following results is that legal crop decisions are
made at an individual level, but spraying and spraying disproportionality are captured at a
municipality level, as this is the smallest unit of spraying that I was able to access. This means
that the effect I capture is the lower bound of disproportionality on legal crops, as it is likely
that many of the surveyed respondents were not personally affected by aerial spraying. Still, as
already mentioned, farmers can change their legal crop planting behavior following a regional
spraying campaign. Conversations with farmers in coca growing areas make me confident that
people know what areas are being sprayed, how often and how severely.
UNODC survey with coca growers
Table 1.5 presents the effects of spraying intensity on legal crops for the UNODC sample using
the cross section version of Equation 1, where I find similar effects as those observed in the
macro data. Since this is not a panel for the individual responses that come from the survey, I
can only observe the effect of spraying disproportionality on legal crops in 2012. Looking at the
secondary data structure, there is high correlation between disproportionate spraying, spraying
and coca in different years. For this reason I decide to test the effect of the sum of spraying
shocks on legal crops, as mentioned in the methodology section.25
I find that one additional spraying shock between 2002 and 2011 reduces the area planted to
legal crops by 13%. Once spraying shocks are taken into account, a 1% increase in spraying
increases legal crops by 0.35%. In this case too, spraying can crowd-in legality as long as it is
not disproportionate or extreme, as captured by a spraying shock. This effect is mainly driven
by permanent crops, which could suggest that in these areas proportional spraying induces
an idea of longer term eradication, which is necessary for permanent crops that require larger
investments in time and resources. When people are exposed to too many shocks, people opt
out of such investments, but do not change their transitory crops, as these are also destined for
self-consumption. The effect of the continuos disproportionality variable is not as strong as the
25 I also test the effect of spraying shocks in 2011, the year before the survey, and the results hold.
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sum of the spraying shocks for this sample; despite having the expected signs, only the squared
term is marginally statistically significant (at a 10% level) when looking at transitory crops.
Table 1.5: Effect of spraying disproportionality on legal crops in UNODC sample
All Crops Transitory Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disprop Shock Disprop Shock Disprop Shock
Total spray shocks -0.176∗∗ -0.033 -0.143∗∗
(0.058) (0.039) (0.047)
ln Spray 2011 0.353∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.094) (0.082) (0.076)
Spraying Disproportional 0.540 0.286 0.254
(0.393) (0.163) (0.389)
Spraying Disproportional 2 -0.125 -0.060∗ -0.065
(0.070) (0.031) (0.067)
Coca affected by spraying (1) 1.210∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.135) (0.128) (0.130) (0.078) (0.084)
Processes coca leaf (2) -0.456∗ -0.357∗ -0.172 -0.155 -0.284 -0.202
(0.229) (0.167) (0.109) (0.107) (0.178) (0.119)
Years growing coca -0.019∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Female -0.317 -0.361 -0.268∗ -0.288∗∗ -0.049 -0.073
(0.256) (0.256) (0.118) (0.116) (0.219) (0.215)
Age 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years in Community -0.009 -0.009 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Farm area (ha) 0.018∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.010 0.011∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Has Title over land 0.742∗∗ 0.748∗∗ 0.439∗∗ 0.444∗∗ 0.303∗ 0.303∗
(0.307) (0.303) (0.164) (0.163) (0.149) (0.149)
Constant -0.080 -1.563∗∗ 0.079 -0.622 -0.159 -0.941
(0.445) (0.465) (0.194) (0.615) (0.479) (0.498)
R2 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.16 0.18
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238
Num.Municipalities 8 8 8 8 8 8
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variable definitions: (1) Dummy that takes the value of 1 if respondent reported their coca crops affected. (2) Takes value
of 1 when person processes coca leaf into coca paste. State capaticty and perceived public service quality explained
in data section.
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This sample has very detailed information on coca cultivation and production on an individual
basis so it makes more sense to use individual coca information than aggregate data. I find
that those who report having their coca fields affected by spraying in the past year increase the
area planted with legal crops, which goes in line with the finding that proportionate spraying
increases legal crops. I also find that people who not only grow but also process coca leaves,
allocate less land to legal crops. This suggests that even though spraying might lead to more
legal crops, this might not be because people are becoming more “legal”, but because they
are just avoiding risk. Those who not only grow but also process coca may still have some
opportunities in the coca business despite the spraying, and are not yet opting for legality. I
also control for key variables for explaining investments in legal crops such as land titles and
land size and find all of them to be positive and significant.
Forest Warden Families
The Forest Warden Families is the biggest alternative development program currently underway
in Colombia. It targets coca growing areas and regions that are at high risk of growing coca
(because of the balloon effect) and gives its beneficiaries money on the condition to keep their
lands coca-free. Additionally, they attend culture of legality workshops and receive technical
assistance in the hope that substituting legal products for coca will be sustainable. Even though
the government targets municipalities, only some communities in each municipality receive the
program, which means that there could still be coca-growing areas in the targeted municipalities,
which, as a result, would continue being exposed to spraying. As mentioned, FWF communities
may be exposed to spraying because they i) see the planes flying to neighboring regions, ii)
hear stories from neighboring communities or iii) get sprayed themselves by mistake (pilot
miscalculation, or strong winds that carry the glyphosate to their fields). In fact, even though
FWF areas should not have experienced any spraying since joining the program, 10% say that
spraying has been one of the main problems preventing their new productive activities from
flourishing. A big difference between the UNODC and the FWF sample is that even though
the latter are also exposed to low quality of public services and more than half of them are
considered to be poor (53%), at least they have received support in finding an alternative
livelihood and therefore have seen another face of the state. This could make a big difference
when it comes to be willing to follow the law and live under legality, as suggested by the second
chapter of this dissertation.
The effect of spraying disproportionality on legal crops is presented in Table 1.6. Column one
presents the effects of the disproportionate spraying one year prior to the survey (2011) and
column two presents the effect of the total amount of shocks on legal crops. I find that spraying
disproportionality in 2011 and the cumulative amount of spraying shocks decreases legal crops
in 2012. However, in this case spraying does not have a positive effect as was the case in the
macro data and the UNODC sample.
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Table 1.6: Effect of spraying disproportionality on legal crops in the Forest Warden Families
sample
(1) (2)
Spraying Disproportionality Spraying Shock
Total spraying shocks -0.1559∗∗∗
(0.0518)
Ln spraying 2011 -0.0883∗
(0.0522)
Spraying disprop 2011 0.1228
(0.1439)
Spraying disprop 2 2011 -0.0485∗∗
(0.0222)
Ln coca 2006 0.3287∗∗∗ 0.4929∗∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0744)
Ln monthly pc expenditure 0.2893∗∗∗ 0.2196∗∗∗
(0.0680) (0.0686)
Immorality (1) -0.0794∗∗∗ -0.0541∗
(0.0298) (0.0310)
Perceived good quality land (2) 0.2111∗∗ 0.2563∗∗∗
(0.0833) (0.0858)
Perc. land with title 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Male HH head 0.1610∗ 0.1628∗
(0.0825) (0.0843)
Years at home 0.0016 0.0030
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Age head of HH 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032)
Belongs to productive association 0.1694∗ 0.1779∗
(0.1013) (0.1076)






Expanded pop 3946 3946
Strata (municipalities) 15 15
Coefficients weighted by survey expansion factors. Standard errors stratified at municipality level in parentheses.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variable definitions: (1) Immorality measured as the total number of
immoral behaviors tolerated. (2) Dummy that takes value of 1 if respondents perceive their land to be of good quality.
(3) Dummy with value of one when the reason given by a person for not cultivating coca is related with morality.
A possible explanation for this is that FWF have a contractual agreement with the government
by which they pledged to keep their land free of coca and voluntarily agreed to eradicate illegal
crops in return for support with legal crops. Aerial spraying could thus be seen as a violation
of the state’s commitment, as spraying not only destroys illegal crops but legal ones as well.
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Once in the field, stories of FWF crops being sprayed are not uncommon, giving rise to feelings
of deceit among community members. I control for coca in 2006, the year before the seventh
phase of the program started, in order to capture coca without the effects of the Program. It
seems that higher levels of coca before the inception of the Program led to higher legal crop
growing levels in 2011, suggesting crop substitution.26
Since the government was interested in capturing the culture of legality aspect, the survey
included a series of questions regarding the amount of unethical actions that people found
morally wrong. It is interesting to note that in the case of FWF, the higher the number of
unethical activities not judged as immoral, the lower the levels of legal crop cultivation. When
the same regression is ran for the neighboring controls (people in the same municipalities but
in communities that did not receive the program) this variable is insignificant, suggesting that
the program’s efforts to promote a culture of legality are playing a role in people’s productive
decisions.
Coffee Growers in coca growing areas
The last sample deals with coffee growers, a group of special interest in Colombia as it is one of
the country’s most important export products. For various reasons, the majority of the coffee
growing areas have had very low presence of coca crops. However, some of them have been
affected and I focus my analysis only on these ones. Table 1.7 shows the effect of spraying
disproportionality and spraying shocks on two coffee production-related variables, following
the specification in equations 1 and 2. The first variable is the amount of 60kg bags of coffee
produced by the farmer as a measure of production (controlling for plot size) and the second
the amount of 60kg bags per hectare, a measure of productivity. These are much more accurate
measures of agricultural output than area, but it can only be used with this sample because
the product is comparable among all producers.27 Table 1.7 shows the results.
26The evaluation also collected data on distant controls and near controls. In the Appendix I show results
for both the treatment group and the neighboring control group, which was exposed to exactly the same levels
of spraying disproportionality in the municipality level. However, this comparison should be handled with care,
as the impact evaluation showed spill over effects on this group, and thus the program might affect the outcome
variable as well. The neighboring controls reduce legal crops in the face of a spraying shock, but not with the
disproportionality variable. The distant control group exhibits very high levels of spraying disproportionality
before the survey was undertaken and thus are not comparable in this sense. Program participation could only
be related to legal crops through the relationship of legal crops and violence, since the avoided operations in
red zones. Still, control municipalities were also chosen with this in mind. I also did an additional check and
calculated the inverse mills ratio for participating in the program, which I then added as an independent variable
(see Table A1.6 in the Appendix). The reducing effect of severe spraying remains. I do not use this specification
as the main specification because the inverted mills ratio is highly correlated with the observable variables
that determine participation and which I also control for in the main specification. Since these variables are
important for determining participation given program rules, and I account for them in the main model (gender
of household head, as female heads of household were targeted, age of household head, land with title), selection
effects are already accounted for. See more on the comparability of the treatment and control groups in Chapter
2.
27Even though coffee bags are a better way to capture overall coffee production than coffee area, I run the
same regressions using coffee area as dependent variable so as to obtain comparability with the other samples
and find no effect of spraying intensity on the amount of areas cultivated with coffee.
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Table 1.7: Effect of spraying intensity on coffee growers in coca affected coffee growing munic-
ipalities
60kg Bag of Coffee Bags per Hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disprop Shock Disprop Shock
Spraying Shock -1.133∗∗∗ -0.800∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.195)
Spraying Shock (t-1) 0.607 0.316
(0.693) (0.475)
ln Spraying 0.085 0.020
(0.082) (0.061)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.051 0.031
(0.080) (0.080)
Spraying Disprop 0.572 0.109
(0.441) (0.254)
Spraying Disprop2 (t) -0.079∗ -0.025
(0.046) (0.027)
Spraying Disprop (t-1) 0.105 0.018
(0.154) (0.035)
Spraying Disprop2 (t-1) -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.000)
Spraying Disprop (t-2) -0.017
(0.128)
Spraying Disprop2 (t-2) -0.002
(0.002)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.044 -0.109 -0.101 -0.126
(0.158) (0.145) (0.101) (0.098)
ln Coca (t-2) 0.360 0.048 -0.104 -0.193
(0.224) (0.177) (0.155) (0.145)
ln Area with Coffee 1.803∗∗ 1.853∗∗
(0.851) (0.815)
Num. Farms (1) 1.944∗∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.425∗∗
(0.367) (0.336) (0.174) (0.172)
Num. Coffee Growers in Region -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Perc. Rural Population 19.227 -16.387 -35.334 -46.280
(50.428) (44.190) (33.454) (31.882)
Plot Age (years) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054) (0.019) (0.019)
Owns Land -1.084∗∗∗ -1.095∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.401) (0.381) (0.047) (0.045)
New Crop (2) 3.143∗∗∗ 3.095∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.302) (0.059) (0.059)
Renewed Crop (3) 3.652∗∗∗ 3.482∗∗∗ -0.787∗ -0.789∗
(1.235) (1.280) (0.451) (0.451)
Perc. with Colombia-Type Coffee (4) 0.467 0.663 0.600 0.614
(1.148) (1.001) (0.929) (0.931)
Crop Density (5) 0.001 0.001∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -14.676 13.323 31.495 40.380
(37.951) (33.092) (26.304) (25.490)
Num.People 67082 71503 71503 71503
Num.Municipalities 56 60 60 60
R2 Overall 0.29 0.23 0.02 0.02
R2 Within 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.06
R2 Between 0.25 0.21 0.03 0.03
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(1) Number of farms worked by the farmer. (2) Established new coffee crops in field.
(3) Renewed existing coffee plantation.
(4) Percentage of land that has Colombia-type coffee, a more resistant coffee variety.
(5) Area with coffee/Productive area.
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First, the effect of spraying disproportionality, despite having the same signs as the other sam-
ples (positive in low disproportionality and negative in high) only generates a loss in production
and productivity when it is captured via spraying shocks and not via the continuous dispro-
portionality variable (only the squared term in t has a statistically significant reducing effect).
It could be that overall proportionate spraying levels and low exposures to coca lead to only
capturing negative effects when one identifies shocks. Spraying itself also does not seem to
significantly encourage legal coffee production, despite its positive sign.
One possible reason for the weaker effects for coffee growers is that they are exposed to the
lowest levels of coca cultivation and also of spraying. Moreover, the production data starts in
2009, precisely when it seemed that spraying disproportionality was following coca and spraying
trends, and consequently its effects could be quite low, if any.
Overview of micro level results
To wrap up the results from the micro data sets, Figure 1.7 shows the turning points for each of
the samples. All turning points affect people in the sample and do not happen in an implausible
value. It is also interesting to note that the turning points happen at different values of spraying
disproportionality depending on the sample; FWF beneficiaries are the first to start decreasing
their legal production, and they do so when spraying disproportionality is at around one, which
is expected as they feel their voluntary decision to achieve a coca-free territory is not being
corresponded by the state. The UNODC sample decreases production when spraying is about
twice the amount of coca found and coffee growers decrease coffee production when spraying
is four times as much coca. This means that even though the turning point with macro data
shows a much higher turning point (spraying seven times as much coca), this could obscure
regional variation, where sensitivity to the policy might be much higher. The spraying strategy
itself assumes a necessary four overpasses to achieve efficient coca reduction, a number that
will already backfire in some regions with legal crop reduction.
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Possible channels
Which are the channels that may be causing this reduction in legal crops once high intensity
levels of spraying are reached? Although I lack all the necessary information to pin down the
channels with full certainty, I can grasp the surface of possible mechanisms at hand, even if
no strong conclusions or causality claims can be drawn. I focus on three possible channels:
displacement, environmental damage (and crop damage) and loss of legitimacy.
Displacement
One possibility is that such intense spraying events might have led people to move out of their
territory; in fact, there is some evidence that among the displaced some people mention spraying
as the reason for moving. Dion and Russler (2008) find that during the implementation of Plan
Colombia aerial spraying reduced coca crops mainly through generating displacement. Palacios
(2012) also provides evidence in this direction and mentions a report from an NGO for IDPs
(CODHES) that denounces the displacement of 13.000 people due to aerial spraying. I used
the official data collected by the government of Colombia on forced internal displacement in
order to test its relationship with disproportional spraying. The variable used is the rate of
expulsion from one municipality per 100.000 inhabitants. I cannot disaggregate this variable by
the cause of displacement (sometimes captured in official documents) and use the variable that
includes all people that were displaced by violence (and not for economic reasons). However,
the aggregated variable is also useful since according to informal conversations with government
officials, many displaced do not report spraying as the reason for displacement, as they fear
being treated as coca-growers and criminals and therefore potentially losing State support.
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Table 1.8 presents the effect of spraying disproportionality on forced displacement using the
aggregated panel dataset. Disproportionate spraying seems to have a short term effect on
displacement, that is reversed after two years, which suggests that part of the loss in legal crops
could be due to a loss in rural workforce.28
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Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.4 shows that the negative effect of disproportionality actually lasts at least two years,
suggesting that there may be something else at play. Still, this effect of contemporaneous
displacement could be the reason why the linear component of spraying at time t is not positively
significant in the macro data but becomes significant after the first lag, since it is after two
years of the intense spraying that displacement starts to reverse.
When I include displacement in the original specification (see Table A1.7 in the Appendix), I
find that it reduces legal crops only when they are transitory, a result that has already been
found in the literature (Ibanez et al., 2013), but it does not take away the significance of
28There is no evidence of a quadratic relationship between spraying intensity and displacement. The linear
term has a negative sign and the squared term a positive one, but none of the terms are significant in none of
the lags. However, there is no theoretical reason to defend a quadratic relationship.
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spraying disproportionality, suggesting that there is more to the story than only displacement
of the labor force.
Environmental damage
A second possibility is that since glyphosate falls indiscriminately on the land and is non-
selective, it affects both illegal and legal plants. High levels of spraying may have damaged
the soil and prevented both legal and illegal productive crops from developing. Studies on
the effect of glyphosate on the environment are not conclusive. Relyea (2005) finds negative
effects on amphibious populations, Navarrete-Frías et al. (2005) show effects on deforestation.
During field visits I heard farmers complain about animals dying and crops’ yields declining
in the subsequent season. An ICRC report29 mentions that spraying passes over the fields are
not accurately targeted, leading to the destruction of legal crops, including those that are part
of alternative development projects. Still, other studies indicate that the effect is not long
lasting (Busse et al., 2001) or that crops recover quickly after spraying (Franz et al., 1997).
The inconsistency may be due to differences in the amount of glyphosate used. Monsanto, the
company that produces the product Round Up® used in the aerial spraying, issued a response
to Relyea’s study indicating that the product was not to be used over water and that the study
had been done with very high Round Up® concentrations. Since in this context the product
is not being used for gardening or agricultural purposes, Monsanto’s own concerns regarding
the use of Round Up® may underlie the potential environmental damage caused by spraying.
My focus is on spraying disproportionality, not measured as high levels of spraying, but as the
proportion of spraying to coca. In this sense, high disproportionality does not necessarily mean
highest levels of spraying but rather a very high disproportion between spraying and coca. If
the negative effects I find are due to environmental damage, a reduction of legal crops should
arise when using spraying, rather than spraying disproportionality. In fact, it it hurts the land,
one should not see positive signs of spraying inducing legal crops in neither the linear nor square
term. When I test the relationship between spraying levels and legal crops using the Equation
1 specification in Table 1.4 (but changing disproportional spraying by spraying levels), I find
that there are no significant effects of spraying and spraying squared on the same year nor on
the first lag, precisely where environmental damage was most likely to happen (see Table 1.9).30
There some evidence of an inverted U relationship in the second lag with transitory crops that
goes in the same direction as disproportionality, but does not indicate environmental harm, as
the linear term is positive. In fact, two years after high levels of spraying there is an increase in
legal crops, as the government expects. This results stresses the finding that disproportionality
matters. This also rules out the possibility that people are not planting because they are afraid
to get sprayed again, since large amounts of spraying would give people the same signal and, if
it is not disproportional, it even seems to increase legal crops in the medium term.31
29ICRC. Colombia: cultivos lícitos de campesinos afectados por aspersiones aéreas contra la
coca. http://www.icrc.org/spa/resources/documents/feature/2012/colombia-report-2011-displacement-feature-
3.htm
30The same comments for past panel data specifications apply to this model. In particular, I do not include
variables that are time invariable such as municipal size, since they drop out with the fixed effects, and reduce
collinearity between spraying and coca by keeping coca in changes instead as in absolute terms.
31I cannot rule out that subsistence crops are destroyed, given their small scale and the possibility of not
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Table 1.9: Effect of spraying on legal crops
(1) (2) (3)
All Transitory Permanent
Spraying (t) 0.070 0.138 0.022
(0.068) (0.107) (0.083)
Spraying2 (t) -0.004 -0.014 -0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.024 0.291∗∗ -0.172
(0.088) (0.129) (0.167)
Spraying 2 (t-1) -0.004 -0.026∗∗ 0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Spraying (t-2) -0.191∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.264
(0.060) (0.129) (0.203)
Spraying 2 (t-2) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.011 0.022
(0.006) (0.012) (0.016)
Change in ln Coca -0.002 0.020 -0.002
(0.041) (0.052) (0.046)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.029 -0.015 -0.001
(0.049) (0.069) (0.043)
Constant -13.604 -67.723∗∗∗ 1.375
(21.156) (22.660) (18.873)
Observations 283 279 283
Num.Municipalities 83 82 83
R2 Overall 0.32 0.09 0.08
R2 Within 0.23 0.21 0.20
R2 Between 0.28 0.11 0.09
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Control variables included.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Legitimacy Loss
The third channel, loss of legitimacy, is highly likely in coca growing areas where, according
to Garcia (2011), people are mainly exposed to the coercive face of the state and would tend
to develop a contentious relationship with the authorities, as they see their basic livelihood
(illegal crops) being destroyed by the state. The loss of legal crops due to spraying, especially
in subsistence farming, increases discontent, as food security is also under attack by a state
policy. I explore this channel with the UNODC sample, where legitimacy questions were asked.
Even though the sample is not representative of all coca growing areas in Colombia, results are
nonetheless suggestive of what happens when spraying is used intensively in areas that have
commonly been marginalized by the state and where coca has been the norm for a large part
of their history.
It is interesting to note the type of relationship that people in the surveyed area have with
the state (Table 1.10). In terms of public utilities, most people recognize the existence of
appearing in aggregate data sets or not even being mentioned by farmers when asked about their agricultural
activities. In fact, in the UNODC sample while 58% of the legal production goes to self-consumption for the
farmers that have experienced a spraying shock, farmers who have not experienced a shock only consume 33%
of their legal crop production. Moreover, farmers could get involved with legal crops through working for others
during harvest season in non-coca areas, but capturing this effect would need a more general framework that is
beyond the scope of this study.
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transportation and education services, and to a lesser degree, of drinking water and electricity,
and the very low access to both. However, once they are asked to rank the quality of these
services, where 1 is very bad and 5 is very good, not one single service was ranked as high as
having a medium quality of 3, and all except for education are rated below 2. This indicates that,
to begin with, people’s perception of what the state provides to them is not particularly good.
The survey also asks about the capacity of the state to solve problems related to public services
(water, electricity, education, health, productive alternatives and unemployment, nutrition and
security). In all cases except for education, half or less than half of the surveyed perceive the
state as capable of solving the problem. In fact, out of the 6 possible problems, on average
people think that the state can solve 2.87.
Table 1.10: Relationship to state in UNODC sample
Public goods, State Capacity and Alternatives to Coca












Perceived capacity of the state to solve problems related to:
Quality of Public Services 50.8%





Total Problems it can solve (max.6) 2.87
Alternatives to Coca given by the state
Has received support to substitute coca 0.4%
Voluntary eradication program exists 4.2%
Productive project exists 8.8%
Someone in HH in PP 6.3%
Wants to stop growing coca 78.7%
Source: UNODC, SIMCI
The problems where state capacity is perceived as the lowest relate to productive alternatives,
which is highly related to legal options outside coca. When asked directly about the alternatives
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offered to them by the state in order to stop coca cultivation, even though 78.7% claim wanting
to stop growing coca only 0.4% have received support, and 4.2% point out that a voluntary
eradication program exists in their region. This is worrisome because people in these regions
perceive only the coercive side of the state, which may lead them to have a wrong view of the
state’s motivations, a key element for wanting to follow the law. I heard a coca farmer once say
that he understood that what he was doing was wrong, and knew that he could be punished
for it, but that he only saw the state when he saw the planes. Then he added, “why don’t they
send a plane full of seeds and fertilizers after the spraying plane? Then we could at least get
some support from the government” (Coca farmer in Putumayo region, December 2011).
Results suggest that disproportionate spraying further alienates people from the state. Figure
1.8 Panel A shows how many problems people think the state can solve (out of a given list).
It turns out that if one focuses on the inner values, higher exposure to spraying shocks in the
year prior to the survey reduces the people’s belief that the state can deliver.32 Additionally, a
negative binomial regression of spraying disproportionality (and other controls) on how many
problems the state can solve give rise to Panel B of Figure 1.8, which clearly shows a negative
relationship between spraying intensity and trust in the state’s capacity. The descriptive statis-
tics presented above depict an already troubled relationship between the state and the people
in this area because of the former’s lack of presence and efficacy. Those results together with
this Figure point to a possible story of resentment, or, as Veldab-Brown (2006) noted, a loss of
“hearts and minds” from farmers that see their livelihoods threatened but find no support for
alternative options ahead.
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Table 1.11 presents a stronger way to see if legitimacy is playing a role in the amount of legal
crops planted. The first column explains legal crops in terms of state capacity and trust in the
state variables, and of other control variables included in Table 1.5, and excludes any measure
of spraying disproportionality, while the second and third columns replicate include spraying
disproportionality. It can be seen that when spraying disproportionality is not included in the
32The extreme values are hard to interpret, as there are people who may have very absolute positions vis-à-vis
the state or that do not want to support/oppose the government and therefore express a complete/null state
capacity.
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regression, perceived state capacity has a positive and statistically significant relationship with
legal crops, which turns insignificant when spraying disproportionality is included, suggesting
that this variable captures the effect of state legitimacy. If this is the case, if this is in fact
the channel that is driving legality out of the fields, the state needs to carefully balance coca-
reducing efforts with legitimacy-enhancing actions.
Table 1.11: Legal crops and state legitimacy
(1) (2) (3)
Without Disprop Including Disprop Including Shock




Spraying Disproportional 2 -0.122∗
(0.055)
Total spray shocks -0.127∗∗
(0.047)
ln Spray 2011 0.358∗∗∗
(0.081)
Constant -0.692∗ -1.129 -2.653∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.604) (0.510)
R2 0.35 0.37 0.38
Observations 237 236 236
Num.Clusters 9 8 8
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
State capaticty: Percentage of problems the State is able to solve
Coca crops
One last question is what is happening with coca and whether the only thing that is going on is
a substitution between legal crops and coca. Although this is not the focus of my study, as this
question has already been answered with very rigorous instruments and identification strategies,
as mentioned in Section 3, it is still interesting to look at the relationships that appear once
using spraying disproportionality rather than spraying levels.33 Using the macro data, the
relationship between spraying disproportionality and coca crops is U shaped but neither the
linear nor the squared term are significant in any of the lags. This relationship can only be
tested with the UNODC sample, where individual involvement with coca is asked and is reliable.
I find that spraying disproportionality reduces the proportion of people cultivating coca by 18%,
and there is no evidence of a non-linear effect (See Table A1.8 in Annex). This indicates that
it is possible that legal crops are substituting coca crops when spraying is proportionate, but
when spraying turns disproportionate, investments in any agricultural product, either legal or
illegal go down.
33Ibanez (2010) and Ibanez (2013) use the ratio between coca hectares and coca sprayed as their variable of
interest to capture its effect on coca crops. The difference with this study is that it does not include the squared
term, and used both spraying and coca hectares contemporaneously in the ratio.
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Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of severe punishment on legal behavior using the case of drug
policy in Colombia, namely aerial spraying of coca crops. Until now it was thought for the
most part that if risks, costs and other moral factors were high enough, people would opt out of
illegality in favor of legality; in this case, that if the costs and risks of cultivating coca are too
high, farmers would go back to a legal crop. This study endogenizes the legal outside option
and makes it dependent on the disproportionality of punishment. Severe punishment that is
disproportionate to the crime committed violates the proportionality principle, necessary for
the law and the state to be perceived as fair and legitimate. Legitimacy is in turn a main
determinant in people’s willingness to obey the law and live according to a culture of legality
and the rule of law. Thus, once people are exposed to extreme punishment, even though
illegality might decrease, legality could also be crowded out. This study tests this balance
and finds exactly what legal scholars would predict: extremely severe punishment crowds out
legality, while mild punishment crowds it in.
I test this relationship using aggregate data on all agricultural crops in Colombia, and three
micro data sets with very different types of farmers: coca growers, beneficiaries of an alternative
development program to substitute legal crops for coca and coffee growers. The findings point
to similar results across all groups. I also test some channels that drive this relationship and find
that disproportionate spraying displaces farmers but only for a short period of time, generating
a loss in legal crops as a result of a loss of rural labor force. I do not find evidence that the
reduction of legal crops after severe punishment may be due to environmental damage, although
more research should be done in this direction for more precise estimations. Finally, results
support the loss of legitimacy channel, whereby disproportionate spraying undermines trust in
the state.
These results have direct policy implications. It has long been said that achieving order and
compliance with the law relying only on force and without state legitimacy is extremely costly
and inefficient. Such levels of punishment are unsustainable, undemocratic and unfair, and
could therefore trigger negative spill over effects that reduce overall legality. I find that dispro-
portionate spraying and spraying shocks, instead of inducing farmers to opt in for legal crops,
actually make them opt out. In fact, an aspersion shock reduces legal crop harvests by 19%,
a large effect especially when one considers that Colombia’s agricultural sector rarely grows
above 4% in one year. If spraying is kept within “fairness” limits, it has the opposite effect
and crowds in legality. Drug policy should be shaped accordingly and extreme spraying shocks
should be avoided at all cost if a sustainable reduction in coca and in other types of illegality
is to be achieved.
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Appendix
Table A1.2: Marginal effects of interaction terms in spraying and spraying shock models
(1) (2) (3)
Spraying Spraying Disproportionality Spraying Shock
Threat Yellow Zone 0.297 -3.929 0.373∗∗
(0.622) (6.175) (0.183)
Threat Red Zone 0.206 -2.687 0.356∗
(0.680) (3.451) (0.205)
Distance to urban (ln) -7.416∗∗∗ 12.850 -0.037
(1.831) (14.903) (0.559)
lnCoca(t-1)-lnCoca(t-2) 0.421∗∗ -2.771 -0.146∗∗
(0.181) (1.758) (0.058)
ln Coca (t-2) 0.408 -1.372∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.715) (0.095)
Rural density -0.130 0.159 0.026
(0.216) (0.287) (0.059)
Num. armed actions -0.004 -0.147∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.039) (0.084) (0.008)
Num. FARC 0.002 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.008) (0.001)
Num. ELN -0.036∗ -0.041 0.000
(0.020) (0.037) (0.003)
Num. BACRIM 0.028∗∗ 0.018 0.006
(0.014) (0.033) (0.004)
Num. Combats 0.058∗∗ 0.070 0.004
(0.030) (0.053) (0.009)
Num. Mines 0.034 0.066 0.013
(0.031) (0.070) (0.010)
Observations 251 251 251
Municipality fixed effect linear models. Clustered standard errors at municipality level in parentheses.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1.3: Effect of spraying disproportionality on legal crops controlling for selection into
coca cultivation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Transitory Permanent All (shock)
Spraying Disp 0.057∗ 0.036 0.041
(0.029) (0.053) (0.034)
Spraying Disp 2 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-1) 0.044 0.080∗ 0.041
(0.039) (0.044) (0.034)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-1) -0.004 -0.006∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-2) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.024)




Spraying Shock (t-1) -0.271∗∗
(0.133)
Spraying Shock (t-2) 0.115
(0.109)
ln Spraying (t) 0.096∗∗∗
(0.024)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.061∗
(0.036)
ln Spraying (t-2) 0.028
(0.033)
Inverted mills ratio 0.220 0.296 0.181 0.346
(0.277) (0.468) (0.264) (0.229)
lagged Change in ln Coca -0.125∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.014 -0.159∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.066) (0.042) (0.048)
ln Coca (t-2) -0.100 -0.103 -0.063 -0.297∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.089) (0.068) (0.087)
Constant -10.055 -90.993∗∗∗ -3.478 -13.099
(19.015) (26.941) (19.727) (22.737)
Observations 266 262 266 264
Num.Municipalities 79 78 79 78
R2 Overall 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.28
R2 Within 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.26
R2 Between 0.18 0.11 0.04 0.25
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Includes same controls as in the specification in main text.
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Spraying Disp 2 -0.004
(0.007)
Spraying Disp (t-1) 0.067
(0.057)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-1) -0.005
(0.003)
Spraying Disp (t-2) 0.091∗∗
(0.042)




Spraying Shock (t-1) -0.144
(0.201)
Spraying Shock (t-2) 0.101
(0.165)
ln Spraying (t) 0.046
(0.043)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.109∗∗
(0.051)
ln Spraying (t-2) 0.016
(0.046)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.115 -0.222∗∗
(0.083) (0.087)
ln Coca (t-2) -0.045 -0.340∗∗
(0.099) (0.129)
Threat Yellow Zone -0.256 -0.519
(0.399) (0.521)
Threat Red Zone -0.373 -0.566
(0.448) (0.508)
Num. armed actions 0.005 -0.003
(0.008) (0.010)
Num. FARC -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Num. ELN -0.009 -0.006
(0.008) (0.009)
Num. BACRIM 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)






R2 Overall 0.33 0.32
R2 Within 0.35 0.37
R2 Between 0.27 0.27
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Includes same controls as in the main text specification.
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Table A1.5: Effect of spraying disproportionality on planted and cultivated legal crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cultivated Planted Cultivated Planted
Spraying Disp 0.040 0.036∗
(0.026) (0.021)
Spraying Disp 2 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-1) 0.030 0.019
(0.037) (0.032)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-1) -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Spraying Disp (t-2) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.021)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-2) -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Spraying Shock -0.215∗∗ -0.160∗
(0.091) (0.083)
Spraying Shock (t-1) -0.267∗∗ -0.204∗
(0.126) (0.110)
Spraying Shock (t-2) 0.053 0.054
(0.100) (0.080)
ln Spraying (t) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.023) (0.022)
ln Spraying (t-1) 0.057∗ 0.033
(0.033) (0.033)
ln Spraying (t-2) 0.027 0.014
(0.032) (0.033)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.108∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.055) (0.050) (0.046)
ln Coca (t-2) -0.068 -0.075 -0.268∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.084) (0.079)
Constant -17.217 -29.557 -20.041 -32.768
(19.222) (20.478) (22.849) (23.953)
Observations 283 283 282 282
Num.Municipalities 83 83 82 82
R2 Overall 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.40
R2 Within 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.33
R2 Between 0.27 0.35 0.31 0.36
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Same controls as in main specification using macro dataset included.
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Table A1.6: Beneficiaries, near controls and beneficiaries controlling for the inverse mills ratio
Disproportion Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FGB FGB N.Control N.Control FGB FGB N.Control
Total spray shocks -0.156∗∗∗ -0.088 -0.203∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.078)
lnSpray 2011 -0.088∗ -0.246∗∗∗ 0.101
(0.052) (0.056) (0.081)
SprayInt 2011 0.123 0.138 -0.242 -0.034
(0.144) (0.156) (0.247) (0.046)
SprayInt2 2011 -0.049∗∗ -0.051∗∗ 0.034
(0.022) (0.024) (0.037)
lnCoca 2006 0.329∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.160
(0.040) (0.043) (0.059) (0.057) (0.074) (0.075) (0.098)
lnExpenditure pc 0.289∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.073) (0.086) (0.086) (0.069) (0.072) (0.085)
Immorality -0.079∗∗∗ -0.065∗ 0.027 0.027 -0.054∗ -0.051 0.031
(0.030) (0.035) (0.059) (0.059) (0.031) (0.034) (0.060)
Good land 0.211∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.194 0.193 0.256∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.187
(0.083) (0.091) (0.150) (0.150) (0.086) (0.091) (0.147)
Perc.land with title 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 0.161∗ 0.193 0.167 0.163∗ 0.158
(0.083) (0.249) (0.251) (0.084) (0.248)
Years home 0.002 0.005∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.003 0.005∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Age 0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Productive association 0.169∗ 0.055 -0.040 -0.029 0.178∗ 0.106 -0.022
(0.101) (0.101) (0.365) (0.347) (0.108) (0.106) (0.381)
Coca immoral 0.098 0.064 -0.174 -0.160 0.110 0.108 -0.146
(0.088) (0.094) (0.165) (0.159) (0.090) (0.095) (0.158)
Inverted mills ratio 0.875∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.184)
Constant -5.779∗∗∗ -6.138∗∗∗ -5.717∗∗∗ -6.049∗∗∗ -5.247∗∗∗ -6.029∗∗∗ -5.742∗∗∗
(0.837) (0.911) (1.135) (1.087) (0.835) (0.897) (1.079)
R2 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.26 0.25
Num.Observations 678 677 647 647 678 677 647
Expanded pop 3946 3941 2433 2433 3946 3941 2433
Num.Strata 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Immorality is the sum of all the immoral behaviors justified; Good land is a perceived land quality;
Coca immoral: person will not grow coca for moral reasons
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Table A1.7: Effect of spraying on legal crops controlling for displacement
(1) (2) (3)
All Transitory Permanent
Displacement Intensity Rate -0.00000 -0.00002∗∗ -0.00000
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Spraying Disp 0.03053 -0.01643 0.01720
(0.02422) (0.04821) (0.02700)
Spraying Disp 2 -0.00150 0.00123 -0.00133
(0.00157) (0.00285) (0.00186)
Spraying Disp (t-1) 0.02794 0.05464 0.02909
(0.03783) (0.03965) (0.03270)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-1) -0.00277 -0.00451 -0.00205
(0.00227) (0.00275) (0.00200)
Spraying Disp (t-2) 0.06894∗∗∗ 0.09183∗∗ 0.03566
(0.02427) (0.03863) (0.02515)
Spraying Disp 2 (t-2) -0.00295∗∗∗ -0.00510∗∗ -0.00170
(0.00093) (0.00194) (0.00107)
Lagged Change in ln Coca -0.10475∗ -0.11288 -0.01134
(0.05860) (0.07040) (0.04197)
ln Coca (t-2) -0.06441 -0.04494 -0.03354
(0.06065) (0.08353) (0.06484)
Product cluster (HHI) 1.84903∗∗∗ -2.32764∗∗ 1.76845∗
(0.61063) (1.02468) (1.02929)
ln Rural Land Price -0.06827 -0.04160 -0.06606
(0.06616) (0.06724) (0.05651)
L.ln Rural Land Price -0.01801 -0.02797 -0.00381
(0.04808) (0.07461) (0.05153)
D.Fiscal Performance -0.00340∗ -0.00566∗ -0.00082
(0.00185) (0.00295) (0.00259)
D.ln Rural population 2.47042 8.74403∗∗∗ 1.55780
(2.24154) (2.13135) (2.37421)
L.ln Rural population 3.06626 8.19968∗∗∗ 1.28845
(2.36823) (2.28947) (2.35266)
Rural density -0.05294 -0.46008∗∗∗ 0.10607
(0.15664) (0.16198) (0.17846)
D.ln Urban population -27.41241 -2.28661 -8.93088
(34.26608) (59.32844) (22.67661)
LD.ln Urban population 42.63963 32.47889 24.19664
(27.94733) (50.23108) (17.20111)
Proportion rural -15.27223∗∗∗ -10.23585∗ -15.61294∗∗
(5.56093) (5.59326) (6.20378)
Perc. income from transfers 0.00349 0.00054 0.00273
(0.00218) (0.00294) (0.00268)
Constant -9.57635 -60.38994∗∗∗ 3.36716
(19.66146) (19.10639) (19.39288)
Observations 283 279 283
Num.Municipalities 83 82 83
R2 Overall 0.31 0.09 0.06
R2 Within 0.25 0.21 0.16
R2 Between 0.25 0.11 0.06
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A1.8: Spraying disproportionality and coca crops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spraying disp squared dy/dx Spraying disp linear dy/dx
Spraying Disproportional -0.164 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.734) (0.031) (0.147) (0.029)
Spraying Disproportional 2 -0.087
(0.121)
Coca affected by spraying (1) -0.111 -0.031 -0.086 -0.024
(0.267) (0.075) (0.228) (0.065)
Years growing coca -0.041∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.018) (0.005) (0.020) (0.006)
Female 0.184 0.052 0.193 0.055
(0.198) (0.058) (0.204) (0.061)
Age -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Years in Community -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Farm area (ha) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Perceived State Capacity -0.467 -0.131 -0.446 -0.126
(0.316) (0.090) (0.334) (0.096)
Perceived Quality Public SS -0.044 -0.012 -0.044 -0.012
(0.253) (0.071) (0.258) (0.073)
Has Title over land 0.132 0.037 0.115 0.033




Observations 236 236 236 236
Num.Municipalities 8 8
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variable definitions: (1) Dummy that takes the value of 1 if responden reported their coca crops affected. (2) Takes value
of 1 when person processes coca leaf into coca paste. State capaticty and perceived public service quality explained
in data section.
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3. How alternative development achieves more honest com-
munities: An experimental approach in Colombia †
Abstract
Dishonesty is widespread: evidence shows than when people have the chance, they will
cheat. This behavior costs societies billions of dollars every year, and has motivated re-
search on how it can be reduced. We focus on a legality-building policy applied to a novel
group: farmers that live in coca growing regions in Colombia, who are exposed to high
levels of violence, poverty and widespread illegality. We build on the impact evaluation of
Colombia’s biggest alternative development program that offers culture of legality work-
shops to their beneficiaries, and gives them monetary incentives to keep their territories
free of coca. This allows us to see if the program is able to bring dishonesty down, and
to explore the novel relationship between poverty and dishonesty, and between moral re-
minders and dishonesty. We introduced a die-type honesty experiment similar to that of
Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) to the impact evaluation, which was played by 3710 individ-
uals. We find evidence that beneficiaries are more honest than their distant counterparts
and generate spillovers to their neighbors. We also find a non-linear relationship between
dishonesty and poverty, where dishonesty decreases when the poverty line has been crossed,
but increases right before crossing it. Moreover, as exposure to the program’s workshops
increases, dishonesty decreases. This suggests that the program’s focus on coca reduction
and compliance with legality spills over into other realms of ethical behavior and achieves
not only more legal, but also more honest communities.
Keywords: Cheating, morality, alternative development, public policy
JEL codes: K4, O21, D03
†Joint work with Marcela Ibanez. We would like to thank Econometria Consultores and Oscar Rodriguez
for their important suggestions and for incorporating the dishonesty experiment in the survey. We also thank
DNP in Colombia for the research agreement that allowed us to use the data. We also thank Axel Dreher for
his comments and suggestions.
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Introduction
Acts of dishonesty appear to be common and widespread, not only from “bad apples” but from
the average person (Ariely, 2013; Vetter et al., 2010; Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Azar et al.,
2013; Fosgaard, 2013). Although “bad apples” cause sensation in the media, it is the daily
“minor” dishonesty that hurts societies the most (Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Loewen et al. 2013).
For example, insurance fraud costs the United States 24 billion every year and “wardrobing”
(buying something, using it for one day and returning it) amounted to $16 billion in 2002 in
the US economy (Mazar and Ariely, 2006). Dishonesty does not escape the academic field. For
instance, Butler (2010) found that in the journal Nature, between 6% to 23% of its papers had
plagiarism while an anonymous survey from top medical journals found that 17.6% of their
papers had been published in the name of guest authors and 7.6% had been written by ghost
authors (Wislar et al., 2011).1
The quest for effective measures to curb dishonesty is currently active and much attention has
been given to identifying factors that either trigger or limit people’s natural tendency to cheat
(Fosgaard, 2013; Ariely 2013; Gneezy, 2005; Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002; Shu et al., 2011; Ploner
and Regner, 2013; Gravert, 2013; Gino et al., 2013; Mazar et al., 2008; Mazar and Ariely, 2006;
Shu, Gino and Bazerman, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2013). While most of the research has focused
on student populations in developed countries,2 there is relatively little research of this topic
in developing countries affected by high exposure to illegality (i.e., corruption, black economy,
money laundry and tax evasion) and violence and civil conflict, as is the case in Colombia.
We contribute to this research focusing on a population that has never been considered in this
topic before: people who live in rural and marginalized coca growing areas that suffer from
state absence, high levels of poverty, few (legal) economic activities and high levels of violence
and armed conflict. Our unique sample allows us to analyze unexplored questions such as
whether exposure to an illegal environment, violence and conflict are positively associated with
dishonesty and whether there is a positive association between poverty and an individual’s
propensity to lie.
The second contribution of our analysis is to consider the feedback effect of anti-drug policies.
We focus on the impact of the the Forest Warden Families program (FGB from its Span-
ish name), the most important alternative development program in Colombia, on individual
propensity to lie.3 The FGB Program offers farmers living in coca growing areas a regular
cash transfer for a three-year period conditional on their promise to keep their land coca-free.
The assumption behind this program is that by offering farmers a regular income, they will
learn the advantages of working in the legal sector and voluntarily decide to remain working
1Guest authors are usually senior authors that have had no or very little contact with the manuscript, but
that have been invited to put their name as authors in order to increase the chances of the manuscript being
recognized and published. We refer to ghost authorship in the form known mainly in the medical field, where
a company (pharmaceutical) hires an author to write a manuscript (ghost author) but then asks a well known
author to be the “real” author.
2Exceptions to lab experiments with students are Bucciol et al. (2013); Azar et al. (2013).
3Econometria-SEI (2012). Evaluación del Programa Familias Guardabosques y Grupo Móvil de Erradi-
cación.
56
within legality even when the incentive is taken away. To foster the permanent transformation
of farmers from coca to the legal economy, or the so called “culture of legality,” one impor-
tant component of the Program is mandatory attendance to workshops, where farmers learn
the meaning and importance of following the law and living by the rules set in a democratic
process.4 Our analysis aims at shedding light on the effectiveness of this intervention to reduce
other immoral behaviors, such as cheating.
We are interested in investigating whether such an intervention can move people’s moral com-
pass beyond coca related activities and increase honesty. Mazar and Ariely (2006) state that “if
the reason for dishonest actions lies in a lack of internalized social norms, our primary recom-
mendation would be to invest in educational efforts and socialization to increase the strength
of the internal reward mechanism” (pp. 13). This is what the FGB is trying to do with its
interventions, and our study wants to see whether it has worked out or not.
To identify the impact of the FGB Program on dishonesty, we compare program beneficiaries
with a group of producers that live in similar areas. First, they live in municipalities that are
equally likely to be targeted by the Program, based on the Program’s own targeting index.
Moreover, the Program has been rolled-out in time allowing for comparisons between those
who have already received the Program and those that will most likely benefit in the future.
Second, they have similar experience cultivating coca and have been similarly affected by anti-
drug policies other than the FGB Program, such as manual eradication or aerial spraying.
Lastly, they have been similarly affected by conflict and violence. Furthermore, in the analysis
we explore variation in the intensity of exposure to the educational workshop. Given capacity
constraints of the governmental agency responsible for the FGB program (Accion Social at the
beginning of the Program and the Unidad Admistrativa de Consolidacion Territorial – UACT
in its latest stage) and the growing expectation to involve local partners, this agency contracts
third party agencies like universities and NGOs to be responsible for the implementation of
the educational workshops. While the topic and aim of the workshops is predefined as well
as the number of workshops that need to be offered, implementing agencies have some degree
of freedom to decide when and how to deliver them. We find that depending on the region
and implementing agency, there is variation in the intensity of exposure to these workshops.
Agencies are chosen after a competitive process in their own regions and are chosen based on the
same criteria, assuring similarities in capacity and quality. We explore this variation in exposure
to educational workshops to identify if impacts are channeled through moral reminders sent by
the Program.
We use data from the 2012 evaluation of the FGB Program provided by the National Planning
Office – DNP.5 The data contains information of a representative sample at the national level
of over 3710 thousand households living in seven departments and in 34 municipalities in the
country.6 We worked together with the consulting firm so that within the surveys conducted
4The description of the “social component” is found in internal Program documents such as the: Guia de
Procedimientos (procedures guide) and the ABC del Programa (ABC of the Program)
5Econometria-SEI (2012). Evaluación del Programa Familias Guardabosques y Grupo Móvil de Erradi-
cación.
6There are 33 departments and 1021 municipalities in the country. 23 of these departments had coca in the
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to evaluate the impacts of the Program, we were allowed to conduct a short experiment. To
measure the impacts of the Program in honesty we used an experiment similar to the one
used by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Participants were offered the possibility to gain a small
incentive as a retribution for participating in the survey. We explained that the amount to be
paid would be determined by luck.7 Participants were asked to sit in private where no one,
including the enumerator, could see them, and throw a regular six-sided fair dice ten times
writing the result in a paper after each throw. The sum of the numbers obtained in the ten
independent throws were multiplied by one hundred and paid as credit for mobile phones.8
In this experiment honesty is not directly observable; instead, it is possible to use the distri-
bution over throws and compare it with the expected mean, the expected distribution of each
trow or the expected distribution over the sum of trows in order to analyze the average level of
honesty in the group. Moreover, in the analysis we correlate the value of the claimed payment
with socioeconomic characteristics of the participants to uncover interesting relations. We find
a non-linear correlation between dishonesty and poverty where the poorest and the richest are
more honest than those close to the poverty threshold. We also find that the environment in
which people live plays a key role in people’s moral actions: people living in areas with high
levels of coca also exhibit the highest dishonesty levels. People seem to reflect in the game their
real-life “illegality-type” behavior, since those cultivating coca the year before the survey tend
to be more dishonest than non-coca farmers.
Regarding the impacts of FGB, we find that FGB beneficiaries are less dishonest than non-
beneficiaries living in distant regions. Our results indicate that this result is channeled through
the education effect of the Program’s workshops, as dishonesty decreases with participation in
the workshops.
This paper makes various contributions to the research on dishonesty. One behavioral pattern
that commonly emerges is that people cheat when given the chance to do so. Yet, people
do not cheat to a maximum degree, or at least as much as they could (Mazar and Ariely,
2006; Gneezy, 2005; Ariely, 2013; Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2013). This
form of incomplete cheating seems from people’s need to balance the incentives to profit from
cheating with keeping a positive image of themselves (Fischbacher and Heusi 2008; Fosgaard,
2013, Aquino and Reed, 2002; Ploner and Regner, 2013; Gravert, 2013, Gino et al., 2010;
Shalvi and Leiser, 2013; Gneezy, 2005; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013). Mazar and Ariely (2006)
and Ariely (2013) rationalize this behavior in the theory of self-concept maintenance according
to which there is an internal threshold that allows “some” dishonesty after which it becomes
unacceptable. In our analysis, we test how generalizable this theory is in case of populations
that live in conditions of high illegality and violence.
Empirical evidence suggests that one particular immoral act in one domain, spills-over into
other domains (for a review see Ariely, 2013). For instance, experimental evidence finds that
time of the survey.
7 All participants in the survey agreed to participate in the game, reducing problems of self-selection.
8Coverage of mobile telephones in Colombia is relatively good and it is estimated that 80 percent of rural
households have a mobile telephone. Most of the people prefer prepaid contracts and even for those with fixed
contracts it is possible to buy additional credit.
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when people are given counterfeit glasses to wear, they cheat more in honesty experiments
that had nothing to do with glasses or fake products (Gino et al., 2010). It also seems that
dishonesty not only has negative externalities within a person, but from an environment to the
person. Mazar et al. (2008; p.2) find that placing people in a “morally permissive environment
is sufficient to increase cheating.” We explore the opposite direction and study if morality in one
aspect (being exposed to the possibility to leave coca crops) also generates positive externalities
in other aspects of moral traits, like honesty.
This paper is also related with the literature on “moral reminders” (Mazar et al., 2008; Shu
et al., 2011, 2012). Moral reminders have the potential to bring a person’s attention to her
own moral standards, making her more conscious of unacceptable behaviors by such standards.
Experimental tests have shown that moral reminders affect dishonesty. For example, Mazar
et al. (2008) design a game where people can cheat and compare students that were asked to
sign to comply with an honor code before playing with a control group. They found that their
intervention eliminated cheating, even in universities that do not have an honor code. Shu et
al. (2011, 2012) ask people to sign their names on the tax-refund or insurance claim form before
they fill it out. Compared to the control group, where people signed their names at the end
of the form (after dishonesty already happened), those who signed at the beginning claimed
less tax returns and smaller insurance claims. Mazar et al. (2008) implement an experiment
where people are asked to recall either the 10 commandments or the last 10 books they have
read, and find that those who had to think of the commandments (regardless of their ability
to name them correctly or their religious beliefs) cheated much less than those who recalled
the books. We contribute to this research investigating how exposure to educational workshops
that focus on the substitution of coca by legal crops, generates spill over effects in other norms
like honesty. This research is complementary to our work on the impacts of participation in
the FGB Program on norms regarding coca cultivation (Chapter 3).
There are several studies looking at how poverty and crime are related but come up with
different results, with some studies finding no relationship at all. Sariaslan et al. (2013) find
a strong positive relationship between poverty and crime in Sweden, that disappears as soon
as unobserved family confounders are accounted for. Bjerk (2007) re-examines the relationship
and shows that ignoring non-linearities and having problematic measures of poverty has led
to the weak or non-existent effects. He finds that once non-linearities are accounted for, and
income is not the main indicator used for capturing for poverty, the relationship between crime
and poverty is empirically stronger. Hipp and Yates (2011) add evidence to the relationship
and find a diminishing positive relationship between neighborhood poverty and crime. Muroi
and Baumann (2009) find that a quadratic relationship best fits the data using property and
violent crime and median income and poverty rate as crime and poverty variables respectively.
Even though the relationship between poverty and crime has been studied both theoretically
and empirically in the literature (although in developed countries), the relationship between
poverty and dishonesty or immorality has been overlooked and our study sheds some light in
this direction. We build on the poverty-crime literature and explore non-linear effects between
poverty and crime, and use multidimensional poverty measures instead of income.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the local background while
Section 3 discusses the identification strategy used. Section 4 presents the experimental design
and procedures, followed by Section 5 where we present the empirical strategy used to analyze
our information. Section 6 presents descriptive results and the impact of the Program on
dishonesty, and disentangles the channels that relate to it. We discuss these results in more
detail in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
Local background
Colombia is regarded among the most unsafe places in the world. It appears in the list of 40
countries for which the US Department of State provides regular travel warnings. 2014 Travel
Warning Report advices:
“The Department of State strongly encourages U.S. citizens to exercise caution
and remain vigilant as terrorist and criminal activities remain a threat throughout
the country. Explosions occur throughout Colombia on a regular basis, including in
Bogota. Small towns and rural areas of Colombia can be extremely dangerous due to
the presence of terrorists and criminal elements, including armed gangs (referred to
as BACRIM in Spanish), that are active throughout much of the country. Violence
associated with the BACRIM has spilled over into many of Colombia’s major cities.
These groups are heavily involved in the drug trade, extortion, kidnapping, and
robbery.
U.S. government officials and their families in Colombia normally are permitted
to travel to major cities only by air. They may not use inter- or intra-city bus
transportation, or travel by road outside urban areas at night.”
One of the factors that has fueled crime and violence is the drug trade. Colombia is the
largest producer of cocaine and it is estimated that 70% of all cocaine that enters the USA is
produced there. The cultivation of coca, the main active component in cocaine, affects large
parts of the territory: 23 out of 33 departments were affected by the production of coca in
2012, 250 municipalities (25%) were threatened by coca9 and 62.400 households were engaged
in its cultivation (UNODC, 2012). Some studies have already found evidence that supports the
association between coca and crime. Castillo et al. (2013) find that an increase in the value of
coca of 10% increases homicides and forced displacement by 1.25% and 3% respectively. Angrist
and Kugler (2008) find that areas with accelerated coca production became more violent and
reported more deaths specially among young males. We focus on areas in Colombia with high
levels of coca, and explore whether alternative development programs translate into more honest
communities.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the municipal level characteristics in the mu-
nicipalities that were included in our analysis compared to other municipalities in the country
9UNODC developed an index that includes affected area, persistence, expansion, concentration, abandon-
ment and regrowing of coca crops to calculate a threat index.
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with coca, and with the national average excluding main cities.10 The municipalities in our
study are similar to other municipalities that have coca in most variables, although they have
grown coca one-and-a-half years more than other coca regions, pose a slightly higher threat to
the state and have a lower proportion of rural population. Yet, compared with municipalities
without coca, they are very different: they have a higher forced displacement rate, have twice
as high homicide rate, pose a higher threat to the state and are poorer, as captured by an
unsatisfied basic needs index.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of municipalities in study, other coca growing municipalities
not in the study and the rest of the country (excluding main cities)
In study Out of study Out of study
with coca no coca
Prop. land with coca 2009 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.0004) (0.0002) -
Years with coca until 2012 10.3 8.9*** 0.71***
(0.42) (0.24) (0.09)
Forced displacement rate 2009 538.9 397.8 67.0***
(92.10) (65.23) (6.72)
Num. military actions 2009 1.06 1.56 0.29**
(0.30) (0.31) (0.04)
Homicide rate 2009 57.1 44.9 24.5***
(8.48) (3.28) (0.94)
Threat to state index 2009 2.59 2.38* 1.49***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.02)
Prop. rural population 2009 0.54 0.67*** 0.58
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Unsatisfied basic needs (2005) 55.7 58.1 45.7**
(3.88) (1.58) (1.14)
Num. Municipalities 34 190 883
Note: Significance relative to municipalities in the study at ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.1 significance levels. Targeting
index calculated by the Program. Threat to state index comes from the Ministry of Defense and takes into
account combats, displacement, coca, armed actions, presence of illegal armed groups among other variables.
Unsatisfied basic needs is a multipoverty index calculated from the 2005 census, that goes from 1 to 100, where
1 is no needs unsatisfied and 100 all needs unsatisfied.
Sources: Colombian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Agriculture, PFGB
In response of the problem of drugs, Colombia has launched a two side strategy that combines
eradication and alternative development. The first strategy aims at decreasing coca by destroy-
ing the crops either manually or by aerial spraying. The second strategy aims at decreasing coca
by providing legal economic alternatives to the farmers. The Forest Warden Families Program
(FWF or FGB for the spanish name) is Colombia’s flagship alternative development program
since 2003. This Program offers beneficiaries a monetary subsidy for up to three years11 condi-
tional on them keeping their land free of coca. One of the main objectives of the Program has
been to generate a culture of lawfulness, hoping that it will ensure that beneficiaries will not go
back to coca crops once the program has ended. Hence, the Program emphasizes the importance
10Many variables were calculated for 2009 because it is the year before the seventh phase of the FGB program
started, which defined where our study took place.
11The value of the subsidy offered has varied over the different implementation phases.
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of complying with the law in their workshops. Our objective is to identify if this intervention
has had the expected result, by capturing legality with a general dishonesty measure.
Identification strategy
Our analysis is based on the data for the impact evaluation of the Forest Warden Families
Program.12 This study was commissioned by the national government (National Planning Office
— DNP) and carried out by the consultancy firm Econometria Consultores from November 2011
to September 2012. The evaluation was based on a survey that collected extensive information
on household and individual socioeconomic characteristics, economic activities and relations to
coca (precisely what the program wants to tackle). As no baseline existed, the survey collected
retrospective and current data. The farmers that participated in the evaluation were selected
according to the following criteria. First, a nationwide representative sample of 1236 Program
beneficiaries from a universe of 8664 families from the seventh wave of the Program that started
in 2010 was selected. At the time of the evaluation, they were active Program beneficiaries.
All municipalities that had FGB presence in this wave were selected; each municipality was
stratified by size and within each stratum treated veredas13 were chosen. Within the veredas,
beneficiary households were chosen at random from the Program’s own beneficiary lists. Second,
replicating the conditions the program uses to select beneficiaries, they selected 1264 distant
controls that lived in areas never touched by the Program, to serve as the pure control group.
Another 1210 controls were chosen to serve as near-controls (farmers who live in the same
municipality but were not selected to participate in the program), who were chosen simply
based on their geographical proximity to the beneficiaries, in order to capture possible spill-
over effects. Most of our results will focus on the differences between beneficiaries and distant
controls.14
The choice of the distant controls exploited the program’s clear guidelines on who should be
targeted and used the index the program created to prioritize municipalities based on these
rules. The program was not able to reach all areas of interest at the same time, and has been
rolled out since 2003, giving us the possibility to exploit this time variation to select the controls.
The index is based on municipal data (and thus targets municipalities) and includes variables
such as presence and amount of coca and poppy crops, being a national border, willingness
to participate in the program, population size and density, presence and size of woodland,
presence of USAID alternative development programs, among others. Using a probit model
we checked whether in fact these variables determined participation in the program and we
12Econometria-SEI (2012). Evaluación del Programa Familias Guardabosques y Grupo Móvil de Erradi-
cación.
13A vereda is the smallest administrative unit. It can usually be thought of as a community in rural areas.
14The evaluation also focused on capturing spillover effects that were expected especially in variables that
had to do with agricultural production and productive activities that could have stemmed from the creation
of clusters around new legal activities. Since they were chosen only based on their geographical proximity
they don’t assure comparability between the groups when estimating impacts. The evaluation used the distant
controls for estimating impacts and the near control for capturing spill-over effects.
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find convincing results that they do.15 Based on this model the consultancy firm estimated
the probability of being chosen and selected the distant controls that had the closest estimated
probabilities to the FGB municipalities, and balanced both high and low probabilities, so that
the whole range was included. The neighboring controls were chosen based on their distance and
links to the treatment communities. All neighboring control communities were inside treated
municipalities. Once a control municipality was chosen, local authorities in charge of the rural
sector and the technical assistance of the region produced a list of all households that according
to the programs’ rules would be eligible.16 From this list the consultancy firm randomly selected
the control group.
Table 2.2 presents average characteristics for the FGB municipalities in our study, the distant
control municipalities, and other municipalities that have coca in the country in 2009, a year
before the program started in these regions. Overall, treatment and control municipalities are
very similar in almost all the variables tested. Importantly, both treatment and distant control
municipalities have a very similar targeting index, which is the key variable for receiving the
program. Treatment and distant control municipalities only differ in the homicide rate, which is
higher in the latter. However, when looking at coca and conflict related variables, both groups
are statistically identical. This table also shows that the selection of control municipalities
was well done, as the differences that were observed between FGB municipalities and other
municipalities with coca are not replicated in the sample. This procedure allows to select
municipalities and households that are as comparable as possible.
15See Table A2.1 in the Appendix with a probit model that estimates the probability of being in the program
based on these variables.
16In order to be eligible the household needs to derive its income from an agricultural activity, must have
a piece of land to work with, can’t be a public servant, should be living in the community before the program
arrived, be older than 14 and be a household head and not having received the program in the past. Additionally,
families with children and female heads of household were given priority.
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Table 2.2: Average characteristics of Forest Warden Families municipalities, distant control
municipalities and coca-growing municipalities not in the study
FGB in study Distant Controls Not in study
with coca
Targeting index 27.3 27.9 23.6
(2.44) (1.81) (0.72)
Prop. land with coca 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Years with coca 10.7 9.4 8.9***
(0.49) (0.71) (0.24)
Forced displacement rate 604.7 401.4 397.8
(111.45) (156.42) (65.23)
Num. military actions 1.17 0.82 1.56
(0.38) (0.46) (0.31)
Homicide rate 45.4 81.5** 44.9
(7.82) (18.46) (3.28)
Threat to the state index 2.61 2.55 2.38
(0.13) (0.20) (0.05)
Prop. rural population 0.56 0.51 0.67**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Unsatisfied basic needs (2005) 56.7 53.1 58.1
(3.80) (9.88) (1.58)
Num. municipalities 23 11 181
Note: Significance relative to municipalities in the study at ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.1 significance levels
Targeting index calculated by the Program. Threat to state index comes from the Ministry of Defense
and takes into account combats, displacement, coca, armed actions, presence of illegal armed groups
among other variables. Unsatisfied basic needs is a multipoverty index calculated from the 2005 census,
that goes from 1 to 100, where 1 is no needs unsatisfied and 100 all needs unsatisfied.
As we mentioned, the FGB Program has been rolled out since 2003 in seven waves, and Table
4.1 shows how it has been rolled out since the beginning.17 Our identification strategy greatly
benefits from the fact that the priority level of the incoming municipalities has been very similar
in every wave. Only the sixth phase that was aimed at preventing coca to enter regions that
had been greatly affected by heavy rains is not comparable. The differences between the phases
were mainly the duration and amount of the conditional payments and the way the savings
component18 was designed.
17In 2012 the institutional structure of most of the offices that were responsible for conflict-related activities
(and were not military) changed. This caused very large changes in the Program, which was placed under new
direction and new institutional structure. Between end of 2011 and February 2014, 15,689 families entered the
Program. From the 11 distant control municipalities that we included, two have been treated in this period of
time. Most of the remaining families belong to municipalities that had already been treated in the past by the
Program.
18The FGB Program wants its beneficiaries to save and has established different mechanisms to do so. First
it was voluntary, then every beneficiary had to save in a group-account and in the last version the Program
keeps part of their payments and gives them back when they agree on the productive investments that they
want to make.
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Table 2.3: Phase-in of the Program in its initial seven waves
Program Starting Depart- Munici- Veredas New
Families
Mean
wave year ments palities municip target index
I 2003-2004 7 13 352 13 18,392 18.0
II 2005-2006 13 34 709 26 17,832 20.0
III 2006-2007 11 24 434 21 17,406 24.0
IV 2007-2008 15 44 828 42 33,546 23.6
V 2008 10 25 763 19 19,743 24.6
VI* 2009 3 7 136 7 7,408 16
VII 2010 10 25 344 11 8,664 23.9
Source: Forest Warden Families Program
*Wave VI was intended at those municipalities that had suffered greatly from heavy rains, and it
operated in a different fashion. It intended to prevent the introduction of illegal crops when people
were economically vulnerable.
The next question is whether the beneficiaries of the program, or the treated (TT) are com-
parable with the distant controls (DC). Table 2.4 presents the differences in key observables
at an individual level between these groups before the program started, to avoid capturing
program effects. We classified beneficiaries and distant controls by the priority the program
had assigned each of their municipalities of receiving treatment (very high, high and low) based
on the targeting index. Using this criteria, 57 percent of our sample is classified as very high
priority, 35 percent into the high priority and 8.5 percent in the low priority category. We find
that beneficiaries and distant controls that live in municipalities with a very high priority of
being treated are very similar in those observable characteristics that could potentially affect
norms of honesty, such as how much coca was present in their area before the Program started.
Given differences in some socioeconomic variables, we make sure to control for them in the anal-
ysis. Even though the control group seems less poor than the treatment group, both groups
are statistically the same when looking at who is above and below the poverty threshold (67
points in the livelihoods index), in which case both groups are considered mostly poor. Despite
both groups having a majority of male-headed households, the treatment group has a lower
proportion as the Program targets female-headed households.
With these results we estimate the impact of the Program for those that have the highest priority
of being treated, as here the control group is the most comparable. Those in municipalities with
a high priority are also comparable, although the distant controls seem to score one point above
the treatments and are poor to a lesser extent. Those in low priority regions do not seem to be
comparable. Given these results we base our analysis in the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
that live in high priority municipalities to increase comparability. Since we are basing out
comparisons on observable information, we added additional data that could also affect our
results such as the municipality’s fiscal performance as a way to measure the capacity of local
authorities, and included distance to big cities.19 The inclusion of additional control variables
19We checked whether a household’s poverty level might have played a role when determining program
participation and confirm that PFGB is not targeting based on poverty, as appears in the program’s guidelines.
Therefore we don’t match on this variable.
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also helps reduce intra-cluster correlation between people living in the same municipality. We
use these variables as control variables in order to estimate the Program’s impact.
Table 2.4: Differences in key variables for each group and treatment priority as defined by the
Program
Very High Very High High High Low Low
TT DC TT DC TT DC
Targeting index 32.33 32.24 19.38 20.60*** 1.26 4
(0.13) (0.11) (0.31) (0.08) (0.16)
Not poor (ICV) 2009 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.12** 0.10 0.15
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Livelihoods index 2009 51.29 54.33*** 54.57 51.91** 49.75 54.80**
(0.47) (0.76) (0.98) (0.60) (1.24) (1.34)
Threat to the state* 5.35 5.31 2.45 2.22 3.46 0.40***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.21) (0.00)
Age of HH head 44.65 49.12*** 49.68 50.64 44.35 52.89***
(0.55) (0.75) (1.03) (0.55) (1.63) (1.46)
Sex of HH head (male) 0.73 0.83*** 0.79 0.89*** 0.59 0.94***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
Coca before FGB* 9180.49 8592.28 258.53 498.96 12993.71+
(278.16) (180.17) (16.36) (6.61) (1513.19)
Observations 842 442 281 739 113 83
Note: Significance levels ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.1.
*These variables are at the municipal level, for the municipalities where these people live.
+There are only two municipalities in this category. One of them, San Jose del Guaviare, has histori-
cally had very high levels of coca, and this single point pushes the average to outstanding levels.
When we take the retrospective variables that described the households in 2009, one can es-
timate a probability of being treated based on individual characteristics in order to see how
similar they are. Figure 2.1 shows the propensity scores for the whole sample (left) and for
those that live in very high priority municipalities. If we take the whole sample there is enough
common support in order to carry out comparisons, even though the distant controls are skewed
towards the left. When we only take those that live in high priority municipalities, the dis-
tant controls are no longer skewed and the distribution among them is very similar. Given all
the reasons mentioned, we feel confident that both municipalities and households coming from
treated and non-treated areas are suitable for estimating the impact of the FGB Program on
dishonesty, especially when we focus on those who live in high priority areas.
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Experimental design and procedures
Our experimental design follows Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Participants are asked to roll a
six-sided fair die 10 times in private, and report what they got in each throw. The payment is
estimated by summing the value reported over the ten throws and multiplying it by 100. The
maximum payments is 6000 (3 USD) or the equivalent of one third of a daily salary.
Decisions were made in private and did not depend on the decisions of other participants, since
each survey took place in the person’s house.20 Many of the places where the surveys were
collected are dangerous and giving cash to the enumerators could have placed them in high
risk. For this reason people were paid in cellphone minutes. Cellphone coverage in rural areas
is high and has become very popular, even among farmers in distant regions. However, people
buy the phone without a calling plan, and buy “calling minutes” whenever they have some
extra cash. People could choose the company where they wanted to buy minutes from and gave
their cellphone information to the enumerator who passed this information to Econometria,
where some team members made sure that the minutes were delivered to the phone numbers
given. They also implemented random monitoring of this delivery and made sure that people
had received the amount promised. This payment in minutes was seen very positively by the
people, as everyone wants to have minutes but can usually not afford them. If someone did
not have a cellphone, they could send the minutes to the cellphone they usually used, owned
typically by a spouse, parent, child, friend, etc.
This experimental structure does not allow us to identify individual lying, but lets us compare
what people did with what is expected from throwing a fair six-sided die 10 times. In particular,
we can compare whether people’s answers differed from the expected mean of 3.5, whether each
possible number was reported with its expected probability of 1/6 (0.167) and if the obtained
distribution follows the expected uniform distribution.
20We asked the enumerator to turn around and move away from the respondent. Given the low schooling
rates among our population, some people said they could not write. In this case, the enumerator clearly showed
and explained each side of the die, and gave him the possibility to shout each roll to the enumerator to write
down. In this case the enumerator would be far and facing an opposite direction, but would listen and write
down each throw. This happened in very few cases, but allowed everyone to play.
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We embedded the experiment in the middle of the impact evaluation survey, right when the
household section was finished and before the business/economic activity section started. They
were told that since the survey was long, they deserved some time to relax, play a game and
also have the chance to get some economic gain from their time, which depended only on their
luck. This way they could not relate the experiment with a question on values or honesty. It
was never mentioned that their answers would be checked, nor were they told that they should
not cheat; they were simply allowed to play, no questions asked.
Empirical strategy
Main specification for impact estimation
To assess the impact of the Program we run an OLS regression for the following model:21
SumThrows = β0 + β1FGBi + β2TargetIndexi + β3Xi + εi (3)
where, FGB is the variable of interest and takes a value equal to one for beneficiaries of
the program, TargetIndex is the index built by the Program and used to target program
municipalities andX includes additional variables such as sex of household head, distance to the
closest urban cluster and fiscal performance of the municipality. We use the sampling weights
defined by the impact evaluation where the strata are municipalities. Evidence of spillover
effects from the treatments to their neighboring controls, and the comparability results shown
in the identification section advised the use of the distant controls as the comparison group.
Possible channels and interesting correlations
We have two main channels that we want to test: moral reminders and justifications. Moral
reminders appeared during the workshops, were people were reminded about the importance
of adhering to the law and following the rules of the state. Justifications for growing coca are
many, but the one that is most commonly heard is that without coca people will not make
a living (poverty). In fact, participants were asked if they thought that people would work
or start working again with coca and if so, why. More than half (55%, no difference between
treatment and control) stated that people would work with coca, and out of those, the most
cited reason for both groups was “because people need to get income for their families.”
Since only the treatment group received moral reminders, we run the regression described in Eq.
4 with only FGB respondents, where we look at the effect of treatment intensity on dishonesty.
21As a robustness check we estimate the impact using propensity score matching with Abadie and Imbens’
(2006, 2011, 2012) methods for correct standard errors. This check is useful as it not only controls for the ob-
servable variables as OLS does including them in the propensity score, but additionally matches each beneficiary
with a control that has the same probability of being treated. The common support assumption was presented
in the identification strategy section. We double checked that the variables included in the Propensity Score
Matching were actually the right ones to determine participation by estimating a boosted regression (Shon-
lau, 2005) that non-parametrically calculates the influence of each variable in determining participation. This
analysis concludes that the secondary data variables have the highest influence in determining FGB treatment.
We also set a caliper of 0.15 (half of the standard deviation of the propensity score) as the maximum distance
between two observations to be matched, and prevents that observations that have very different propensity
scores are matched. Results of this exercise can be seen in the Appendix.
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Attendance to the workshops is mandatory and not showing up can cause beneficiaries to stop
receiving the monetary transfers. The Program hires local actors to carry out the workshops
such as universities, NGOs and other types of organizations, who must follow a curriculum
and teach specific topics, but who have freedom to decide how they teach and how to allocate
the hours that they need to teach in total. In the end, everyone will have received the same
intensity of treatment, but there could be differences in the intensity received at the point of
the evaluation, as people where still being treated, or because some people entered the program
at different moments. This exogenous variation of intensity of treatment allows us to interpret
the relationship between program intensity and reported rolls as causal.
To test the poverty-dishonesty relationship we include the ICV index as a poverty measure in
the regression. The livelihoods index (ICV in Spanish) is an index constructed by the Colombian
government to capture multidimensional poverty which includes quality of housing, access to
public utilities, education variables and household composition. The index ranges between 0
and 100, where 0 is absolute poverty and 100 is no poverty. The Constitutional Court has
established a threshold of 67 to define who is poor and non-poor according to this measure.
We also want to test additional relationships, such as whether living in a place that has higher
historical levels of coca relates to higher dishonesty, or if higher social capital prevents dishon-
esty. Even though we can’t establish a causal link between honesty and poverty or illegality,
a correlation is also of great interest. For comparison purposes we run the same regression for
the control group (without treatment intensity) to see whether the relationships operate in a
similar way. We estimate the following linear equation:
SumThrows = β0 + β1Ii + β2I
2
i + β3Pi + β4P
2 + β5Ci + β6Si + β7Oi + εi (4)
Where I is the intensity of treatment measured in hours of workshops received, and captures
the effect of one additional hour of exposure to workshops on dishonesty, with its squared
term to to see if there are diminishing returns to the intervention or turning points; P is the
livelihoods index with its square term to capture non-linearities of poverty with dishonesty as
suggested by Bjerk (2007), Muroi and Baumann (2009) and Hipp and Yates (2011). C contains
variables related to violence, coca, and coca spraying strategies used by the government, S
contains variables regarding social capital, O has additional control variables and ε is an error
term. These sets of variables aim to test the different possible hypotheses behind dishonesty
that we discussed.
Results
This section presents the results of the study starting with an overview of who are the people
sampled, followed by descriptive statistics of dishonesty patterns. We then show the results of
the Program on dishonesty and finish with a model that explores the mechanisms that could




Survey and secondary data confirm that we are dealing with a population that has not been
considered before in dishonesty studies; mainly poor, marginalized and mostly rural. Only 43%
of our sample lives above poverty, 82% have at most primary schooling (22% have no education
whatsoever and 42% did not finish elementary school) and 82% live in dispersed rural areas.
The average monthly per capita expenditure is approximately 66 USD. All municipalities where
people live have had coca at some point since 2001; security wise 70.7% have been on average
“red” zones and 25.5% yellow zones, as defined by the Ministry of Defense; in fact, 26.5%
reported a violent calamity in the past 5 years.22
Are people cheating?
To answer this question we consider the proportion of times that each number was reported.
Figure 2.2 presents the results and suggests that people are not truthfully reporting their throws.
Higher numbers are more often reported than low numbers. Compared with the predicted
probability of appearance (16.7 percent), the number one was less likely to be reported (14.5
percent of the throws) while the number six was more likely to be reported (19.2 percent of the
throws).


























22Red zones have a serious insecurity problem that needs special resources and actions. Insecurity is measured
by threats concerning: homicides, massacres, kidnappings, land mines, coca fields, presence of illegal armed
groups, combats with armed groups and internal forced displacement. Yellow areas have some insecurity issues
regarding some aspects and need to be monitored.
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An alternative approach to consider the degree of honesty in the game is to compare the
predicted distribution (a normal distribution with mean=35) with the distribution of the total
sum reported. Figure 2.3 presents this comparison. We find that the average value reported is
significantly higher than the predicted mean value (t-test, p<0.1). Moreover, we find that the
Kolmogorov-Smirnof test rejects the equality of the reported distribution to what is expected
from throwing a balanced die 10 times. However, even though the majority obtained a larger
than expected sum, only a few seemed to cheat completely. These findings point to incomplete
lying and conform with the theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008).




















Are beneficiaries of FGB more honest?
We now focus our attention on differences between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
Table 2.5 shows the proportion of times each number was reported for beneficiaries and distant
controls. We find that dishonesty occurs for all groups and that a low number is less likely to
be reported than a large number. However, the degree of dishonesty is relatively higher in the
distant control group than in the beneficiary group. When considering the mean of the throws,
FGB beneficiaries report on average 3.63 and distant controls 3.72 — all statistically different
from the expected average of 3.5 (p-value of t-test 0.003).
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Table 2.5: Proportion of numbers reported per group







Note: Significantly different than the expected probability of each throw of 1/6 (0.167) at ***
0.01, ** 0.05 and *0.1 levels
We tried to get closer to an individual measurement of dishonesty by comparing the distribution
of throws for each individual to the expected uniform distribution and computing a Kolmogorov-
Smirnof test with the exact p-value of their difference.23 This is a very demanding test as the
whole distribution is taken into account and it must differ from the expected mean, thus we
establish these results as a lower-boundary for cheating, since those that are cheating by a little,
or only with some particular numbers would not come out as cheaters under this definition.
Under this lower-bound approach we find that 8.3% of the beneficiaries and 11.9% of the distant
controls most likely cheated, as there is a significant difference between the observed distribution
of throws and the predicted distribution at a 95% level.
Dishonesty and the environment
We now explore the relationship between dishonesty and the environment people are exposed
to; namely the amount of coca hectares in their municipality. Figure 2.4 presents the relation
between number of coca hectares and the average reported die-rolls. We find that municipalities
with higher exposure to illegality (more coca) also exhibit a higher reported die-roll average,
suggesting a positive association between dishonesty and other forms of illegality.24
23We estimate the exact p-value to account for very few observations (10 per person).
24We only look at FGB beneficiaries to avoid possible uncontrolled endogeneity in descriptive results that
don’t yet include the observed rules that determine program participation.
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Impact of the program on dishonesty
Up to here we have only shown possible relationships and differences between groups, but
we have not established any type of causality. The next results address possible endogeneity
problems by controlling for variables that determine participation as well as for variables that
were different at the beginning of the Program, and answer how large the impact of the FGB
Program was, and what factors could be behind it.
Table 2.6 shows the impact of the Program on the reported sum of throws, our approximation
of dishonesty. The first column presents the effect of the intervention, controlling for variables
that determined selection into treatment. Since we are interested in the poverty channel and
the Program gives money to its beneficiaries (giving rise to the question of welfare effects), we
want to make sure that the effect of the program holds, once we control for the livelihoods index.
We find that the Program lowered dishonesty by one unit of the sum of reported rolls, and by
1.2 units when poverty is included.25 Poverty itself also plays a significant non-linear role that
we will discuss below. It is interesting to note that the program decreases dishonesty, while
having a high chance of being prioritized by the targeting index has a positive relationship with
dishonesty. In the next regressions we disaggregate the index by some of its components and
try to see which of its elements might relate to higher dishonest behavior. What is important
to note is that the program counteracts these factors and reduces dishonesty. We will discuss
this finding in the next section.
25When we implement PSM as a robustness check, we find higher reducing effects of the Program of 1.8 units
on the average (ATE) and 2.1 on the treated (ATT), for those who live in very high priority areas. We also find
positive, but smaller impacts when we consider the whole sample of 1.4 (ATE) and 1.6 (ATT). See Tables A2.2
and A2.3 in the Appendix for results.
73
Table 2.6: Impact of the Forest Warden Families Program on dishonesty
(1) (2)
Sum of Die Throws
FGB -1.001∗∗ -1.150∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.440)
Targeting Index 0.065 0.074∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Gender: Male -1.013∗∗ -1.072∗∗
(0.425) (0.425)
Distance to closest city (x100km) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Municipal fiscal performance -0.044∗ -0.041∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Livelihoods Index baseline 0.167∗∗
(0.075)





Num. Strata (municipalities) 18 18
Clustered SE in parentheses. Includes only people in municipalities with high priority of treatment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Interesting relationships and possible channels
Table 2.7 shows regression results that relate to the total sum of die reports for beneficiaries
and distant controls in terms of five different potential drivers: intensity of exposure to culture
of legality workshops (only for the treated); livelihoods index (poverty); conflict, coca and
violence (illegal environment); social capital, and other variables. The rich survey collected
for the impact evaluation permits exploring each of these relations. We start with treatment
intensity, as we want to know whether exposure to workshops that highlight topics such as social
capital, associability and most importantly for us, culture of legality were behind changes in
dishonesty. The program relies on local implementing actors who carry out the workshops and
technical assistance and they decide how it should be executed, how many hours, which types
of activities, etc. Since attending workshops is mandatory, variation in treatment intensity
depends on the implementer and not on the beneficiaries’ motivation to participate.26
26We looked at the correlation between treatment intensity and control variables and found no relation
between treatment intensity and poverty, threat to the state (security), trust, land quality, age and sex of head
of household. We found a statistically marginal correlation with being part of an association and with having
received other programs from the State. These variables all enter as control variables in the regression for this
reason.
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Table 2.7: Possible determinants of die reports (dishonesty)
Treatment Distant Control
(1) (2) (3)
Sum of Die Throws
Livelihoods Index 0.19069∗∗∗ 0.19304∗∗∗ 0.04883
(0.0679) (0.0677) (0.1408)
Livelihoods Index squared -0.00160∗∗∗ -0.00163∗∗∗ -0.00087
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Participation in social programs -0.30350 -0.34046 1.09656
(0.4048) (0.4050) (0.6743)
Coca in municipality (x100 hectares) 0.00568∗ 0.00608∗∗ 0.02885∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0134)
Spraying intensity 0.28664∗∗∗ 0.29318∗∗∗ 0.28161∗∗
(0.1052) (0.1055) (0.1404)
Manual erradication intensity -0.00212 -0.00016 1.83401∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0238) (0.6000)
Productive association 0.31929 0.25425 -2.50458∗
(0.4018) (0.4030) (1.4180)
Threat to security 0.49503∗∗∗ 0.50043∗∗∗ 0.00000
(0.1589) (0.1590) (.)
Trust in others 0.89297 0.89958 -0.55912
(0.6470) (0.6469) (1.0627)
Christian household head 0.20672 0.13426 -0.64297
(0.4123) (0.4123) (0.8239)
Age household head -0.01125 -0.01011 -0.00360
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0242)
Gender: Male -0.95377∗∗ -0.90023∗∗ -1.41401
(0.4325) (0.4330) (0.9552)
Intensity of training 0.00851∗
(0.0043)
Intensity of training squared -0.00001∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Constant 27.79855∗∗∗ 27.40636∗∗∗ 33.70429∗∗∗
(2.3528) (2.3690) (4.8041)
Subpopulation Observations 1077 1077 440
Num.Municipalities 19 19 4
Clustered SE in parentheses. Distant controls only with high priority of treatment.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We find an interesting non-linear significant effect of treatment intensity on dishonesty that
can be better appreciated in Figure 2.5. The first hours of workshops do not make a difference;
in fact, they could even increase dishonesty (a potential reason for this is discussed in the
next section). However, as exposure increases, dishonesty decreases: at 350 hours of training
(around 8 weeks) dishonesty starts decreasing and when people have received around 730 hours
of workshops dishonesty is no longer observable, as people’s total report equals the expected
report of 35. From this point forward even smaller amounts are reported. We control for
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participation in other state programs, to make sure that the effect is coming from FGB’s
intervention and not from participation in other programs simultaneously or in the past.
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As we mentioned, the program is also generating a welfare effect, as its main treatment is
giving people bimonthly payments conditional on farmers keeping their land (and the whole
community) coca free. If cheating is mainly fueled by necessity, controlling for poverty might
take away the significance of legality workshops. We find that poverty relates to dishonesty
in a non-linear way.27 In fact, the sum of reported throws is at its peak when the farmers
are at the threshold between being poor and non-poor with respect to their livelihoods index.
When people cross this threshold, dishonesty starts decreasing. However, the poorest of the
distribution are also the ones that cheat the least.
This relationship can be better observed in Figure 2.6, where it is clear that dishonesty starts to
decrease as poverty reaches the poor/non-poor cutoff of 67 points. It is interesting to note that
this relationship is only visible in the treatment group. In the distant controls, even though the
signs are in the same direction, the relationship is insignificant. A very important result is that
controlling for poverty does not affect the impact that treatment intensity has on dishonesty.
27We test a linear and cubic relationship between poverty and dishonesty and none are significant. This goes
in line with the literature that has found a non-linear, positive-diminishing relationship between poverty and
crime (Bjerk, 2007; Muroi and Baumann, 2009; Hipp and Yates, 2011).
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Next we explore how the type of environment people are exposed to relates to dishonesty. We
have access to both secondary municipal data and self-reported survey data to tackle the con-
flict, violence and coca dimensions.28 We also look into the intensity of forced coca eradication,
by calculating the amount of coca hectares sprayed over the amount of coca hectares in the
municipality at the end of the previous year.29 We can not draw causality conclusions from this
analysis, as we can not be sure people did not self-select into high coca and high violence areas.
We have some evidence that the causality goes in the direction of the regression (coca generates
dishonesty) as the average person has lived in their community for 29 years and the median for
27 years, which means that they arrived before the coca booming years of the 1990’s and the
early 2000’s. Nonetheless we are cautious and don’t claim causality in this relationship.
Interestingly, we find a positive and very strong relationship at 1% of significance between
hectares of coca fields in the municipality and total die reports: higher amounts of coca in a
municipality are related to higher reports (indicative of higher dishonesty), in both treatment
and control groups. Living in the average coca exposure of 5449 hectares in coca regions relates
to higher dishonesty in 0.33 units compared to those that live in a coca-free region, and living at
the maximum exposure would increase cheating by 2.6 points, a big difference considering that
the impact of the program reduces dishonesty by around 1.2 units. Since coca is an important
component of the targeting index, this might be one of the reasons why, even after controlling
for program participation, the targeting index positively relates with dishonesty. High aerial
spraying intensity has a strong and positive correlation with dishonesty (controlling for coca
hectares), and this effect is quite large: those living at the average spraying intensity already
increase their dishonesty by 1.45 points, while those exposed to the maximum intensity would
28Coca is included in this topic given the close relationship between coca and armed conflict in Colombia.
29It is possible that in one municipality the same hectare was sprayed various times during the year due to
replanting or the fact that people were able to protect their coca from the spray. In this sense, some municipalities
experience much higher eradication intensity than others.
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report 13 more points. It is interesting to note that for FGB beneficiaries this relationship is
only observed with aerial spraying and not with manual eradication, while for the control group
manual eradication also increases dishonesty. In terms of violence we take the security index
that captures military confrontations, attacks and other conflict-related variables and find that
the higher the threat to security that a municipality poses, the higher is the reported sum of
throws. If we use a sub-category of this index, threat to personal security, its effect goes up to
1.5 points. We stay with the overall index, which captures more aspects of security.30
None of the social capital and collective action variables seem to affect people’s behavior in the
die experiment. Whether people trust other community members does not have any effect and
if they work as part of a producers’ association also does not make a difference, except for the
control group, where being part of an association is related to lower reported sum of throws.
We introduce personal variables such as age, gender and belonging to an evangelic church and
find that only gender makes a difference: Respondents that come from households with male
heads report lower total throws.
Discussion
We now discuss each of our hypotheses in light of the results. We first point out that our
population behaves similarly to what other studies have found: people are cheating but not
maximally. Even though it was perfectly possible to report a 6 in every single throw, only 6
people did this (0.16%), and only 1.02% reported values that where always above 3. However,
these numbers are much lower than what others have found; for instance, in Fischbacher and
Heusi’s (2008) experiment, one fifth of their study subjects lie fully. However, differences in
experimental design can lead to differences in the results.31 It seems that people tried to keep
their self-concept of being an honest person by making sure that they also reported low numbers
once in a while, but still tried to get a higher payoff by reporting higher paying numbers: a one
was reported 14.5% of the times, while a 6 came up 19.2% of the throws. This conforms to all
the studies mentioned in the literature review that find some sort of self-concept maintenance.
Ariely (2013) calls this balancing act the process of rationalization which states that “as long as
we cheat by only a little bit, we can benefit from cheating and still view ourselves as marvelous
human beings.”
Moreover, some evidence points to the fact that even though people cheated, this did not change
their level of acceptance of unethical actions mentioned in the survey: most of them still find
unethical behaviors unjustifiable and having cheated in the game does not make a difference.
We did find acceptance of two unethical behaviors positively related to higher reported rolls,
namely, taking energy without paying for it and not paying taxes. This could mean that
30In the highest priority distant control group this variable is dropped as it is highly collinear with manual
and aerial eradication. Until alternative development is not in place in a municipality, eradication strategies
differ.
31In their experiment people had to report only the first roll of the die. Also, in their case the highest paying
number was 5, because 6 was taken as a 0.
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some people have a higher threshold before they feel that a behavior is wrong. Self-deception
(Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Bazerman and Banaji, 2004) could play a role here, as people reframe
an unethical act in a way that is not perceived to be wrong and in this way have a higher
threshold before their internal mechanism that limits dishonesty is activated.
This tendency to cheat incompletely was common for both treatment and control groups, with
one difference: treatments cheated more toward the extremes but reported middle values such
as three and four in the expected way, while controls cheated always, and didn’t report any
value in the expected way. They switched from under-reporting all values equal or less than
three, to over-reporting everything equal to or greater than four.
This brings us to whether the Program had any effect on cheating; we found that being part
of FGB reduces dishonest behavior, especially for those who have had greater exposure to
the workshops. The program does two things that might be behind these results: first, it
offers workshops and technical assistance where culture of legality is emphasized, and second,
it requires every community member and program beneficiary to sign a contract where they
promise to keep their land free of coca (similar to signing the tax return form before filling it
out). This can be looked at through the lens of the “moral reminder” studies already mentioned,
since the program could trigger such reminders through both of these channels. Even when
people receive technical assistance they are reminded that its aim is supporting the switch from
illegal activities to legal products. Together with their pre-program promise to keep their land
legal, ethical concerns are raised and continually made salient to program beneficiaries.
The legality workshops are also relevant for social norms, as they define what is acceptable
or unacceptable (Kallgren et al. 2000). In fact, the literature points out that when social
norms are perceived to be weak, social norms are less likely to be followed (Vetter et al., 2010).
Frequent “morality cues” in the form of culture of legality workshops could develop into an
internal social norm that embraces legality and leads community members to reward those
who comply with the law and punishing those that go against it (Mazar and Ariely, 2006).
The Program requires communities to form “surveillance groups” so that the community itself
controls coca production in its territory; their success in achieving compliance with a coca-free
land might rest in how well a social norm of legality is internalized (Campbell, 1964).
It is interesting to note that in the workshops legality is mentioned in terms of illegal activities
and not in terms of cheating. Our results suggest that once morality is activated in one aspect,
other aspects where it may play a role are also activated. As mentioned earlier, dishonesty
spreads from one aspect to another. Our results suggest that the opposite is also true: once
morality is improved in one domain (working in the legal sector), it can influence morality in
other domains (not cheating).
Another point we want to discuss is the non-linearity of the intensity of treatment on dishonesty
and the fact that only when people are exposed to high doses of intervention does their dishon-
esty decrease, while if they only receive small doses the intervention might even backfire and
generate negative effects. One possible explanation is the relationship between team work and
cheating, which has been found to increase dishonesty (Gino et al., 2013; Ariely 2013; Ploner
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and Regner, 2013). These experimental studies found that when people were put in groups
where their acts of cheating also helped other group members, they cheated even more than
when the benefit of cheating was individual. Dishonesty was higher even when supervision was
present, but the group and supervisors knew each other and developed a relationship. It seems
that working in groups and cheating on behalf of others helps people rationalize dishonest be-
havior and makes unethical actions seem less immoral. FGB operates in regions where social
capital and trust have been hurt by armed conflict. The workshops also aim at strengthening
social capital, associative work and community ties, thus bringing the community together. As
social ties are restored, the possibility of collectively being dishonest also arises (for example,
going back to coca and helping each other not getting caught). However, if the community
is at the same time highly exposed to culture of legality workshops, and the moral standards
of the community and its members are made salient, the possible negative effects of group
collaboration might be counteracted, as we found.
The non-linear relationship between poverty and dishonesty is, as far as we know, new in the
literature. We find that maximum die reports are found right before the poverty threshold is
crossed, which points to the possibility that what motivates cheating is not poverty, but the
distance to overcoming poverty. If one is too far from the threshold, cheating might not even
appear to make any difference, but when crossing the threshold seems plausible, then an idea
such as “the means justify the ends” might kick in. Despite not being able to claim causality
of this result, the relationship could be indicative of possible indirect effects of the Program in
reducing dishonesty, which could be further studied. In particular, if the cash transfers farmers
receive and the alternative crops work in favor of overcoming poverty, then dishonesty is also
further reduced. This result goes in the same direction as that of crime and poverty, where
poverty has a positive but diminishing relationship with crime.
Living in an area where coca is highly present also relates to honesty in a negative way. The
fact that coca cultivation is acceptable in these regions could easily lead to a social norm of
tolerance to working with illegal crops.32 Ariely (2013) states that when the social norms that
define which behaviors are appropriate or not are not very clear, what others do becomes a clear
signal of what is right or wrong. Gino et al. (2009) find that cheating can increase by observing
the bad behavior of others, especially when people feel that they belong to the same group.
Thus, if someone in a distant rural area sees others start working with coca and profit from
it, he could quickly think that this behavior is not wrong because others are doing it, and can
rationalize engaging in coca growing much easier. If we add to this what we discussed earlier of
immorality spreading from one aspect of life to another, illegality in economic activities could
spread into general cheating or dishonesty. Following the logic of the Broken Windows theory
(Wilson and Kelling, 1982) and of the neighborhood effects literature, when people see others
not conforming to a norm of legality, they are less likely to follow it, and create a vicious circle
of illegality.
32As we cannot argue causality, it is possible that areas where tolerance to illegality is high attracts people
that are less willing to follow the law. This relationship is also problematic. Once people self-select into high
illegality areas, social norms of legality are even harder to arise.
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The very strong and positive relationship between dishonesty and the state’s primary anti-
narcotics strategy, aerial spraying, calls for attention. Even though FGB is a voluntary eradi-
cation Program, beneficiaries have been exposed to forced eradication (aerial spraying and/or
manual eradication) in many ways. Before entering the program they could have been targeted
by a spraying campaign and been themselves sprayed; after entering the program they could
have been exposed by miscalculation of a pilot spraying neighboring areas, by hearing stories
about their non-beneficiary neighbors being sprayed, or by seeing spraying planes fly above
them. Presence of spraying airplanes and how often they are seen are a sign to the locals of
how strong the state’s spraying policy is in the area, even if they are not themselves sprayed
on. Since we have aerial spraying information at the municipal level and not the community
level,33 we can only test the relationship between dishonesty and living in a municipality that
has endured a given amount of eradication intensity. High aerial spraying disproportionality
could signal a battle between the state and the population, as the latter actively seeks to un-
dermine the government’s eradication efforts by re-cultivating coca and defending their coca
fields, and the former insists on spraying whenever the coca reappears. Why people so strongly
defend coca in these areas is not clear; it is possible that some communities have even higher
tolerance for illegal activities, which correlates with an overall higher threshold for unethical
behavior and leads to the relationship found. It could also be that farmers view any other
agricultural activity as unfeasible because of a lack of roads and infrastructure and see their
livelihoods attacked, in which case the poverty channel could play a role. Moreover, many of
these communities have had high presence of illegal actors for longer periods of time, where
they, and not the State have been the ones in charge of day-to-day order and where the rule of
force, rather than the rule of law has been followed. In fact, the positive relationship between
security threat and dishonesty could mean that people’s overall moral compass might be dam-
aged from exposure to events that constantly violate the rule of law along with human rights,
and to environments where violent and illegal acts are normal.
This result calls for caution when using forced eradication, especially aerial spraying, as the
main mechanism for eradication: the reduction of coca per se that results from high eradication
disproportionality might not lead to sustainable results in the long term, as people might feel
alienated from the state, and thus could tend to oppose the rule of law in the future. This creates
a situation that can very likely hamper people’s moral compass and is very well described in
Vanda Felbab-Brown’s studies on counterinsurgency and the war on drugs: very strong forced
eradication programs directly attack the livelihoods of marginalized farmers who, alienated from
the state, seek protection by illegal armed groups and even favor them. She states that without
“winning the hearts and minds” of farmers, eradication efforts and even counterinsurgency
efforts will be in vain. It is interesting to see that this increase in dishonesty is not statistically
significant with manual eradication in the treatment group, but it is in the control group. Aerial
spraying might be perceived as unjust by the population, as it affects not only coca plantations
but also legal crops, and it often also falls on people who do not have coca but are close to
33We talked directly to the anti-narcotics police who have this data and tried very hard to get it but it was
not possible.
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coca plantations.34 For the control group, without being given alternatives to coca, manual
eradication would be seen in a similar light to aerial spraying. This reassures the argument that
the rise in dishonesty comes from a loss of legitimacy of the state that could trigger anti-rule
of law behaviors.
The only personal characteristic negatively correlated with dishonesty is having a male head of
household. Other studies have found results in three directions: some find that women cheat
more than men (Fosgaaard, 2013), others quite the opposite (Azar et al., 2013; Vetter et al.
2010; Bucciol et al., 2013) and others find no effect at all (Childs, 2012). As Childs (2012)
states, gender differences could be country or culture-specific and until now it is not clear why
one gender would cheat more than the other.
Finally we would like to point out some limitations and drawbacks of our study. One possible
drawback is the inability to measure individual cheating; however, the workshop interventions
are aimed at the whole community and powerful conclusions can be drawn at this level, making
this drawback less crucial.
An additional limitation is the inability to establish a causal link between the dishonesty found
in the experiment and present or future engagement with coca crops. We found that only 7.3%
of the beneficiaries believe that people from the community would grow coca in the next six
months compared to 16.7% of the distant controls and 13.7% of the neighboring controls. We
would need individual follow-up measures that capture coca fields at the community level to
confirm the link between honesty and coca-free communities. Despite this limitation, we take a
look at the other side of the coin, the relationship between dishonesty and legal crops (see Table
A2.4 in the Appendix), and find that those who reported higher throws in the experiment use
lower percentages of their land for legal agricultural purposes, even after controlling for land size
and other variables. Even though this is no proof of causality nor of long-term sustainability,
it does show that general honesty is linked with legal productive decisions in the short run.
This study also leaves an interesting door open for future research concerning the open question
of why dishonesty levels in our experiment, both for the treatment and control groups, are so
much lower than those reported in other experiments in developed countries in urban settings.
One first step would be to run this same experiment within Colombia in urban and rural settings
and a much wider variation of poverty and exposure to violence, after tackling the challenge of
the endogeneity caused by self-selection into coca growing areas, urban areas, etc. This would
shed some light on whether systematically cheating is lower in rural areas, where family ties
and social capital tend to be stronger.
Conclusions
We study the impact on dishonesty of an alternative development program targeted to coca
growing regions in Colombia where the rule of law is low and a culture of illegality is the
34Chapter 1 studies the relationship between spraying disproportionality and legal crops and finds that very
disproportionate spraying campaigns crowd out legal activities.
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norm. Through a dishonesty experiment we found that the Forest Guarding Families Program’s
intervention that emphasizes culture of legality significantly reduces cheating. This suggests a
spillover from voluntary eradication efforts to more general realms of people’s morality, reflected
in more honest communities.
We find that high intensity aerial eradication efforts could backfire into even more dishonest
communities with higher thresholds for illegal behavior if not accompanied by support to the
communities, preventing their alienation from the state. This has very strong implications on
the effectiveness of policies that want to change norms of compliance with the law, especially
in areas where illegality is the norm. Once moral reminders are systematically introduced
in people’s lives, moral standards change and with them the internal personal threshold that
decides what an unacceptable behavior is. The reduction in dishonesty we observe could be an
indicator of changing social norms towards unethical behavior as a whole and can potentially
derive in more honest communities that are willing to try harder on the side of legality before
they cross over to illegality once again. The support of the state to ensure that communities
remain strong in this path is crucial, making post-eradication efforts key at this point.
The program recognizes that economic incentives also play an important role in people’s decision
to work with coca and for this reason gives conditional cash transfers to its beneficiaries for
a limited amount of time. It also understands that if people’s moral compass is not altered,
as soon as the cash disappears, coca will return. The intervention is able to alter this moral
compass in two complementary ways: first, by giving cash it removes the possibility people have
to rationalize illegality with a survival argument (if I don’t grow coca I can’t feed my family);
second, by exposing beneficiaries to culture of legality workshops, moral reminders trigger
people’s awareness of their own morality and help create a social norm of what is acceptable or
not. The big question is whether, after the first part of the intervention disappears, the second
will be strong enough to keep people away from illegality. A more pressing question is whether
the social norms that evolve from exposure to the program will be strong enough to achieve
sustainable coca reductions in the future.
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Appendix
Table A2.1: Explanation of program presence based on targeting index variables
(1) (2)
Selected for FGB Probit Marginal Effects
main




Geographic continuity 2.540∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.856) (0.107)
National Consolidation Plan -1.060 -0.138
(0.865) (0.110)
Forest Density 0.555∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.020)
Population Density 0.120 0.016
(0.088) (0.011)
USAID MIDAS -0.267 -0.035
(0.790) (0.102)
USAID ADAM 0.574∗ 0.074∗
(0.333) (0.043)
New Department 0.103 0.013
(0.155) (0.020)





Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35
Robust SE in parentheses
Variable definition: MIDAS is USAID’s alternative development program and ADAM its institutional
development program. Geographic continuity aims at targeting areas that are geographically clustered.
The National Consolidation Plan has targeted municipalities to recover them from conflict.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.2: Propensity score estimation using individual and municipal level variables for PSM
results
(1) (2)
Probability of being treated All sample High Priority
tratpuro
HH Level
Livelihoods index 2009 -0.00096 -0.00860
(0.00547) (0.00581)
Gender: Male -0.40749∗∗∗ -0.31948∗∗
(0.09859) (0.14619)
Age of HH head -0.00961∗∗∗ -0.01037∗∗∗
(0.00216) (0.00226)
Food security -0.10765 -0.15411
(0.10495) (0.14629)
Num. people in HH 2009 0.18036∗∗∗ 0.13897∗∗∗
(0.02862) (0.02338)
Targeting index -0.46454 -0.67935
(0.38102) (1.15181)
Targeting index squared 0.00774 0.00988
(0.00618) (0.01655)
Municipality Level
Threat to the state 0.15498 0.13353
(0.17215) (0.28921)
Coca in municipality 0.00008 0.00006
(0.00009) (0.00007)
Distance to closest city 0.00000 0.00003∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001)





Num. Strata (municipalities) 29 18
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.32
Clustered SE in parentheses at municipal level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.3: Impact results from PSM analysis
All Very high priority
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) -1.36** -1.82**(0.58) (0.78)
Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) -1.61* -2.09*(0.89) (1.11)
Significance level: p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.1*. Abadie and Imbens
robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A2.4: Legal production and dishonesty
(1)
Percentage of land under legal production OLS










Perc. land with title -0.013
(0.021)
Land perceived of good quality 3.704∗∗
(1.796)
Access to farm by paved road 2.789
(1.897)
Belongs to productive association 2.829
(2.408)
Time living in community 0.019
(0.047)








Coca in municipality -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Participates in social program 0.565
(1.868)
Threat to the state -0.322
(0.488)
Num. people in HH 2009 0.770
(1.161)
Distance to closest city -0.000∗∗
(0.000)





Num. Strata (municipalities) 29
R2 0.10
SE in parentheses stratified at municipalities.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4. Can we fight drugs using communication campaigns? A
framed field experiment in Colombia †
Abstract
Economic behavior is shaped not only by economic incentives but also by norma-
tive factors. Hence, a promising alternative to reduce crime is the use of persuasive
communication. This paper uses a field experiment to test the effect of persuasive
messages as a strategy in the fight against drugs in Colombia. Our design varies the
salience and the degree of informativeness of the messages that participants receive,
while highlighting particular negative effects of growing coca in the community. We
find that messages that make the relation of coca cultivation with violence salient
are the most effective at reducing coca investments. Our results suggest that the
main mechanism at play is attitudinal change rather than a change in beliefs. In-
terestingly, we find that exposure during the experiment to persuasive messages
translates into lower intentions to cultivate coca in the future. We conclude that
interventions that aim at increasing “awareness” of the negative effects that coca
has in the community are a promising policy instrument in the fight against drugs.
JEL codes: A13, G11, D03, D83, K42, Z13
Keywords: Field experiment, attitudinal change, communication campaigns, illegal behavior.
†Joint work with Marcela Ibanez. This study was financed by the Courant Research Center for Poverty,
Equity and Growth, University of Göttingen and the German Science Foundation under the Grant RTG1723.
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Introduction
Extensive empirical evidence supports monetary incentives as an instrument to deter crime
(Andreoni et al., 1998; Cameron, 1988). However, there is relatively little evidence on how nor-
mative factors can be “triggered” to affect behavior. In this paper we investigate the efficiency
of persuasive messages as a strategy to reduce crime.
The context of our analysis is the war on drugs in Colombia, the largest supplier of cocaine to
the US and European markets. In response to the drug problem, Colombia has engaged in an
aggressive campaign to eradicate illegal crops. Although 1.1% of the annual GDP was invested
annually in the military component of the fight against drugs between 2000 and 2008 (Mejia et
al., 2013), the results of this policy are rather disappointing (Ibanez, 2013; Rozo, 2013; Mejía
et al., 2013). In this context, it seems necessary to identify alternative policy instruments to
decrease the supply of illicit drugs.
Empirical evidence suggests that in areas with coca crops, the number of violent deaths among
the young male population is higher than in comparable areas (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). Mejia
and Restrepo (2013) find that a 10% increase in the price of coca is associated with a 1.25%
increase in homicides, a 3% increase in displacement, a 2% increase in attacks by insurgent
groups and a 1% increase in incidents involving land mine explosions.1 Besides, the production
and processing of coca is associated with negative effects on the environment (UNODC, 2006;
Davalos et al., 2011). It is estimated that between 2001 and 2013, 275,588 hectares of forest
were cut down in Colombia exclusively to grow coca (UNODC, 2014), and Rincón-Ruiz and
Kallis (2013) estimate that between 2001 and 2008 about 110 thousand hectares of primary
forests were cleared to establish coca fields. Additionally, large amounts of agrochemicals are
used in the cultivation and processing of coca base. Bernal (2007) reports 28 different types of
pesticides used to protect the leaves, and estimates that about 2.7 liters of herbicides are used
annually. The transformation of the leaf to coca paste also generates pollution. The gasoline,
sulfuric acid, ammoniac and other chemicals used to producer one kilo of coca paste are freely
disposed in the environment, contaminating water sources.
Normative and moral factors seem to be important in explaining coca growing decisions in
Colombia. Ibanez (2010) finds that producers belonging to protestant groups, producers with
higher degrees of moral development and those that have higher trust in state institutions are
less likely to grow coca. This finding suggests that an alternative policy instrument in the fight
against drugs could be persuasive communication.
Highlighting the negative consequences of illicit drug production seems to be a sensitive ap-
proach to persuade illicit crop producers to voluntarily abandon them, but would this policy
work? Which type of messages would be more effective in persuading producers? Who would
be persuaded by these messages? What would be the mechanisms to explain such behavioral
change?
1Similar estimations are provided by Botero Degiovanni (2013).
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To test the effect of persuasive communication messages on illegal crop cultivation we conducted
a framed field experiment with farmers living in Putumayo, a region with one of the longest
coca cultivation traditions in the world. Mimicking coca cultivation decisions, participants have
to decide how to allocate an endowment between more profitable but risky coca cultivation and
a secure but low-return legal product. Spelling out the negative effects of coca as deforestation,
pollution, increased violence and school dropout, we allow investments in coca to generate
negative externalities. Our experimental design uses four different frames to highlight various
negative consequences of coca cultivation. One of our frames considers the environmental
consequences that coca cultivation generates as deforestation, pollution and health problems.
Two frames consider the effects on violence such as increased presence of illicit armed groups,
more insecurity and domestic violence. Yet one of the frames is only descriptive while the other
provides quantitative information. The last frame considers the negative effects on values (easy
money, no respect for others). The different degrees of informativeness and salience of the
frames allow us to explore the potential channels driving investment decisions. Moreover, using
a post-experimental survey we test whether making the negative consequences of coca salient
influences the opinions and attitudes of farmers toward coca cultivation and the intention to
cultivate coca in the future.
We find that communication messages are effective in changing investment decisions, gener-
ating changes in people’s attitudes and altering the intentions to cultivate coca in the future.
Particularly, we find that messages that communicate the violence that coca generates are the
most effective in reducing farmers’ willingness to invest in coca.
This paper contributes to different areas of research. The first strand is the economic analysis
of persuasion. Economic models of persuasion consider that a sender provides a message with
the potential interest of changing the receiver’s behavior. According to these models, persuasive
communication can explain behavioral change due to belief formation or preference changes.
Persuasive messages can convey new information that is used by rational Bayesian receivers
to update beliefs (Stigler, 1961 and Tesler, 1964).2 Persuasion messages can also help as a
signal (Nelson, 1970) or alternatively, can help to affect behavior of non-perfect rational agents
who have attention deficits and over-react to more salient messages (Karlan et al., 2010).
Persuasion messages can trigger categorical thinkers to change behavior even when the messages
are uninformative (Mullainathan et al., 2008). A second channel by which persuasion can
affect beliefs is by affecting preferences. We build on these theoretical models and empirically
investigate different mechanisms that lead to behavioral change.
There is extensive empirical research on the effectiveness of persuasive communication to in-
crease desirable behaviors such as inter-group prejudice and conflict, racial prejudice, use of
contraceptives, HIV prevention, saving for the old age, loan take-up, obesity and recycling,
among others (Paluck, 2009; Paluck and Green, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Kellstedt, 2000;
Mesina, 2005; Palmgreen et al., 2008; Karlan et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2012; Bertrand, 2009;
2Sophisticated receivers can take into account strategic motives of the persuader leading to persuasion games
(Milgron and Roberts, 1986) in which the sender tries to develop an optimal persuasion strategy (Kamerica and
Gentzkow, 2011). Alternatively, the receiver could neglect the incentives of the sender (Eyster and Rabin, 2009).
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Carlson, 2001; Burn and Oskamp, 1986; Chong et al., 2013). Also recent papers have considered
the use of persuasive communication to increase political participation and shape political atti-
tudes and attitudes towards candidates (Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2009; Oberholzer-Gee
and Waldfogel, 2009; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2009; Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2010; Gamson, 1992; Nelson et al., 1997; Wood, 2000). While most of these stud-
ies find that communication leads to behavioral change, they do not investigate the effect of
communication campaigns on law compliance as we do in this paper.
The second strand to which we contribute is the economic models of law compliance. There is
a relatively long tradition in economics trying to understand why individuals comply with the
law. Empirical literature largely supports the predictions of Becker’s (1968) economic model
of crime (Cameron, 1988; Freeman, 1999; Witte and Witt, 2000; Levitt, 2004). However, the
standard model of crime fails to explain why compliance rates are so high: people report taxes
correctly and pay TV licenses even if the benefits from breaking the law are positive (Andreoni,
1998; Fellner et al., 2013). To account for this anomaly, behavioral economic models of crime
recognize that economic behavior is not only driven by economic incentives but also depends
on normative factors. First, individuals have an internal sense of what is right and wrong and
deviating from this standard generates a feeling of internal disappointment or guilt (Etzioni,
1986; Sen, 1986; Vanberg, 1988). Second, individuals have a sense of respect towards authorities
and the law, which generates a moral obligation to comply (Tyler, 1990). Lastly, individuals
respond to the pressure of the social environment and follow the social code on what is accepted
out of fear of being stigmatized (Elster, 1989; Axelrod, 1986; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986). We
contribute to this research by investigating whether it is possible to persuade individuals to
comply with the law by using non-monetary interventions that aim at triggering normative
factors.
The third strand of literature to which we contribute is on moral suasion. Moral suasion is
defined as a persuasive tactic used by an authority to influence agents to adhere to a policy.
Moral suasion has been used as a strategy to increase tax compliance, with mixed results. In
early field experiments, Schwartz and Orleans (1967), McGraw and Scholz (1991) and more
recently Hasseldine et al. (2007) find that using moral appeals increased reported tax. Yet,
other field experiments have not found significant effects (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Fellner et al.,
2013). Moral suasion has however been effective in decreasing late book returns in the public
library of Barcelona (Apesteguia et al., 2013) and increasing honesty in payments for newspapers
sold in unguarded newspaper boxes (Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013). We contribute to this
research by investigating in the field-lab the effectiveness of persuasive communication on coca
investments, and by investigating the mechanisms that lead to behavioral change. Similarly as
DalBo and DalBo (2013), we use a lab experiment in the field to investigate how information
frames affect beliefs and attitudes, yet we focus on law compliance, whereas they focus of
voluntary contributions to a public good.
Our intervention differs from previous work in many dimensions. First, unlike previous inter-
ventions we do not use explicit normative appeals. Instead of telling participants what the
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“correct” behavior is, we provide participants with an example on the social consequences of
investing in coca (an illegal activity). Second, while previous papers point at the positive effects
of law compliance, we look at the negative effects of breaking the law. Consistent with prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) aversion to losses is expected to play a larger role and
hence, persuasive messages that emphasize losses are expected to have larger behavioral effects.
Third, our intervention does not consider social interaction effects and we do not refer to the
behavior of others. Instead, we are interested in testing whether the intervention affects belief
formation by changing what people expect that others will do. Lastly, unlike previous papers
we are not only interested in measuring the behavioral response to the intervention, but we are
also interested in understanding the mechanisms that lead to such change. To achieve this task
we conduct our intervention in the field-lab, or following List and Levitt’s classification, we use
a framed field experiment and not a natural experiment.
The use of an experiment to measure the effect of communication campaigns has many ad-
vantages over observational data. The comparison of participants’ decisions in a controlled
environment allows us to identify the channels that lead to behavioral changes. Our experi-
ment allows us to test the effect of persuasive messages on the beliefs about others’ behavior,
while keeping constant the beliefs about the social cost of investing in coca and about the risk
of being sanctioned. Moreover, using survey data we are able to investigate the short term
effects of messages on attitudes. The lab in the field also offers the possibility to observe illegal
behavior, something that is harder to achieve with observational data. Since the experiment is
conducted with participants who face the experimental decisions also in their daily life, we can
capture reactions to communication messages in the population that would be targeted by this
policy.
The last strand of literature we contribute to is the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of
anti-drug policies. The few papers that evaluate the impact of anti-drug policies in Colombia
find that coca production falls as the risk of eradication increases, the marginal return of the
alternative is higher or the investment in alternative development grows (Moreno-Sanchez et
al., 2003; Ibanez and Carlsson, 2010; Reyes, 2011; Ibanez and Martinsson, 2013; Ibanez, 2013;
Rozo, 2013; Mejia et al., 2013). We build on this literature by exploring in the field-lab whether
alternative policies can be used in the fight against drugs, in particular if communication
campaigns can be used to persuade coca farmers to abandon the illicit activity. While the effect
of communication campaigns on drug use has been investigated before (Derzon and Lipsey, 2002;
Palmgreen, 2006), this is the first paper that considers the effect of communication campaigns
on drug production.
The paper is organized in seven sections. After this introductory section, section 2 presents the
background of the war on drugs in Colombia and provides a motivation for the intervention
used. Section 3 presents the experimental design and discusses the main hypothesis of the
study. Section 4 presents the experimental procedures. Section 5 presents the results. Section
6 discusses the external validity of the experiment and the last section concludes.
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Background
The war on drugs
The fight against drugs has been critical for Colombia in the last two decades when the country
became a major cocaine producer and started suffering the consequences of this problem.
Two main strategies are used to control drug supply: eradication and alternative development.
Eradication focuses on the detection and destruction of the crops. The second strategy aims
at raising the opportunity cost of coca growing by establishing alternative legal opportunities,
although has been used to a lesser degree compared with the first. Between 2008 and 2010,
the Colombian government spent about US$1,1 billion per year on military component of the
war against drug production and trafficking, with additional US subsidies of US$406 million
per year (Mejia et al., 2013).3
The efficiency of anti-drug policies is however highly contested. Rydell, Caulkings and Ever-
ingham (1996) conclude that it is more cost-effective to implement demand control (treatment)
than enforcement. Grossman and Mejia (2008) and Mejia and Restrepo (2013) use micro sim-
ulation models to estimate the cost-effectiveness of different anti-drug strategies in Colombia,
and conclude that it is more effective to control trafficking than production. Using micro data,
Ibanez (2013) shows that coca cultivation is very inelastic to eradication efforts and that a
one percent increase in eradication decreases coca cultivation in only 0.22 percentage points.
Mejia et al. (2013) consider exogenous variation in restrictions to aerial spraying along the
Ecuadorian border imposed in 2006 to identify the local effects of this policy. They find that
spraying an additional hectare reduces coca cultivation between 0.02 and 0.065 hectares in a
given year. Rozo (2013) gets similar results exploring restrictions to spraying inside national
parks. Aerial spraying has also been criticized on the grounds of the side effects that it generates
on human health. Camacho and Mejia (2013) show that spraying is associated with increased
dermatological problems and miscarriages.
Concerns about the sustainability of supply control efforts in the war on drugs calls for an
alternative approach. Authorities proposed that in order to eradicate coca it was necessary
to create a culture of lawfulness that succeeds in “eradicating coca from peoples’ minds and
hearts.” In 2008, the DNE (Colombia’s agency against illegal drugs), the Ministry of Justice and
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) implemented a mass communication
campaign by radio and television, seeking to persuade producers not to cultivate coca.4 Using a
simple message, a girl said “don’t grow coca, the plant that kills.”5 The message further explains
that coca cultivation is illicit and generates losses at the personal, family and community level.
Although the campaign was criticized on the grounds of disregarding diversity of cultural values
of indigenous populations that use coca for religious and traditional purposes, this was the first
3This represented 1.1% of the annual GDP. In the subsequent period the economy grew so the expenditure
of the war on drugs had a lower share of GDP.
4Previous campaigns have addressed consumption problems or trafficking without making reference to prob-
lems of production.
5The original messages in spanish was “No cultives coca, la mata que mata.”
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time a large-scale intervention was carried out in the country, with the objective of increasing
awareness of the problems that drug production brings to the community. Inspired by the above
campaign, we investigate the effectiveness of persuasive communication to change attitudes
towards coca and coca cultivation. As communication campaigns are part of the strategy that
the government is setting up to recover territories that have been hardly hit by conflict and
illegality, a relevant question is how effective they are in changing people’s attitudes and which
type of messages are more effective in persuading producers to stop working with illegal crops.
Understanding the effects that communication campaigns can have on legality opens up a whole
new avenue of interventions that are able to reach more people at lower costs, and complement
the efforts of other government interventions. Additionally, if communications do in fact change
attitudes towards illegality, the sustainability of other strategies in the fight against drugs is
likely to increase.
Attitudes towards coca
To persuade producers to abandon coca, the first step is to understand why they cultivate
it and what they think about this activity. In November 2011, in cooperation with UNODC
Colombia, we organized two focus group sessions with around 25 cocoa producers that lived in
coca areas and who were beneficiaries of alternative development programs. The objective of
this workshop was to collect information on people’s views on the drug problem. We specifically
asked participants: “In the region many people cultivate coca. Why do you think they do
it?” Participants could vote on the following options: i) Coca is more profitable than other
products, ii) There are no other productive options, iii) People are forced to cultivate it, iv)
It (coca) has better market, v) Coca is a common activity and almost everybody cultivates it,
vi) Other. Not surprisingly, the most voted reason was coca’s higher profitability with respect
to other crops. However, in the subsequent discussion many participants disagreed with this
statement and argued that in the past coca was a better option but that “now” producers were
just receiving enough to cover production costs. The high risk of eradication, lower prices of
coca base and high production costs make this activity no longer attractive. In the discussion,
easier transportation of coca versus other products6 and market security emerged as key factors
explaining why farmers prefer to grow coca. One participant said: “people entered the coca
business even though they knew it was illegal to obtain ’easy’ money.” Another participant
added: “those who started cultivating coca did it not because there were no options, but due to
ambition.” Workshop participants pointed out that the “coca boom” had not brought progress
to the region. Throughout the workshop the relation of illicit armed groups, coca cultivation
and violence was often mentioned. One respondent said: “After the coca boom no money was
left. The only legacy was death and poverty.”
When we asked participants for the reasons why many people were not cultivating coca in the
region, the most voted reason was that they had other productive options, for example cocoa,
6Coca leaves are usually collected at the producer’s farm. In case farmers need to carry the harvested
leaves out of their farm, its weight is much lower than other products such as cacao, plantain, etc., making
transportation easier and cheaper.
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oil palm, avocado, and that these options could be as profitable as coca. Moral aspects were
also cited as a reason for not cultivating coca. One participants said: “My parents did not
cultivate due to scrupulousness.” Other said: “People realize that it harms others in the USA
and Europe.” Another participant added: “Experience with coca in the family allowed us to
think about the problems with coca. The youth are being damaged, they went to work with
coca (raspar) and left their studies. They got used to the easy money without much effort.
The good habits were lost.” Finally, a preference to live in legality and avoid problems with
the authorities and other community members, was commonly cited. One participant said:
“People like to live in legality.” Another one added: “For many, living in peace is important
and therefore they do not cultivate,” “without coca people can live in peace. Leaving the illicit
crops decreased violence.”
Finally, we asked what was needed for people to stop cultivating coca. One respondent said “An
infusion of scrupulousness.” Participants considered that people need to understand the damage
that they generate to their communities and become conscious of the damage that they cause
the younger generations. Interestingly, participants considered that campaigns should focus on
the impact on the consumer more than the impact on their own communities. Another group
considered that people needed productive options to see the advantages of living in legality.
A respondent said “Some people have the consciousness to stop cultivating, but do not have
the resources to do it.” Another participant considered that the problem was related with
consumption. “Policies need to target consumption, but not production. If nobody buys, then
it would not be profitable to cultivate.” These answers suggest that persuasion campaigns,
accompanied by alternative development projects could have the potential to decrease coca
cultivation. We aim at testing this hypothesis in the paper.
Based on the focus group sessions, we selected three sets of arguments on the consequences
of coca cultivation to build our treatments. These argument can be classified according to
how often they were mentioned in the workshop and hence how informative they are. Table
3.1 presents the summary of arguments used by participants in the workshop when pointing
at the negative consequences of coca and the reasons to stop cultivating it. We find that
the argument that is most commonly used (less informative) is related with violence. This
argument was used 16 times. Participants associate coca cultivation with the arrival of illegal
armed groups, increased weapon possession, disputes over coca proceeds and with “death.”
People noticed that there was an increase in domestic violence and a lack of trust in others.
The second most common argument (middle degree of informativeness) was related to what
we denominate “change in values.” People mention that the good traditions were lost, that
children abandoned school to work with coca, that people wanted easy money. The third set of
arguments (high information value) is related with the environment. These arguments are less
frequently mentioned, with few participants recognizing the impacts on deforestation of natural
protected areas, forests and pollution. Another set of arguments was related to consumption
problems. In this case, the consumers were thought of mainly outside their communities, and
participants recognized it as a global problem. Finally, indirect effects like higher risk of legal
crop damage due to aerial spraying were also mentioned.
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Table 3.1: Arguments used to explain why coca is bad for the community
Argument With coca... Total
Violence
Social leaders who disagreed were killed
16Armed groups support coca cultivation
Violence, displacement and extortion increased
Life without coca is safer, more time with the family
Those who did not cultivate did not want problems
Values
Good traditions were lost
9
Coca brings more bars and prostitution
The children dropped out of school
(No coca in order to be) a good example for the youth
Environment
Natural parks are invaded with coca
5
Eradication has negative effects on the environment
Consumption
Drug consumption among adolescents is higher
6
People do not understand consequences on consumption
Note: The arguments are taken from discussions with people living in coca growing areas who are beneficiaries of
an alternative development program. We classify the arguments based on the statements used. We select only a few
examples based on the statements used. Total refers to the simple count of the number of times that arguments were
used. We cannot measure the intensity of emotions that the arguments evoke.
The experiment was conducted with farmers living in the region of Putumayo, Colombia, be-
tween March and May 2012. Putumayo is one of the regions in Colombia with longest tradition
in the cultivation of coca, where it started to be cultivated as early as the 1980’s. By 2000 it was
estimated that 66 thousand hectares were cultivated with coca only in this region, representing
forty percent of all area with coca in the country. As a consequence, Putumayo has been tar-
geted by different anti-drug programs such as aerial spraying, forced manual eradication and
alternative development.
Experimental design
Our experimental design builds on Ibanez and Martinsson (2013). Participants were randomly
and anonymously matched in groups of five. Each participant received ten experimental units
(E = 10) that represent the amount of land, labor and capital available to them for investments
in agricultural activities. Their task was to decide how to distribute the endowment between
investments in coca and cattle farming. They could invest any amount, but investments had
to be done in whole units (0, 1, 2, etc.).
The experiment mimics the three main features of coca cultivation. First, coca is more profitable
than cattle. Hence, each unit allocated to coca receives one point in return, whereas each unit
allocated to cattle receives a < 1. Second, coca cultivation is illegal and with probability p,
authorities will inspect investments. If coca investments are positive, participants are fined
f = 1.2 units. Otherwise, no fine applies. The fine punishes only those who invested part of
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the endowment in coca. Third, coca production generates negative externalities. For each unit
invested in coca in the group, all participants in that group lose b = 0.17 units, independently
on whether they individually invested in coca or not.
The pay-off for subject i when he is not discovered, which happens with probability (1 − p),
can be expressed as
πi = ci + a× (10 − ci) − b
∑
ci, (5)
where ci is the amount invested in coca and a is the relative profit between coca and cattle.
On the other hand, the expected pay-off for subject i when they are discovered, which happens
with probability p, can then be expressed as
πi = ci + a× (10 − ci) − b
∑
ci − f × ci (6)
The experimental design uses a between-within subject design that combines i) five different
frames to persuade producers and ii) nine different marginal incentives to cultivate coca (three
different levels of a and p). We randomized the persuasion treatments over sessions so each
participant was exposed to only one persuasive message. Yet, we allow participants to make
decisions under nine scenarios that vary the relative return to the legal activity, a, and the
probability of inspection, p, so we can compare how each participant behaves under different
scenarios of risk and relative profitability between a legal activity and illegal coca.
Between subject design
Persuasion messages are introduced in a subtle way when we explain the experiment and pay-
offs to the participants. To illustrate the negative consequences associated with coca cultivation
we used different frames that emphasized different potential consequences of coca cultivation.
The frames serve only as cues and are not consequential for the payments in the experiment.
In other words, the size of the negative effect of coca investments is kept constant (b = 0.17)
over treatments. These messages are not deceptive as they are based on actual facts collected
from secondary sources and coca growers’ opinions.7 In the Control treatment we explained:
“Coca cultivation generates negative effects in the community. Hence, for each
point invested in coca every participant in the group will lose b points.”
The persuasion messages were selected according to information that we collected in the two
above-mentioned focus groups in November, 2011. We use three sets of persuasive messages
that vary i) the degree of new information conveyed and ii) the salience of the information.
The degree of informativeness is assessed according to how often people use the arguments as
7The participants in our experiment are not the same as those in the focus groups.
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a justification for not cultivating coca.8 We use four different frames to illustrate the negative
consequences that coca has on the community. The first frame considers the effects of coca on
violence. Based on our focus groups we found violence to be the most commonly cited reason
for arguing against coca cultivation. Since association between coca and violence was clear to
most participants, the Violence treatment can be considered to carry a low informative value.
Participants in this treatment were told:
“Coca cultivation generates negative effects on the community as it increases
violence. In coca growing areas people buy weapons and often get killed in quarrels.
Criminals arrive and illegal armed groups fight to gain control of the territory.
Hence, for each point invested in coca every participant in the group will lose b
points.”
The second frame used to persuade producers was related with the change in values due to coca
cultivation. In coca growing areas school attendance is lower than in non-coca growing areas
(Angrist and Kugler, 2008). Children abandon school to work in coca fields. The proceeds
of coca are not invested in better living conditions but instead are used to buy sex, alcohol
and status goods. Some farmers told us that during the coca boom people stopped consuming
rum and beer (the common drinks) and turned to whiskey (which is typically not even found
in Colombian rural areas and is consumed by the wealthy), and that the best girls from a
famous region came and were available. The women mentioned that the men were barely
home, because of the presence of new bars and prostitution. Even though some participants
mentioned the above reasons, they were not the most commonly mentioned to justify why coca
is bad. Therefore we consider that this treatment has a middle informative value. Participants
in the Value treatment were told:
“Coca cultivation generates a change in values. The money from coca is carelessly
spent and people do not save. The young get used to earning money easily and do
not study. They become lazy and get into bad habits. The proceeds from coca are
spent in partying, alcohol, drugs and sex. Hence, for each point invested in coca
every participant in the group will lose b points.”
The third frame illustrated the negative environmental impacts of coca cultivation. It is es-
timated that since 2001 at least 275,588 hectares of forest have been lost to coca (UNODC,
2014). This does not take into account the loss before 2001, which is hard to estimate without
the satellite pictures available since 2001, and also does not include the hectares eradicated in
order for coca farmers to establish survival crops around the coca crops.9 In addition, the pro-
duction and processing of coca is intense in the use of chemicals that are freely disposed into the
environment, polluting the soil and water sources (Bernal, 2006). As people do not associate
8This measure could also reflect the importance that this criteria has for the people.
9An additional very serious issue is that this deforestation does not follow deforestation by urban expansion,
but happens in places that environmentally strategic, as in the deep forest. Additionally, farmers use a slash-
and-burn technique that depletes the land of its soils, making it much harder for it to recover (UNODC, 2006).
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coca with environmental problems we consider that this treatment carries a high informative
value. Participants in the Environment treatment were told:
“Coca cultivation generates negative effects on the environment. Planting coca
fields generates deforestation. The chemicals used to process coca pollute the soil
and the water and affect human health. Hence, for each point invested in coca every
participant in the group will lose b points.”
The last frame used is similar to the violence frame, except that it makes the relation between
coca and violence more salient. When illustrating the negative effects of coca, we provide actual
figures on violence in coca-growing areas versus non-coca-growing areas. This information is
made salient by showing the order of magnitudes compared with other regions. For example,
experiencing twice the number of violent deaths, being three times more likely to have illegal
armed groups, etc. We consider that this frame has a low informative value as violence is
commonly associated with coca. However, compared to the violence treatment, this treatment
has a high level of salience. Participants in the treatment Violence Data were told:
“Coca cultivation generates negative effects in the community, as it increases
violence. In coca growing areas, homicide rates are twice as high as those in non-
coca areas. While in non-coca growing regions 33.35 out of a thousand people are
killed, in coca growing areas this rate is 63.13. Coca growing areas are three times
more likely to have a massacre. In coca growing areas there are over five combats
per year, vis-a-vis less than one in non-coca areas. In coca growing areas there are
over five land mine accidents per year, while in non-coca areas the average is less
than one. Hence, for each point invested in coca every participant in the group will
lose b points.”
Table 3.2 presents the summary of the persuasion treatments used. We compare the effect of
frames with different informative values (low, middle and high information value) and with
different degrees of salience (no salience or salience) with the control treatment.
Table 3.2: Between subject design: Persuasion treatments
Salience
No Yes
No Information Control -
Information Value
Low Violence Violence Data
Middle Values -
High Environment -
Note: The frames are randomly allocated across sessions. Each participant is exposed to only one frame.
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The messages used emphasize a particular consequence of coca cultivation on the community.
In our design we preferred to focus on the effects on the community only, as we considered
that social distance is an important element in rationalizing coca investments. As discussed
earlier, people in coca growing areas seem to have the perception that the problem of coca is
for the consumer countries and not so much for the producer countries. We are aware that the
information that we give farmers on the negative consequences of coca is not completely new to
them. For this reason we try different levels of informativeness and salience. In fact, people may
think that coca has negative effects, but the direct link between coca and its specific effects,
such as extreme violence, environmental damage and value deterioration is not recognized to the
same degree. One example from the field that this might be the case comes from a conversation
we once had with a farmer, during which we asked him if he had experienced any type of
violence during the coca boom in the region and he answered, “no, not really.” And then he
added: “Well, one of my sons was killed, but that was because a paramilitary wanted his girl.”
(Putumayo, Colombia. December, 2011).
The main hypothesis that we test in our experiment is that persuasion treatments can decrease
coca investments compared to the control group that receives no messages.
Hypothesis 1.
Coca investments will be lower in treatments that emphasize a particular con-
sequence of coca cultivation on the community compared to the control treatment.
Second, we expect that the effectiveness of the messages on decreasing coca investments, de-
pends on the informative value and salience of the message. However, the direction of the effect
would depend on the channel at play. If persuasion messages affect beliefs, then messages that
have more information value would result in a larger decrease of coca investments compared
to messages with low informative value. Moreover, in this case, changes in beliefs would be
reflected on changes in the expected coca investments of other group members. We expect that
messages that are more informative result in a larger change in the beliefs regarding how much
money would be invested in coca by other group members. However, if persuasion messages
operate via changes in attitudes, we expect that the behavioral change would not necessarily be
correlated with the value of the information. Messages with low information value might result
in a high change in coca investments as they could lead to less favorable attitudes towards
coca. We test this hypothesis by comparing responses to a post-experimental survey on atti-
tudes towards coca. Moreover, if persuasion operates via changes in attitudes, we would expect
to find a change in behavior, even though beliefs about the expected investment of others has
not changed. This leads us to the next hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.
Changes in behavior will depend on the information value of the message. More
informative messages will result in a larger behavioral response if the mechanism
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at play is belief formation. Persuasion treatments with a higher informative value
would also result in larger changes in beliefs regarding what others will invest in
coca.
The alternative hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2a
Changes in behavior will depend on the informative value of the message. Less
informative messages will result in a larger behavioral response if the mechanism
at play is attitudinal change. Persuasion treatments with a lower informative value
would result in larger changes in attitudes towards coca cultivation.
Within subject design
The second feature of the experimental design is that each participant is exposed to nine dif-
ferent scenarios that combine three relative profits of the alternative activity (cattle farming)
and three levels of risk. Based on observations from real-life and likely future levels, we in-
cluded the following three levels of relative profits between cattle farming and coca growing:
a = [0.2; 0.44; 0.68] and three levels of plausible successful eradication p = [0; 0.1; 0.3]. The
parameters included in the experiment reflect historical values. For example, Ibanez (2007)
estimates that in 2007 the relative mean return of the second best alternative to coca was
about 0.28 while the risk of eradication was about 0.1. The selected parameters ensure a social
dilemma situation as the social cost related to the negative externalities (0.17 ∗ 5 = 0.85) is
larger than the private benefit from investing in coca (1−a) in all nine scenarios. It is expected
that a risk-neutral, self-interested utility maximizer would make a non-zero investment in coca
if 1−a− b−1.2p > 0. Table 3.3 presents the marginal incentive to cultivate coca in each of the
nine scenarios presented to participants, which are denoted by letters according to the order
in which the decisions were presented in the experiment. All but one of the scenarios imply a
positive marginal incentive to cultivate in coca and imply that risk-neutral participants should
invest all their endowment in coca. In the ninth scenario the optimal response would be to not
invest in coca.




0.2 A=0.63 D=0.51 G=0.27
0.44 B=0.39 E=0.27 H=0.03
0.68 C=0.15 F=0.03 I=-0.21
Note: Estimated as π′ = 1− a− b− pf . Each participant was exposed to all nine scenarios.
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We expect that participants would respond to economic incentives by reducing coca invest-
ments as the marginal return of the alternative, a, and the probability, p, increase. Yet, the
empirical question that we want to test is the magnitude of the elasticity of investments to
these two policies. Another hypothesis that we want to explore is whether the effectiveness of
the persuasion messages increases as the marginal net return of the alternative activity is larger
and as the risk of eradication is higher.
Hypothesis 4.
The effectiveness of persuasion treatments increases as the marginal incentives
to cultivate coca are lower.
Experimental procedures
Four municipalities situated in Putumayo were included in the study: Puerto Asis, Valle del
Guamuez, San Miguel and Puerto Leguizamo. UNODC (2012) estimated that about six thou-
sand hectares were cultivated in coca in these four municipalities in 2011. This represents
almost ten percent of the total area cultivated with coca in the country.
Participants in the experiment were recruited using a two step procedure. In the first step,
within each municipality we selected communities (veredas) that had a medium or high density
of coca crops and that were safe enough to visit. Local contacts who knew the areas helped
us with this selection. In the second step, community leaders (veredal presidents) helped us
with recruiting the participants. In order to avoid self-selection, they were instructed to use a
random selection mechanism. After writing a numbered list of all head of households living in
the neighborhood, the leader was asked to draw 30 to 40 numbers.10 The households identified
with those numbers were invited to a one-day workshop with university researchers. No further
information was given on the purpose of the workshop, and no more than one person per
household was invited to participate. Community leaders controlled that only the randomly
selected participants came to the activity.
In the morning session we conducted the experiment and after a lunch break participants were
interviewed individually. We conducted 21 sessions with a total of 652 participants. The
experimental sessions consisted of four stages. First, the experiment instructions were read out
loud to the subjects. This was followed by several examples and individual exercises. To check
for subjects’ understanding of the experiment we used control questions that were checked by
an enumerator before continuing the activity.
In the second stage participants simultaneously decided how much they wanted to invest in
coca in each of the nine scenarios. The scenarios were presented in the same order to all
10We had to use this procedure as there is no central registration of the population. The experimenter team
verified that the selection process was conducted as instructed but did not have access to the list of inhabitants.
This procedure was used to maintain anonymity of the participants, as explained below.
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participants and involved increasing relative returns of the alternative activity (cattle) and of
risk of inspection. We also asked participants to note their expectations on how much would
other group members invest in coca in each of the scenarios.
In the third stage, a lottery randomly selected one of the nine scenarios for payment. If the
selected scenario involved a positive probability of inspection, then a second lottery determined
whether they were caught or not.11 The selected scenarios and outcome of the lottery applied to
all participants in the session. The outcomes from these two lotteries are common to everyone.
This mimics real life since both relative profits and successful eradication are normally the same
for people living close to each other.
Finally, in the last stage, all subjects were paid privately in cash. Earnings amounted to 9 USD
on average, a little more than a full working day’s wage. While the payouts were calculated,
we had a group discussion and heard comments from the participants.
In order to encourage honest answers we did not ask names, addresses or any other information
that would have allowed us to identify the participants. To match survey and experimental
information we used participation numbers that were given to participants upon their arrival
to the workshop. The participation number was composed of the date when the experimental
session was conducted, followed by consecutive numbers to identify each participant. We in-
structed participants that payments would be done according to that identification number so
they had to keep it with them. The survey consisted of 14 sections that asked rather standard
questions on socioeconomic characteristics, land use, attitudes towards the state, experience
cultivating coca, attitudes towards coca, and intentions to cultivate coca in the future.
Results
Descriptive statistics and randomization checks
Our group of enumerators collected secondary information on each one of the neighborhoods
(veredas) where the experiment was conducted. This information was collected in local admin-
istrative offices or by interviews to local experts using a standardized format.12 To test whether
the randomization process worked and whether characteristics of the neighborhoods assigned
to each treatment are comparable, we ran the following regression model:
Yik = β0 + β1V iolencei + β2V aluesi + β3Environmenti + β4QuantifiedV iolencei + ei (7)
where Yik refers to a certain characteristic k of individual i, and V iolence, V alues,Environment
and QuantifiedV iolence are dummy variables that take the value equal to one for participants
11We represented probabilities using colored balls. We filled a non-transparent bag with nine or seven green
balls, and one or three red balls depending on the scenario. If a red ball was selected, participants with positive
investments in coca were fined. Otherwise they escaped without being discovered and no fine applied.
12The smallest administrative unit for which there is official and consolidated information available is the
municipality.
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assigned to the corresponding persuasion treatment, T . β0 indicates the average value of char-
acteristic k for the control treatment, whereas β1 to β4 indicate the difference in each charac-
teristic of persuasion treatment j compared with the control. Table 3.4 presents the estimated
coefficients.
The selected neighborhoods in the control treatment are relatively small with about 500 in-
habitants. These communities are relatively poor and about one fourth of the population is
beneficiary of the state subsidy for health services, as established by the system that targets
public subsidy beneficiaries, Sisben. For every hundred inhabitants (including adults) there are
on average two school teachers. About 75 percent of the schools have computers, yet the ratio
of computers per inhabitant is relatively low, with only one computer for every hundred people.
The control neighborhoods are not very remote and the closest urban center is 20 km away, a
distance covered in 34 minutes. Sixty percent of the neighborhoods in the control treatment
have electricity. Only 34 percent of the neighborhoods have public light. We asked local leaders
to rate in a zero to five scale the density of coca in the neighborhood where zero indicates no
coca and five indicates high density. In the control treatment, the average rating was three,
indicating a medium density of coca. Finally, we asked local leaders whether the community
was beneficiary of alternative development projects. Forty percent of the communities in the
control treatment were beneficiary of alternative development projects and have not abandoned
the alternative crop.
Compared with neighborhoods in the control treatment, communities where persuasion mes-
sages were sent differ in few variables. Communities in the Environment treatment are signif-
icantly poorer (more people have are eligible to public poverty related services as established
by Sisben scores), have less computers in their schools per capita and have less neighborhoods
with electricity. The communities under the QuantifiedV iolence treatment have less teachers
and computers per capita and are farther away than the control communities. These differ-
ences in the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities suggest that in the analysis we
need to account for those variables. However, key variables where all communities are balanced
are coca density and being beneficiaries of alternative development programs (and not having
abandoned the alternative crop). Definitions of the variables can be found in Table A3.1 in the
Appendix.
In the post-experimental survey we included a series of questions on the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the participants. We compare the socioeconomic characteristics of the participants
in the different treatments using a randomization test as described in Equation 8. Table 3.5
presents the estimated results. In the control treatment participants were on average 43 years
old, one tenth were women and have a low education achievements with only 1.4 years of edu-
cation attained on average. About one half of the population was classified as poor using the
standard of living index. While most of the population is catholic, one third of the respondents
report being evangelic. About half of the participants have a land title and owned on average
14 hectares of land. One fourth of the respondents self-reported having cultivated coca the year
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Coca investments by treatment





Violence 1.628 -0.030 0.119 0.112 1.830
(2.100) (0.042) (0.144) (0.210) (2.417)
Environment -1.632 0.037 0.311∗∗ -0.117 1.862
(1.545) (0.038) (0.138) (0.089) (2.530)
Values 0.361 0.134∗ 0.249 0.073 6.266∗∗
(2.624) (0.076) (0.267) (0.147) (2.471)
Quantified Violence 1.347 -0.021 0.062 -0.109 0.167
(2.304) (0.030) (0.179) (0.133) (2.848)
Control 43.959∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 52.064∗∗∗
(1.442) (0.026) (0.126) (0.078) (1.923)
N 652 652 649 655 623










Violence -0.114∗∗ -0.122 3.397 0.316 0.008
(0.041) (0.085) (4.885) (4.050) (0.108)
Environment -0.061 -0.122∗∗ 5.133 -3.101 0.076
(0.043) (0.051) (9.057) (2.566) (0.130)
Values 0.066 0.054 -5.928∗ -5.548∗∗∗ -0.163∗
(0.080) (0.075) (2.868) (1.650) (0.084)
Quantified Violence -0.130∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ 4.824 -1.762 0.146
(0.059) (0.045) (9.419) (4.454) (0.153)
Control 0.364∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 14.509∗∗∗ 13.553∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.042) (2.248) (1.341) (0.067)
N 624 651 653 635 646









Violence -0.021 0.079 0.277 -1.218 -0.105
(0.063) (0.185) (0.201) (0.710) (0.087)
Environment 0.031 0.216 0.192 -0.429 -0.044
(0.059) (0.170) (0.194) (0.649) (0.106)
Values -0.024 0.301 0.351∗ 0.527 0.110
(0.065) (0.197) (0.171) (0.672) (0.180)
Quantified Violence -0.010 0.124 0.246 -0.302 -0.111
(0.075) (0.232) (0.268) (0.361) (0.087)
Control 0.869∗∗∗ 2.616∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗ 6.535∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.052) (0.144) (0.169) (0.286) (0.087)
N 649 653 653 652 645
Panel D: Exposure to Violence
Displacement Homicides Landmines Extorsion Accidents
with
Weapons
Violence 0.075 0.065 0.010 0.023 0.022
(0.068) (0.043) (0.014) (0.016) (0.026)
Environment 0.059 0.076 -0.021∗∗ 0.012 0.012
(0.134) (0.048) (0.007) (0.029) (0.019)
Values 0.073 0.028 -0.007 0.024 0.007
(0.100) (0.048) (0.008) (0.031) (0.024)
Quantified Violence 0.052 0.044 -0.007 -0.007 -0.024
(0.070) (0.049) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Control 0.288∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.059) (0.034) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015)
N 653 654 653 653 653
Note: This table reports the results of the post-experimental survey. We test for differences estimating an independent
regressions for each variable. Standard Errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the neighborhood level.
* p<0.1 ** p<.05 *** p<.01 indicate significant differences with respect to the control treatment. Variable definitions
can be found in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
Participants in the survey have also been severely affected by violence and a significant frac-
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tion has had family members displaced by violence (29%), murdered (12%), killed in massacres
(7%), had accidents with land mines (3%) and had accidents with fire arms (3%). Participation
in community activities was relatively high (90% reported participating in a community orga-
nization). Trust in institutions was relatively low with an average of 2.6 in a one to five scale.
The perceived risk of eradication, measured in a one to ten scale was 6.5. About one tenth
of the participants were beneficiaries of the Forest Warden Families alternative development
program.13 We find that there are significant differences between participants in the control
treatment and participant in the persuasion treatments. In the treatment V alues a larger
proportion of the respondents is female, classified as poor, has higher levels of trust, less land
and is less likely to cultivate coca than in the Control treatment. Similarly, in the treatment
Environment, participants are more educated, less likely to have land titles and less likely to
be affected by land mines than those in the control treatment. We control for these variables
in the analysis.
To test for potential channels affecting changes in behavior, in the post experimental survey
we asked participants to rate in a 1 to 5 scale the degree of acceptance to a series of statement
regarding coca cultivation. Table 3.6 below presents the descriptive statistics of the answer
to these questions. We find that participants have a quite negative attitude towards coca: 95
percent of the respondents consider that cultivating coca is not correct, 69 percent consider
that it is never justifiable to cultivate coca and 65 percent disagree that coca cultivation should
be legal. Participants recognize the problems associated with coca cultivation. 63 percent
disagree with the statement that coca brings progress to the region, 86 percent consider that
coca generates violence within the families and a similar fraction considers that it generates
violence in the community. Besides, more than 90 percent of the participants recognize that
coca promotes disrespect to the law and drug consumption habits. Hence, the majority of
participants consider that coca should not be cultivated (76 percent).
Impact of persuasion messages on investments
Participants in the experiment made decisions under nine different scenarios. To account for
possible correlation of the decisions over the different scenarios we estimate a panel random
effects model. Due to the random assignment of the participants into treatment and control
groups, the identification of the causal effect of the persuasion treatment on investment in coca
is straightforward. The impact of the persuasion treatments on coca investments is estimated
using the following model with clustered standard errors at the community level:
Y it = α+β1V iolencei+β2V aluesi+β3Environmenti+β4QuantifiedV iolencei+β5Xit+β6Zi+ui+εit,
(8)
13This program gives a monetary subsidy to communities who accept to keep their land free of coca and
received workshops on social capital, culture of legality and technical issues. The agreement is verified by









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where Y refers the following outcome variables for person i in scenario t: the likelihood of in-
vesting in coca, the amount invested in coca conditional on a non-zero investment, or the uncon-
ditional amount invested in coca. V iolence, V alues, Environment and QuantifiedV iolence
are defined as dummy variables equal to one for participants allocated to each of the different
persuasion treatments, which are fixed throughout all scenarios. X is a vector of incentives to
invest in coca in the experiment that varies over the nice scenarios, while Z is a vector of con-
trols that include individual socioeconomic characteristics and municipality and veredal fixed
effects. The parameter ui is an individual time invariant unobserved effect that is assumed to
be uncorrelated with other variables, while eit is the error term.
We estimate a random effects probit model for the likelihood of investing in coca and report
the estimated marginal effects at the means of the independent variables. The conditional and
unconditional investments in coca are estimated using a random effects linear model. In all
models, standard errors are clustered at the vereda level to account for correlation between
decisions within sessions.
Table 3.7 presents the results of the estimated models using three different specifications. The
first specification controls only for persuasion treatments and municipality fixed effects. The
second specification is similar to the first specification but also controls for the marginal incen-
tives to invest in coca in the experiment (vector X). The last specification includes a vector
of controls Z. We present the results for our three outcome variables: the likelihood to invest
in coca, the conditional investment in coca and the unconditional amount invested in three
separate columns for each specification.
The estimated models suggest that compared to the Control treatment, persuasion messages
that emphasize the relation of coca with violence and that make this relationship salient by
providing data on violence result in a lower likelihood to invest in coca in the experiment.
Exposure to these messages reduce the likelihood of investing in coca by about 20 percent.
Messages that emphasize the effect of coca on the environment or in changes in values have no
significant effect on the likelihood to invest in coca.
Contrary to what we expected, we find that persuasion messages could result in higher coca
investments. Treatments that relate coca with violence and with changes in values result in
higher conditional investments by about 0.3 to 0.7 points. None of the persuasion messages
have a significant effect on unconditional coca investments. Thus, while persuasion messages
seem to deter farmers from investing in coca, they have no effect on the total amount invested.
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Table 3.7: Treatment effects on coca investments
No Controls Experimental Controls Socioeconomic Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
dcoca coca|dcoca=1 coca dcoca coca|dcoca=1 coca dcoca coca|dcoca=1 coca
Violence -0.204∗ 0.343∗ -0.242 -0.156 0.388∗ -0.244 -0.135 0.462∗∗ -0.040
(0.113) (0.193) (0.404) (0.106) (0.198) (0.403) (0.100) (0.206) (0.307)
Environment -0.086 0.089 0.064 -0.080 0.142 0.061 -0.087 0.276 0.056
(0.132) (0.214) (0.333) (0.125) (0.214) (0.333) (0.086) (0.245) (0.310)
Values -0.152 0.572∗∗ -0.079 -0.116 0.611∗∗∗ -0.080 -0.117 0.704∗∗ -0.060
(0.129) (0.238) (0.333) (0.119) (0.228) (0.333) (0.128) (0.277) (0.302)
Quantified Violence -0.229∗∗ -0.088 -0.417 -0.173∗ -0.057 -0.418 -0.252∗∗ 0.009 -0.513
(0.110) (0.303) (0.457) (0.104) (0.294) (0.457) (0.099) (0.394) (0.428)
Risk Sanction -0.533∗∗∗ -2.219∗∗∗ -2.554∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗ -2.116∗∗∗ -2.362∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.583) (0.452) (0.054) (0.620) (0.497)
Profit Alternative -0.090∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.178) (0.084) (0.011) (0.178) (0.108)
Coca Farmer 0.221∗∗∗ 0.353∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.191) (0.126)
Poverty Index 0.000 0.019∗ 0.009
(0.001) (0.011) (0.007)
Female HH 0.041∗ 0.248 0.286
(0.024) (0.326) (0.193)
Catholic 0.021 -0.835∗ -0.309
(0.080) (0.466) (0.462)
Evangelic -0.177∗∗ -0.800 -0.672
(0.074) (0.559) (0.468)
Age HH -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.010∗
(0.001) (0.009) (0.005)
Trust Institutions -0.014 0.081 0.028
(0.009) (0.092) (0.061)
Title 1991 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.007∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.004)
Experience Coca -0.000 -0.026 -0.011
(0.002) (0.016) (0.013)
Control 3.211∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ 3.788∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗ 3.414∗∗∗ 2.149∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.314) (0.276) (0.318) (0.911) (0.655)
Municipal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6241 2568 6241 6241 2568 6241 4691 1943 4691
People 699 405 699 699 405 699 525 302 525
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Standard errors presented in parenthesis are clustered at the vereda level. For models on dcoca: Likelihood
to invest in coca, the marginal effects at the means of a Random Effects Probit Model are reported in the Table.
For unconditional (coca|dcoca==1 ) and conditional investment in coca coca (coca) we estimate Random Effects
Generalized Least Squares. c. Probability of being sanctioned in the experiment. d. Marginal return of the alternative
product in the experiment. e. Self-Reported measure of having cultivated coca in 2011. Results of t-test indicated at
following significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
This effect is partly explained by the perverse effect that certain persuasion messages have on
the conditional amount invested.




Persuasion treatments that emphasize the negative relation between coca culti-
vation and violence deter farmers from cultivating coca. Yet these treatments can
also increase the conditional amount of coca cultivated.
Surprisingly, we find that participants react more to treatments that have low information value
(treatments that make salient the relation between coca and violence). As previously discussed,
this information is not new for participants. They often discuss the consequences that coca
has on violence and are aware of this relationship. Hence, this finding suggests that persuasion
messages operate not via changes in beliefs but via changes in attitudes. We further explore
this potential mechanism below.
Regarding other control variables we find that participants do react to economic incentives
as expected, by decreasing the likelihood to invest in coca and the conditional and uncondi-
tional amounts invested, when the risk of being sanctioned if discovered cultivating, p, and
the marginal return of the alternative, a, increase. Consistent with results from Ibanez and
Martinsson (2013), the elasticity of coca investments is higher to sticks (changes in the risk of
sanction) than to carrots (changes in the marginal return of the alternative).
The regression results of the specification that includes controls on socioeconomic characteristics
uncover other interesting relations. Participants who self-reported having cultivated coca one
year prior to the experiment are also more likely to invest in coca in the experiment. This
seems to suggest that participants bring to the game their past real life experiences with coca.
Interestingly, we find that those who belong to an Evangelic church, who are older or who had
a title over their land in 1991 are less likely to invest in coca in the experiment and also invest
less. This result suggests that investments in coca are partly driven by norms of what is correct
and by poverty. Similar results are obtained by Ibanez (2010) who finds a negative correlation
between the likelihood of cultivating coca and belonging to a Evangelic church.
Heterogeneous effects
From a policy perspective it is important to understand if the effect of the persuasion messages
is reaching those who are intended to be affected by a policy. In other words, we are interested
in testing whether the message affects those who live in communities with high density of coca
to a higher degree than those in low density communities. To explore this relation, we classified
veredas as low or high density according to the fraction of participants who self-reported having
cultivated coca the year before the survey. This measure is positively correlated with secondary
information on coca density (Spearman Correlation Coefficient=0.25, p-value<0.001). Neigh-
borhoods with a density score above the median level of density (more than 19 percent of the
respondents reported having cultivated coca) are classified as high-density while those with
lower scores are classified as low-density.14
14Due to confidentiality agreements with respondents in the survey, we do not report this information.
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Table 3.8 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 8. Models one to three refer to
neighborhoods with low coca density, while models four to six present the results for neigh-
borhoods with high coca density. We find that in areas with low density the only persuasion
treatment that significantly decreases the likelihood to invest in coca is the QuantifiedV iolence
treatment. However, this treatment and the treatment V alues result in larger conditional coca
investments and an insignificant effect on unconditional investments. Surprisingly, the treat-
ment V iolence results in significantly larger unconditional investments in coca.
In areas with high coca density, all persuasion treatments used decrease the likelihood of in-
vesting in coca significantly. Participants who hear a persuasive message are between 40 to
60 percent less likely to invest in coca than the control group. Yet, conditional on investing,
participants invest about five points more in coca than the controls. The net effect of the
persuasion treatments is negative and significant in all treatments with an average reduction
in investments of about 0.8 points.
Result 2
Our results suggest that the effectiveness of persuasion treatments is higher in
areas with high density of coca than in areas with low density. In areas with high
density, persuasion messages have a larger deterring effect and significantly decrease
unconditional coca investments. The treatments V iolence and QuantifiedV iolence
are the most effective in deterring coca investments.
Regarding the response to economic incentives, we find that in areas with high coca density the
elasticity of coca investment to the risk of eradication is lower than in regions with low coca
density. Yet, this difference is not significant (ttest, pvalue > 0.1). There are also no significant
differences in the elasticity of the investments to the return of the alternative product, a (ttest,
pvalue > 0.1).
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneous treatment effects by density of coca in the neighborhood.
Low Density High Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dcoca coca|dcoca=1 coca dcoca coca|dcoca=1 coca
Violence -0.224 0.728 0.764∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ 5.311∗∗∗ -0.878∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.676) (0.247) (0.107) (1.229) (0.066)
Environment -0.097 0.378 0.000 -0.458∗∗∗ 5.213∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.683) (.) (0.080) (1.159) (0.093)
Values -0.028 0.404∗ -0.046 0.000 0.000
(0.202) (0.229) (0.113) (.) (.)
Quantified Violence -0.275∗ 2.681∗∗∗ -0.373 -0.622∗∗∗ 4.734∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.750) (0.266) (0.140) (1.228) (0.090)
Risk -0.631∗∗∗ -3.560∗∗∗ -2.918∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -1.315∗ -1.833∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.978) (0.878) (0.081) (0.681) (0.517)
Alternative Profit -0.103∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.145) (0.122) (0.022) (0.276) (0.183)
Municipal effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2287 688 2287 2404 1255 2404
People 256 118 256 269 184 269
Clusters 10 10 10 11 11 11
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. For models on likelihood to
invest in coca (dcoca), marginal effects at the means of a Random Effects Probit Model are reported in the Table. For
conditional (coca|dcoca==1) and unconditional investments in coca (coca), we estimate Random Effects Generalized
Least Squares. c. Probability of being sanctioned in the experiment. d. Marginal return of the alternative product
in the experiment. e. Not enough observations in the Values treatment in order to estimate high density coefficients.
f. We include the following controls: dummy on having cultivated coca one year before the experiment, dummy for
female respondents, age, religion, indicator of poverty according to living conditions, trust in local institutions, number
of years cultivating coca, title over the land in 1991, session fixed effects. Results of t-test indicated at following
significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Mechanisms
If persuasion treatments are effective at decreasing investment decisions and affect those who
live in areas with higher density of coca more, which are the channels that lead to the behavioral
change? Our hypothesis is that the informative value of the message would determine the
channel at play. One potential mechanism is that persuasion messages affect beliefs and change
the expectations on how much others invest. To assess the importance of persuasion messages at
affecting expectations on the behavior of others, we estimate Equation 8 with expected behavior
of others as the dependent variable and with session fixed effects. Table 3.9 presents the results.
We present the results for three different samples. The first column presents the results for all
participants while the second and third columns present the results for participants living in
low and high density coca areas respectively. We find that the persuasion treatments have no
significant negative effects on beliefs on others’ coca investments in any of the three samples
considered. Yet, the treatment Environment actually increases the expected coca investments
by others, indicating that the channel goes in the opposite direction than intended. It could be
that people do not see the environment as a problem that affects them directly and may think
that once others hear this argument, they may be less likely to reduce their coca investments.
This result suggests that the mechanism associated with behavioral change is not related with
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beliefs. This result is also consistent with the finding that messages with a higher informative
value do not result in a larger change in coca investments. We reject Hypothesis 2, and conclude:
Result 3
Persuasion treatments do not affect the beliefs on coca investments by others in
the group.
Table 3.9: Treatment effects on beliefs of what others invest in coca
Beliefs Others’ Investments
(1) (2) (3)
All Low Density High Density
Treatments
Violence -0.269 -0.001 1.913
(1.729) (1.292) (1.643)
Environment 0.100 0.130 2.133∗
(1.942) (1.273) (1.273)
Values 0.117 0.286 0.000
(1.348) (0.992) (.)
Quantified Violence -0.256 -0.656 1.809
(2.070) (1.336) (1.809)
Economic Incentive Yes Yes Yes
Municipal effects Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4710 2297 2413
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses. We estimate Ordinary Least Squares models. c. We include the
following controls: dummy on having cultivated coca one year before the experiment, dummy for female respondents,
age, religion, indicator of poverty according to living conditions, trust in local institutions, number of years cultivating
coca, title over the land in 1991, economic incentives in the experiment, session fixed effects. d. Not enough observations
in Values treatment in high-density areas to estimate the coefficient. Results of t-test indicated at following significance
levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Another potential channel that could explain investment decisions is attitudinal change. Cues
on the effects of coca on the community could have generated more negative attitudes towards
coca. Hence, anti-coca attitudes should be higher in treatments where participants invest
less than in the control treatment. To test this hypothesis, we regress the post experimental
attitudinal questions on the same set of controls included in Equation 8 and include session
fixed effects. Columns 4 to 6 in Table 3.9 present the results. Panel A presents the results
for the complete sample whereas Panels B and C present the results by areas of low and
high density respectively. We find that the persuasion treatments have ambiguous effects on
attitudes towards coca compared with the control treatment. All treatments result in a larger
fraction of respondents who agree with the statement that people cultivate coca due to need.
Yet, depending on the message received, participants exhibit more negative attitudes towards
coca in different questions. For instance, participants in the treatment Environment agree
to a larger extent that coca brings problems to the family. Participants in the treatment
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V alues disagree that coca should be legal and point at the problem of increased consumption.
Participants in the treatment QuantifiedV iolence agree to a larger extent that coca cultivation
promotes disrespect for the law.
The results of the treatments by coca density in the region, as presented in Panels B and
C, confirm similar tendencies. Out of nine questions on attitudes towards coca, participants
in persuasion treatments from low density areas expressed a more negative attitude in four
questions and those in high density areas in three. Yet, for one question the attitudes towards
coca were less negative. These findings lead us to believe that a change in attitudes is taking
place.
Result 4
Persuasion treatments operate via changes in attitudes. Treatments that lead
to lower coca investments are also associated with more negative attitudes towards
coca.
Impact of the message on intentions to cultivate coca in the future
An interesting question is whether persuasion treatments have effects beyond the laboratory
conditions. To asses this question, in the post experimental survey we asked: How likely is it
that you will cultivate coca next year? Participants could answer in a one to five scale where
one indicated not likely at all and five indicated very likely. Not surprisingly, we find that
there is a significant and positive correlation between the intention to cultivate coca and the
self-declared coca cultivation. The large majority of those cultivating coca declared that they
would not cultivate coca next year (85 percent). Yet, only half of those who declared having
cultivated in 2011, one year before the survey, declared that they would probably cultivate or
be very likely to cultivate (49 percent) in the next year.
To establish the impact of the persuasion treatments on intentions to cultivate coca we run
a model as expressed in Equation 8. Table 3.11 presents the results of this estimation for
the whole sample and for areas with low and high density of coca. We find that the treat-
ment V iolenceData significantly reduces the probability to cultivate coca for all areas. Yet
in regions with low coca density, the probability to be willing to cultivate coca in the next
year is significantly higher in the V alue treatment. For areas with high coca density, two of
the treatments increased the declared likelihood to cultivate coca in the future (V iolence and
Enviornment), while the treatment QuantifiedV iolence had a negative effect. This result
confirms the previous observation that in areas with high density of coca, participants react






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11: Treatment effects on probability to cultivate next year
(1) (2) (3)
Intention to Cultivate All Low Dens High Dens
Violence -0.039 -0.072 0.242∗∗
(0.105) (0.062) (0.087)




Quant.Violence -0.505∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.295∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.094) (0.048)
Constant 1.926∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.592) (0.371)
Observations 522 254 268
Num.Clusters 21 10 11
Note: Standard errors presented in parenthesis and clustered at the neighborhood level. If 19 percent or less of the
population declared to be cultivating coca, the area was classified as low density. Otherwise it was classified as high
density. We include the following socio-economic controls: dummy on having cultivated coca one year before the
experiment, dummy for female respondents, age, religion, indicator of poverty according to living conditions, trust in
local institutions, number of years cultivating coca, title over the land in 1991. Not enough observations in the Values
treatment in High Density areas to estimate the coefficient. We also control for session fixed effects. Results of t-test
indicated at following significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
External validity
One potential concern with the experimental results is that they might have low external
validity. We think that this is not the case.
First, our framed field experiment increases the external validity of the results by i) conducting
the experiment with participants (coca farmers) who face similar decisions in their daily life;
ii) using a frame that represents the decision context. Decisions were framed as investments
in coca production or cattle farming. This feature of the experiment allows us to make salient
both monetary and non-monetary dimensions affecting investment decisions in the game; iii)
simulating the decision context by using parameters that capture real life values. Some evidence
that supports our claim of achieving external validity is reflected by the the positive correlation
between decisions in the experiment and in real life. About 90 percent of those who invested
any positive amounts of coca during the experiment reported having grown coca at some point
in their lives in the survey, and the longer the person had been growing coca, the more likely
he/she was to invest in coca in the experiment. This shows that participants brought their
own experiences to the game and is further strengthened by qualitative work with participant
farmers which indicates that people considered that the game captured pretty well their decision
to cultivate coca or not. When speaking about the experiment, people instantly equated their
decisions in the experiment to their decisions in their daily life. Statements such as "I did not
invest in coca (in the game) because I realized how bad it is for our family and we stopped
growing coca last year" or "it’s impossible not to invest in coca because how else can I send my
children to school or feed them?" say a lot about the close link that people saw between their
experimental decisions and their real life actions.
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Second, one could think that the investment decision in the persuasion treatments change not
because people have internalized the message, but because they want to please the experi-
menter with their answers. In other words, the results of the experiment could be subject to
experimenter demand effects. Yet, if participants wanted to please the experimenter, we would
have seen a decrease in coca investments across all treatments compared to the control group.
However, the results show that the likelihood to invest in coca varies according to the treatment
(and region). Moreover, we also find significant treatment effects on responses to the likelihood
of investing in the future. If people wanted to please the experimenter, reductions would not
have been differential across treatments (or regions) compared to the control.
Moreover, if participants had been seeking to please the experimenter, they would have ex-
pressed more anti-coca attitudes that go in the same direction as the intervention. Hence
treatments that give an example on the negative effects of coca on violence, would have also
lead to higher acceptance of statements that coca is associated with increased violence in the
family or increased violence in the community compared to the control group. Statistical
analysis shows that this is not the case. As discussed previously, responses to the attitudinal
question are influenced by each treatment in different directions. Participants change attitudes
towards questions that are not directly related with the argument used or that go in an opposite
direction (pro-coca attitudes).
Discussion and conclusions
Our work shows that persuasion messages that make salient the adverse consequences of coca
on violence are the most effective in preventing people from investing in coca in the experiment.
The results indicate that this type of intervention is more effective in areas where illegality is
higher. The main mechanism behind behavioral change seems to be changes in attitudes rather
than changes in beliefs.
One limitation of this study is that we are only able to capture short term effects of the
type of persuasive communications used. In the future, it would be interesting to test the
effectiveness of alternative interventions. For instance, it would be interesting to test the effect
of interventions that highlight the positive effects of working in legality and that give hope by
making the achievements of those that have switched to legality more salient. Also, since our
intervention was introduced in a subtle way, it would be interesting to see what would happen
if the persuasive messages were sent in a much powerful way (in songs, billboards, radio spots,
for example). Similarly, it would be interesting to see how people react to the experience of
others similar to them.
Another question that we cannot address in our analysis is whether short term interventions,
like the ones tested in this paper, have longer term effects in coca investments. Is it enough
to tell people once about the consequences of their behavior, or is it necessary to continuously
bring up the same message? Could there be depreciation effects of these interventions, so that
the effectiveness of using the same type of message falls over time?
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The result of our lab in the field experiment cannot predict how persuasion messages will affect
coca growing decisions outside the experiment. Yet, the results of this paper are encouraging,
since they confirm that persuasion messages are in fact capable of affecting behavior at least in
a controlled environment. This finding suggests that alternative policies, different from carrots
and sticks that are solely based on monetary incentives, can be used in the fight against drugs.





The following instructions were read out loud to all participants. These are the instructions
for the control group; those for the other groups are exactly the same, except that when group
externalities of coca growing are explained, each treatment message is mentioned. The following
instructions were translated by the authors. The original spanish instructions can be found in
the online version of this document.
Start
Good morning, welcome to this workshop.
Before we begin we want to thank you for your participation. This workshop has been financed
by a group of University Professors, and everything we do is an academic matter. Throughout
the exercise we will not ask your name, where you live nor any other question that allows us
to identify you or your family. We will carry out this workshop in different communities. For
the exercise to be comparable between communities we have prepared the instructions that we
will now read.
You will receive 15.000 pesos (8 USD). There are two conditions for you to receive this money.
The first one is that you participate in this workshop. The second is that you complete the
survey that we will have in the afternoon. Although participating in both activities entitles you
to these 15.000 pesos, you can end up with more or less than this amount depending on the
decisions that you make during the workshop, as well as on the decision on other participants
from your group.
We will start by randomly forming groups of 5. The groups will remain the same during the
workshop. You will not know during or after the workshop who was part of your group.
How long is the workshop?
This workshop will last approximately 2 hours. You will have to make 9 different decisions.
The decisions seem very similar at first, but they are different. This is why it is important that
you carefully think about each one of them and consider what you would do if in reality you
had to make these decisions.
Which type of decisions will you have to make?
In each decision you have 1 million pesos (526 USD approx.) to invest in coca or cattle. For
each 100.000 pesos that you invest in coca you obtain 1.250.000 pesos. For each 100.000 pesos
that you invest in cattle raising you will get 250.000, 550.000 or 850.000 pesos depending of
which of the 9 decisions is taking place. You have to decide how much you want to invest in
coca and how much you want to invest in cattle. You can invest any amount between 0 and 1
million pesos. You are free to decide how you want to invest, but at the end the whole million
has to be invested. Your investment has to happen in units of 100.000. For example, you can
invest 0, 100.000, 200.000, 300.000 pesos, etc., but you can’t invest 10.000, 50.000, etc.
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[THIS IS WHERE THE TREATMENT MESSAGES ARE MENTIONED DEPENDING ON
THE TREATMENT FOR EACH SESSION]. Coca generates negative effects on society. To
represent the damage that coca generates on the community, we will discount 212.5 pesos for
every 100.000 pesos invested in coca in the group. This discount applies to all the persons in
the group, regardless of whether each grew coca or not.
Since coca is illegal, there is a risk that authorities find out that you are growing coca. If your
investment is discovered, for each 100.000 that you invest in coca you will have to pay a fine of
1.500.000 pesos. However, like in real life, authorities not always discover you. To determine
whether you are discovered or not, we will take a ball from a bag. If the ball is green you are
not discovered. If the ball is red you are discovered and fined. In some decisions all balls will
be green, so there will be no risk of being caught. In other decisions there will be two red balls
and 8 green balls, meaning that the risk of being caught is 20%. In other decisions there will
be three red balls and 7 green balls, so that the risk is 30%.
Correct guess
Your second assignment is to guess how much others from your group are investing in coca.
You can increase your income by guessing correctly how much the others invested in coca. The
closer your guess is to what others did, the higher your payment. If you guess the exact value
that others are investing, you get 1000 pesos more. If your guess is more or less 100.000 pesos
difference, you receive 500 pesos and if your guess is between 100.000-200.000 pesos different
than the real value you get 200 pesos. If you are off by more than 200.000 pesos you don’t
receive anything. Do you believe others will do the same as you? Do you think they invest
more than you in coca? Do you think they invest less than you in coca?
Procedure
You will receive 9 decision sheets like the one on the board.
DECISION A
You have 1.000.000 pesos that you can invest in coca or in cattle.
For every 100.000 pesos invested in coca you get 1.250.000 pesos.
For every 100.000 pesos invested in cattle you get 250.000 pesos.
The impact that coca generated is so that for every 100 thousand pesos invested in coca each
person in the group loses 212.500 pesos.
Coca is illegal. If you are discovered investing in coca you will have to pay a fine of 1.5000.000
pesos for each 100.000 pesos invested in coca.
In this decision there is no risk of being discovered.
1. How much do you want to invest in coca?
2. How much do you want to invest in cattle?
3. How much do you think others will invest in coca?
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The heading of the decision sheet explains the payment conditions for each activity. [In our
example, read the first three lines.] Then the sheet explains the negative effects that coca has
and the cost that this entails [read treatment] The next line explains how risky it is to grow
coca. [Read line on coca is illegal] Next you see the questions that you need to answer. The first
is how much you want to invest in coca. Let’s say that I invest 700.000 in coca. Write 700.000
in the box. The second question is how much you want to invest in cattle. If I invested 700.000
in coca, how much do I have left for cattle? 300.000 pesos. Write 300.000 in the box. The
total sum of your investment in coca and cattle should be 1.000.000 pesos. It’s not necessary
that you write down the sum, but you need to do it in your head. The last line asks how much
you think others will invest in coca on average. This is the value that you have to guess! For
instance, I think others will invest the same as me, then I write 700.000, or more, or less. In
other words, I think on average they will invest 700.000.
How are your payments calculated?
In our example I invested 700 thousand in coca, and 300 thousand in cattle. How do we calculate
the return of our investment in coca? How many times is 100 in 700? 7 times, so that income
for coca investment is 7 times 1.250.000, which is: 7 times 0? -0, 7 times five?- 35 [write down
and calculate together on the board and say each step out loud] 5 and 3 remain. 7 times 2? 14,
and 3? 17, seven and we keep 1. 7 times 1, seven, plus 1, 8. This means that for every 700.000
pesos invested in coca you receive $8.550.000 pesos. What is my income for my investment in
cattle? How many times is 100 in 300? 3. Then, my income would be 3 times 250.000 pesos.
How much is this? 750.000 pesos. The total amount of my investment is 9.500.000 pesos. Let’s
suppose others invest in average 700.000, like I thought. Given the negative effects of coca,
there is a reduction for all group members. In our example, I invested 700.000 pesos in coca
and the others on average 700.000.How much was invested in total in the group? 5 people in
the group times 700 thousand is 3.500.000. For each thousand pesos invested in coca there is
a discount of 212.5 thousand. How many times is 100 thousand in 3.500.000? 35 times. So
the reduction for investing in coca for each group member is 35 times 212.500. This amounts
to $7.437.500 pesos [Taking off 3 zeros], or approximately 7.438. My total income is thus 9500
(9.500.000 pesos) minus 7.438 (7.438.000 pesos) , for a total of 2.062 (2.062.000) pesos. Since
we come from a university, in the workshop we will not pay you 2 million. Instead, we will
pay you the 1 per thousand of what you got for your investments. This means that in this
example we would pay you 2.062 pesos. With an approximation, you would receive 2.100 pesos.
In this example I guessed the exact value of what others invested, so as a prize I receive 1000
more. Additionally, I had received 15.000 for taking part in the workshop, so in total I receive
18.100 pesos (9.8 USD). Coca 100 thousand pesos give 1.250 (one million two hundred fifty
thousand pesos). Invest 700 700/100=7 Receive: 7x 1.250= 8.750 Cattle 100 thousand pesos
give 250 thousand pesos. Invest 300 300/100=3 Receive 3 x 250 = 750 Income for Investments
9.500 Reduction for coca 100 thousand pesos in coca reduce income in 212.5 700 in coca on
average 700*5=35 35*212.5= -7.438 Net investment 2.062~2.100 Correct guess 1.000 Payment
for participation 15.000 Total payoff 18.100
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Let’s now suppose that we are dealing with a decision where we can get caught by the author-
ities. Let’s suppose I did the same investment as before, this is, that I invested 700 thousand
in coca and 300 thousand in cattle. What happens if I get a green ball?- I get the same income
that we calculated. What happens if I get a red ball? For each 1 thousand invested in coca,
the authorities fine me with 1.500 pesos. This means that if I am caught I need to pay a fine of
1500x7=10.500. My payoff when I was not caught was 18.100. If I take out what I had to pay
as a fine, I am left with 7.600 pesos. Total payoff if not caught 18.100 Coca fine 100 thousand
pesos in coca give a fine of 1.500 (one million five hundred) if caught 700 thousand in coca
700/100=7 7*1.500= -10.500 Total payoff if caught 7.600
Let’s see another example. Let’s suppose that you invest 400 thousand pesos in coca. How
much is left for investing in cattle? 600 thousand pesos. How much do you receive for your
coca investment? How many times is 100 in 400? 4. Your income is then 4 times 1250=5000 (5
million). How much do you get for cattle? 100 is 6 times in 600, so 6 times 250=1.500 (1.500.000
pesos). In total you receive 6.500 (six million 500 thousand pesos) for your investments. If
others invest on average 700 thousand in coca, total investment in coca is 700x4+400=3200.
(3 million 200 thousand pesos). The reduction for investing in coca is 32 (100 is 32 times in
3200) times 212,5=6.800 (six million 800 thousand pesos). Your income is 6.500 (six million
500 thousand pesos), minus 6.800 (six million 800 thousand pesos), for a negative balance of
300 (300 thousand pesos). But don’t worry, you don’t have to pay from your pocket. As we had
already explained we will only pay the one in one thousand so you will lose 300 pesos. These
300 pesos we will take from the 15.000 that we gave you for participating in the workshop
and survey. So, in the end you will receive 14.700 pesos. This is if you are not caught by the
authorities. Coca 100 thousand pesos give 1.250 (one million two hundred fifty thousand pesos).
Invest 400 400/100=4 Receive: 4x 1.250= 5000. Cattle 100 thousand pesos give 250 thousand
pesos. Invest 600 600/100=6 Receive 6 x 250 = 1500. Income for Investments 6.500. Reduction
for coca 100 thousand pesos in coca reduce income in 212.5 700 in coca on average 700*4=28
28+4=32 32*212.5= -6.800 Net investment -300. Correct guess 0. Payment for participation
15.000. Total payoff 14.700
What if authorities discover you-a red ball appears? You are fined. And what is the amount of
the fine? 4 times 1.500=6.000 (six million pesos). From this amount you only need to pay the
1 per thousand, which is 6.000 pesos. If you are discovered you will receive 8.700. If your guess
is incorrect you don’t receive any payment. Total payoff if not caught 14.700. Coca fine 100
thousand pesos in coca give a fine of 1.500 (one million five hundred). If caught 400 thousand
in coca 400/100=4 4*1.500= -6.000. Total payoff if caught 8.700.
Implementation
During the workshop you will have to make 9 decisions, but only one will be paid at the end.
To determine which decision will be paid we will select one of the 9 cards marked with letters
A through I. The letter that is randomly selected will determine which decision to pay. The
decision will be the same for all participants. So that we keep everything confidential, you will
receive your payment in an envelope marked with your participant number.
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Procedure
We will begin by assigning seats to everyone in the room. Once you all have a seat we will pass
around an id number. This is the number we will use in the survey. If for any reason you lose
it, we won’t be able to pay you. Do you have any questions until now? Once we start you can’t
talk to anyone in the room. If someone starts talking he/she won’t be able to participate in
the workshop or in the payments anymore. If you have a question please raise your hand and
one of us will go to your seat an assist you. If you want to change any of your decisions, please
cross out with a line what you want to change and give your new answer next to it. Once you
complete all your decisions we will pick up your sheets and we will proceed to determine which
decision will be paid by taking out a card at random. This decision holds the same for everyone
in the group. If necessary, we will decide whether you get caught or not by taking a ball out of
the bag. Whether or not there is control applies to everyone in the group.
Workshop starts
Now we are going to begin the workshop. We are you to please come to the front so we can
assign the seats. {Assign seats and hand out practice round} Practice Round Before we start
with the investment decisions, we want to do a practice round. The idea is to be sure that



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. Changing minds and winning hearts: A natural experi-
ment in Colombia †
Abstract
Policy makers face a big challenge when designing policies whose effects depend on their
interaction with other governmental actions. With a framed field experiment we study
the effectiveness of two types of public policies in achieving legality and also look at their
combined effect when interacted. We focus on policies that activate social norms within
communities and on those that use standard deterrence mechanisms. Our experiment takes
place in a coca growing area in Colombia, where we can study the impact of an alternative
development program on the farmers’ willingness to invest in coca and to establish mech-
anisms of social control. We find that the program enhances coca reduction and increases
internal social control. In turn, internal control mechanisms decrease coca investments
among program beneficiaries and social control is triggered when people observe other
group members deviate from legality. By having exogenous punishment interact with in-
ternal compliance mechanisms, we find that external punishments that make whole groups
liable crowd-out internal control mechanisms; whereas those that make individuals liable
for their actions enhance internal social control. We conclude that by giving farmers in-
centives to act legally, there are positive effects that lead to enhancing compliance and
reducing the need to rely explicitly on costly external punishment.
Keywords: Public policy, social norms, alternative development, compliance, framed field
experiment, Colombia
JEL codes: K42, D74, D04
†Joint work with Marcela Ibanez. We would like to thank Axel Dreher, Michael Grimm, Gerhard Riener for
valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Econometria Consultores, Redes Ltda and Jacob Murillo
for their outstanding support in carrying out the field work and the experimental sessions.
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Introduction
Extensive theoretical and empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of monetary incentives
to align individual and social interests. However, the use of such incentives poses the question
of whether these policies are sustainable and of how long can the government afford to pay
people to do what they should be doing in the first place. One view is that a public policy
can be used as an instrument to educate citizens by expressing social values towards what is
right or wrong (Cooter, 1998; Cooter and Bohnet, 2003; McAdams, 2000). This would generate
feedback effects, understood as the spillovers between policies,1 that translate into higher levels
of sustainability of law compliance after monetary incentives are gone in the future. In this
paper, we investigate this hypothesis and consider the feedback effects of monetary incentives
on attitudes towards illegality, captured as the willingness to invest in illegal crops.
The context of our analysis is the fight against drugs in Colombia, one of the main producers
of coca in the world. We focus on the Forest Warden Families Program (henceforth FGB),
the country’s flagship alternative development program, and the main “social” strategy in the
fight against drug production. This program seeks to reduce coca cultivation by implementing
voluntary agreements with the community, by which beneficiaries receive bimonthly payments
conditional on keeping their territories free of coca. Compliance with the agreements is ver-
ified using satellite information and field inspections. If coca is detected, all members of the
community lose the bimonthly remuneration. This program seeks to achieve a sustainable
transformation towards the legal economy through three mechanisms: First, the monetary sub-
sidy will allow coca farmers to switch to legal activities and learn the advantages of legality.
Second, educational workshops aim at changing the attitudes towards illegality that will “erad-
icate coca from people’s mind and heart.” Third, by making farmers jointly liable in case of
the re-appearance of coca in their community, the program aims at generating a social norm
by establishing social control mechanisms. We ask: Does FGB achieve a permanent change in
norms promoting a culture of lawfulness? Does it reduce farmers’ willingness to invest in coca?
Does it foster mechanisms of social control?
Monetary incentive-based policies, as the one implemented in FGB program, could generate
positive feedback effects or externalities that translate into more pro-social behavior, assuring
the sustainability of the legal activities in the future, once the economic incentives are gone.
Yet, monetary incentives like this could also signal that anti-social behavior is expected and
induce more anti-social behavior. Which of these two effects dominate is an empirical question.
We investigate the effect of the FGB program on the culture of lawfulness using a modified
version of Ibanez and Martinsson’s (2013) framed field experiment. Participants are randomly
matched in groups and receive an endowment that they distribute between a secure but low
return legal crop (cocoa) and the more profitable but illegal coca crop, that is also associated
1Mejia and Restrepo (2013) specifically use feedback effects as spillovers between policies in the drug market,
by which they explicitly model the feedback effect between different anti-drug policies such as eradication and
interdiction. Other studies in the drug literature that incorporate spillover effects in illegal markets are Becker
et al. (2006), Naranjo (2004) and Chumacero (2008).
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with negative externalities to the community. To investigate the effectiveness of supply con-
trol policies, we implement external sanctions in some treatments, where with probability p
investments in coca are monitored and costly sanctions are imposed when coca is detected. We
use two alternative sanction systems. The first system mimics the sanctioning in the aerial
spraying program by making the whole group liable. The second sanctioning system makes
individuals liable for their actions imposing individual sanctions, as it would be the case with
manual eradication, incarceration or land expropriation. To simulate the effect of social con-
trol, in some treatments participants can use costly sanctions to signal disapproval over the
investment decisions of others. We test the effects of program participation on: investments in
coca, willingness to impose costly sanctions and response to sanctions.
To identify the impacts of the program on the culture of lawfulness, we explore the progressive
time expansion of the program and compare beneficiaries, with those who although willing to
participate in the program were not selected due to budget restrictions. First, we show that
beneficiary and not beneficiary veredas2 were similar before the program was implemented in
most observable characteristics such as having coca crops, distances to the local markets and
institutional presence, among others. Second, we show that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
who participated in our study were very similar before the program started. These two findings
support our identification strategy.
We find evidence that participation in the program allows to “change minds and win hearts”:
Beneficiaries of the program invest less in coca and are more likely to establish mechanisms of
social control than the control group of participants. We detect crowding in and out effects
of external social control on social sanctioning. Yet, the direction of the effect depends on the
type of external punishment used. When the whole group is made liable in case of detection,
external control crowds-out social sanctions, whereas in the case of individual liability it crowds
them in.
This paper contributes to different areas of research. Legal scholars and political scientists
propose that policies express social values on what is right or wrong and help to coordinate the
behavior by altering beliefs of what others will do (Cooter, 1988; Feldman, 2011 and McAdams,
2000) or by generating an educational or feedback effect that translates into behavioral changes
(Mettler and Soss, 2004; Soss and Schram, 2007 and Svallfors, 2010). Recent, empirical studies
from the economics field has provided evidence supporting that institutions can shape social
preferences. For instance it has been shown that there are significant and persistent differences
between East and West Germans in various individual and social preferences (Ockenfels and
Weimann, 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Svallfors, 2010; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011).
Similarly, Kotsadam and Jakobsson (2011) find that implementation of anti-prostitution rules
in Norway changed attitudes towards this activity. We present the first paper, to the best of
our knowledge, that investigates the feedback effects of policies that pay people to comply with
the law.
2A vereda is the smallest geographical division in Colombia. In this paper we speak about communities and
veredas interchangeably, since those living in a vereda are usually thought as communities themselves.
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The second contribution of this paper is on the research on procedural justice. Tyler (1990)
proposes that the procedures used in the implementation of the law can affect the perceived
legitimacy of the institutions affecting law compliance. In this paper, we consider whether the
fairness of the policies affect norms of compliance. In particular, we compare the effectiveness of
mechanisms of external control based on joint liability with those based on individual liability.
We expect that mechanisms of external control based on joint liability can be regarded as unfair,
as the innocent are also punished, crowding-out compliance.
Third, we contribute to the evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-drug efforts in Colombia.
While most of the studies focus on the effectiveness of eradication policies (Mejia and Restrepo,
2008; Ibanez and Carlsson, 2010; Ibanez and Martinsson, 2013; Ibanez, 2013; Mejía et al. 2013;
Rozo, 2014; Reyes, 2011), we focus on the impact of alternative development, a topic that has
received relatively less attention in the academic literature3 (an exception is Martinez, 2008).
The focus of our research is however very different. Instead of focusing on the effectiveness of
the program, measured as the decrease in areas cultivated with coca, we consider the effects
of the policies on attitudes towards coca as captured by experimental measures, and on on
how alternative development can be interacted with other anti-drug policies. This research is
complementary to our work on the effects of participation in the FGB Program on honesty
(Chapter 3).
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on punishment and social sanctions. Ample experimen-
tal and non-experimental evidence has shown that individuals are willing to incur in costly
actions to sanction anti-social behavior (Ostrom, 2000; Carpenter and Matthews, 2004; Car-
penter, 2007; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). The mere fact of receiving negative feedback from
other members of society has been shown to alter people’s behavior even when there are no
monetary costs attached on the sanction (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Ostrom and Walker, 1997;
Ostrom, 2000; Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Rege and Telle, 2004; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Masclet et
al., 2003; Sutter et al., 2007). Moreover, it has been shown that external punishment has a
deterrent effect on anti-social behavior (Cameron, 1988; Andreoni et al., 1998). Yet, the inter-
action of external and social sanctions has not been investigated. This paper fills that gap in
the literature and explores how social control interacts with different ways of applying external
sanctions. Our second contribution to this area is that we investigate the dynamics of social
norms of sanctioning. Yet, unlike existing papers that consider the dynamics of social sanctions
within repeated games, we consider how exogenous variation in exposure to legality affects the
willingness to use social sanctions. Hence our research has a similar flavor as Banerjee et al.
(2013)4 and Asiedu and Ibanez (2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background information on
the FGB program. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy used. Section 4 presents the
3Outside of academia, the UNODC carried out monitoring of the Program’s result in
all of its waves and studied its changes over time. These studies can be found here:
http://www.unodc.org/colombia/en/da2013/publicaciones.html. Moreover, the Colombian National Planning
Department (DNP), together with the Program Against Illegal Crops (PCI) and the FGB Program itself
commissioned a results and impact evaluation of the Program carried out in 2011-2012 by Econometria
Consultores. However, this evaluation was carried out internally and as of now has not been made public.
4Work in progress, not out as working paper.
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experimental design while section 5 discusses the main hypothesis of the study. The experimen-
tal procedures are presented in section 6. Section 7 presents the results regarding investments
in coca and use of mechanisms of social control and the last section closes with some final
remarks and conclusions.
Local background
The war on drugs
In 1971 US President Nixon declared drug abuse as a major public enemy and in response
launched the war on drugs. Billions of dollars are being spent each year mainly in supply-
reduction strategies. Colombia, one of the major producers of cocaine in the world, spent
annually between 2000 and 2008 about 1.1 billion dollars only in the military component of
the fight against drugs, costing the country almost as much as the annual public investment in
higher education (Mejia et al. 2013).5 Given the high economic costs of this policy, and the
evidence that raises serious questions on its lack of effectiveness (Mejia et al., 2013; Ibanez,
2013; Rozo, 2013; Reyes, 2011; Moreno-Sánchez et al., 2003), new alternative policies and
strategies need to be evaluated.
Forest Warding Families Program - FGB
The emphasis of our study is on Colombia’s flagship Alternative Development (AD) program:
“Familias Guardabosques” – FGB (Forest Warden Families). FGB targets areas with high
environmental value that already have or are very likely to grow coca and that show other geo-
graphic or socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Beneficiaries of the FGB program receive a monetary
subsidy payable for a fixed number of years without the option of reentering the program.6 In
exchange, communities promise to manually eradicate all their coca crops before the Program
officially starts, and ensure that the community remains a coca free territory during the inter-
vention. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) verifies that the community
starts and remains coca free using satellite information to identify areas where coca is being
cultivated, and also carries out field inspections. If coca reappears, the Program ends and all
the households from the community lose their benefits independently on whether they kept
their land free of coca or not.
The program seeks to achieve a sustainable transformation towards the legal economy by three
main built-in hypotheses. First, that to abandon coca, families need to learn to live in the
legal economy. Hence, families are offered an economic incentive that enables them to start a
5Colombia’s policy on the war on drugs is based on a two-sided strategy that combines stick-type and carrot-
type policies. On one hand, eradication (stick policy) focuses on the destruction of illicit drug plantations by
aerial spraying of herbicides or by manually pulling out the crops. On the other hand, alternative development
(carrot policy) aims at increasing the opportunity cost of cultivating coca by providing legal alternatives to
coca.
6This program has been implemented in seven different phases. Depending on the implementation phase
the cash amounts paid, the number of years they can benefit and compulsory saving rules have changed.
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food security project, while building a seed capital to start a legal productive project. Second,
that coca must be eradicated not only from people’s fields, but also from their minds and
especially from their hearts. In consequence, a common denominator in the FGB has been
the promotion of culture of lawfulness through workshops. Third, that coca eradication is
sustainable if communities develop mechanisms that prevent other community members from
growing it. In fact, a prerequisite of the program is that communities create a “verification
committee” that ensures that their vereda is coca free and works together with UNODC during
the annual inspection. This study aims at investigating the success of the program in changing
attitudes toward coca.
Identification strategy
To evaluate the impact of the FGB Program on the attitudes towards coca (as captured in
the willingness of people to invest in it), we benefit from the progressive expansion of the
program in the region. We compare communities that benefit from the program with those
that although willing to start the program have been allocated to start in a later stage. In the
following paragraphs we explain the criteria used to select beneficiaries and present evidence
that supports the progressive implementation of the program in otherwise similar communities.
Eligibility to the FGB program is defined in a step-wise procedure. First, the central govern-
ment prioritizes municipalities using a targeting index that is based on the region’s illegal crop
affectation, its ecological value, the potential effect over the population, and the complemen-
tarity with other investment programs.7 Based on these criteria, municipalities are classified in
a scale that goes from one to four, where one represents highest priority level of being selected.
Table 4.1 shows how the program has been rolled out. It is important to note that since the
Program began in 2003, every two years at most a new wave was starting. The largest influx of
beneficiaries came in wave IV (the payment and duration were reduced and thus more people
were treated), but overall, the priority level of the incoming municipalities has been very sim-
ilar. Only the sixth phase that was aimed at preventing coca to enter regions that had been
hardly hit by heavy rains is not comparable. The differences between the phases were mainly
the duration and amount of the conditional payments and the way the savings component8 was
designed.
7The components used to build the index are: number of hectares affected with illicit crops, whether
the municipality belongs to a strategic eco-region, whether the region is an important trafficking region, the
population affected and the impacts over ecosystems.
8The FGB Program wants its beneficiaries to save and has established different mechanisms to do so. First
it was voluntary, then every beneficiary had to save in a group-account and in the last version the Program
keeps part of their payments and gives it back when they agree on the productive investments that they want
to make.
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Table 4.1: Phase-in of the Program in its initial seven waves
Program Starting Departments Municipalities Veredas New
Families
Mean
Wave year municip target index
I 2003-2004 7 13 352 13 18,392 18.0
II 2005-2006 13 34 709 26 17,832 20.0
III 2006-2007 11 24 434 21 17,406 24.0
IV 2007-2008 15 44 828 42 33,546 23.6
V 2008 10 25 763 19 19,743 24.6
VI* 2009 3 7 136 7 7,408 16
VII 2010 10 25 344 11 8,664 23.9
Source: Forest Warden Families Program
*The VIth phase was intended at those municipalities that had suffered greatly from heavy rains, and it operated
in a different fashion. It intended to prevent the introduction of illegal crops when people were economically
vulnerable.
In a second step, local representatives of the alternative development Program prioritize the
eligible veredas. First, they consider whether the veredas comply with legal requirements
for participation. In particular, that they are are not located inside national parks or areas
of conservation (as defined by the municipality). Second, local officials asses the ecological
value of the vereda by considering the presence and state of ecological systems, the supply
of environmental services and the existence of forests. The third criteria used considers the
socioeconomic conditions like the willingness of the community to participate in the Program,
the potential number of beneficiaries and the organizational capacity of the community. Another
criteria considered is the economic sustainability of the Program. Hence, local representatives
consider the ability of the community to establish food security projects and evaluate the
experience of beneficiaries with strategic crops promoted by the Program. Finally, to guaranty
the successful implementation of the intervention, local officials evaluate the security conditions
to work in the area.
Table 4.2 presents the tabulation of municipalities according to the priority level assigned and
whether they are selected or not to benefit from FGB. We see that out of 1120 municipalities in
the country, 130 are classified as very high priority while 281 are classified as high priority. We
also see that of those municipalities assigned to these categories, only a fraction are selected
as beneficiaries of the FGB program. Not surprisingly, we observe that the proportion of
municipalities selected to participate decreases as the degree of priority falls. Yet, we see that
a significant fraction of municipalities classified in the highest level of priority do not benefit
from the program. Hence, in the analysis, we use this overlap to identify the impact of the
program on farmers’ attitudes towards coca.
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Table 4.2: Priority to participate in the Program
Priority FGB Beneficiary Total
0 1
Very High 67 63 130
High 222 59 281
Medium 331 3 334
Low 366 9 375
Total 986 134 1,120
Source: SIG, UNODC. Focalization Matrix.
To identify the impact of FGB we compare farmers who live in communities that were actually
selected to benefit from the program, with the norms of compliance of farmers who despite
being willing to participate in the program were not selected. Both types of communities
are located within the same municipalities and, according to program officials, are willing to
take the program. This means we have an intention to treat set up, where we are not directly
evaluating the impact of FGB on its direct beneficiaries, but on households that live in a vereda
that had beneficiaries,9 even if some or even most of the participants were FGB beneficiaries
themselves.
A critical assumption in our identification strategy is that selection to participate in the program
was as if random. While this hypothesis is not directly testable in our data, we compare the
socioeconomic characteristics of beneficiaries and eligible beneficiaries and test for differences
in the distribution of observables (See Section on Results).
Experimental design
Our experimental design is based on Ibanez and Martinsson’s (2013) coca investment game.
Participants are randomly and anonymously placed in groups of three, which remain constant
through the entire session. Each participant receives an endowment of COP $100,000 (USD 50)
and has to to decide how to invest it in two alternative crops: coca or cocoa. The endowment is
given to them in ten bills of $10,000 that cannot be broken down into lower amounts. Simulating
real conditions we allow coca to be more profitable than cocoa. Hence, for each bill invested in
coca participants receive $160,000 pesos (80 USD) in return, while each bill invested in cocoa
gives $70,000 pesos (35 USD). So the marginal return from investments in the alternative are
almost half the return from coca.
The second feature replicated in the experiment is that investments in coca are associated
with negative externalities. In coca growing areas, illicit armed groups dispute the control of
the territory, which results in increased violence (Diaz and Sanchez, 2005).10 To capture this
9There is evidence of large spill-over effects from beneficiary households to non-beneficiary households within
the same vereda. One reason is that although these non-beneficiaries did not receive payments, they were invited
and welcomed to all of the workshops and FGB activities.
10In this setting we leave negative externalities as a general comment. However, Chapter 3 explores what
happens when these externalities are made salient.
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feature, in the experiment we reduce the participants’ payoff by $35,000 pesos (17 USD) per
bill of coca invested in the group. All participants in the group are affected by the negative
externalities of coca, even when they are not investing.
After making investment decisions, participants receive feedback on their own payments and
on the coca investment decisions of the other two group members. This decision problem is
repeated five periods. Yet, to avoid ending-point effects participants do not know for how many
periods the game will last.11
The pay-off for subject i when can then be expressed as:




where ci is the amount invested in coca cultivation and a is the relative profit.
In this situation, the marginal incentive to cultivate coca is larger than the marginal incentive
of the alternative, net the cost of the externality (c− a− b > 0). Hence, the optimal individual
decision is to invest all the endowment in coca. Yet, as the social cost of investing in coca (3 ∗
35.000 = 105.000) is larger than the marginal incentive to cultivate in coca (160.000−70.000 =
90.000), socially it is better that nothing is invested in coca. The social dilemma created in the
framed field experiment recreates behaviors that are close to real life, as mentioned by Lusk et
al. (2006).
We frame our coca investment game as we consider that framing the investment problem
between illegal coca and legal cocoa would make the decision more context-relevant and help
participants understand their decision problem, making it as similar as possible to their real-life
investment decisions.
Experimental treatments
Our experiment uses a between subject design with six different treatments. In the control
treatment (T0) we allow participants to make investment decisions in the absence of control
and sanctioning mechanisms. Hence this treatment captures how norms of compliance or non-
compliance develop in the absence of drug-reducing interventions.
To test the effectiveness of different mechanisms on reducing illegal crop cultivation, we use
five treatments that allow external control, social sanctions or both to be available. Besides,
to test how the perceived fairness of the punishment mechanism affects compliance, we allow
external control treatments to use either individual or group liability. Table 4.3 summarizes
the treatments used in the experiment.
11At the beginning of the game we give them answer sheets for every round. We give them more answer
sheets that rounds played.
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Joint Liability T1 T4
Individual Liability T3 T5
In the treatment that exercises external control with joint liability (T1) participants get to
know that there is a chance, p, that authorities discover the coca crops and destroy them. The
probability of being discovered is set at 30%.12 If the group is caught, all group members get
their income reduced independently of whether they were cultivating coca or not, hence the
joint liability. For each bill invested in coca in the group, the income is reduced by $90 000 (45
USD) for each person in the group independently on whether they were individually investing
in coca.
The expected pay-off for subject i when they are not discovered, which happens with probability
(1 − p) is expressed in Equation 9, while the expected pay-off in case of being discover is equal
to:







where f , is the cost of the sanction. Compared with the control treatment, the marginal
incentive to invest in coca is lower in this treatment. Yet, as the marginal incentive to cultivate
coca is still positive (c − a − b − pf > 0), risk neutral individuals would not be deterred by
external sanctions. Hence, it is expected that a risk neutral individual would invest all the
endowment in coca.
Treatment 2 (T2) introduces endogenous internal control and no external control. Participants
have the chance to implement a mechanism of social control that operates in every round, and
there is no probability of being caught, as there is no external punishment. Yet, they have to
decide whether they want to incur in costly punishment in order to control coca investments of
other group members; at a very low cost of $50 pesos (3 US cents) they can send sad faces to
reduce the other’s income in $100 (5 US cents) for each face received. As before, the expected
pay-off for subject i when they are not sanctioned is expressed in Equation 9, while the payoff
in case of sanction is:
Πi = ci + a(10 − ci) − b
3∑
i=1
ci − rFsi − sFri, (11)
where r and s are the number of sanction points received and sent, respectively and Fr and
Fs are the cost of receiving sanctions and sending sanctions. Sending sanctions is costly, so
12This experiment leaves the probability of being caught constant at 30%. In other experiments (Chapter 4)
p is allowed to vary between 10% and 30% and we find that people do in fact respond negatively to increases in
p, by decreases their coca investments.
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the optimal decision for participants is not to sanction anti-social behavior. Therefore, social
sanctions are not deterrent (decision is simplified to Equation 9) and individuals should invest
all their endowment in coca.
The institution with external control and individual liability (T3) is identical to T1 except that
if coca is discovered only the person responsible is held liable. For each bill invested in coca
the guilty participant’s income diminishes by $90 000. In this case the pay-off in case of being
discovered, which happens with probability (p) is:
Πi = ci + a(10 − ci) − b
3∑
i=1
ci − fci. (12)
The marginal incentive to invest in coca in this treatment is equal to that in (T1), so the
optimal decision is to invest all the endowment in coca.
The last two treatments (T4 and T5) combine exogenous control with individual or joint liability
(T1 and T3) with endogenous internal control (T2). These two treatments also imply that the
optimal decision is to invest all the endowment in coca.
All parameters used in the experiment reflect real life in terms of risk of being caught and
relative profit to alternative products. The following calculations show what is behind the
experiment’s parameters: the pay-off function is standardized so that coca pays 1 (i.e., all
values are divided by 160 000); a is set to 0.44.13 The value of the negative externality, b, is set
to 0.22. While there are no estimations on the exact social cost of coca, negative externalities
are present in these regions (increased violence and environmental damage, health problems,
to name a few). The external punishment for being caught f is set to 0.56. The costs of
receiving (r) a sad face (Fr) and sending (s) a sad face (Fs) reduce the payoff function after
the investment decisions have been made, as they are a reaction to what people see in the
feedback form. Thus, for whatever payment they received in a given round, $50 pesos times the
number of faces sent (Fs), and $100 pesos times the number of faces received (Fr) are deducted
from the payment.
Hypothesis and predictions
Two empirical irregularities in public good games (and public bad games, as the one used in our
experiment) are that people are more pro-social than the model would imply, and that people
are willing to sacrifice payments in order to sanction others. To account for these irregularities,
behavioral models have considered that an individual’s behavior is not only driven by economic
incentives but that it also depends on norms and on the behavior of others. For instance, Ibanez
and Martinsson (2013) consider that individuals take into account the negative externalities
generated in the decision and consider social norms regarding coca cultivation. In this case
Equation 9 can be reformulated as:
13Ibanez (2010) estimated that the relative profit of the best alternative to coca was 0.5 in 2006.
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Πi = ci + a(10 − ci) − b
3∑
i=1
ci −M(b, ci,m), (13)
where M is a function that captures the moral cost of harming others by investing in coca.
According to Ibanez and Martinsson (2013), this function depends on the size of the damage
generated or the value of the externality, b, the amount of coca cultivated, ci, and an individual
parameter, m, that captures how “moral” a person is. A completely moral person will feel
very guilty by behaving against her moral values and would suffer a large moral cost. One
implication of this extension is that the marginal incentive to cultivate coca will be lower. If
the marginal moral cost of cultivating coca is high enough, participants will not invest in coca
even if the economic incentive to do so is positive. This model helps to conceptualize zero coca
investments in the game.
This formulation can be further extended. One extension is to consider that the degree of
morality, m, or the extent to which the person is affected by going against his moral principles
is not fixed, but can be shaped by environmental factors. The hypothesis that we are interested
in testing in this paper is that the individual moral cost of investing in coca is shaped by the FGB
program. Following Cooter (1988) we consider that participation in FGB generates a feedback
effect that translates into a change in preferences towards coca or a change in parameter m.
As discussed previously, there are many channels by which the FGB program can affect m. We
can not isolate the effect of each of them as they occurred simultaneously so we test for their
joint effect. Our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1
Participants living in communities that benefit from FGB are less prone to invest
in coca and when they do, they invest smaller amounts than those that come from
non-FGB veredas.
Another potential extension to the conceptual framework is to consider that individuals care
about social norms. This extension can be incorporated by reformulating Equation 13 as:
Πi = ci + a(10 − ci) − b
3∑
i=1
ci −M(b, ci,m) − S((ci − c̄)2, s), (14)
where S is a function that captures the cost of deviating from the social norm that is assumed
to depend on the difference between own behavior and average behavior of others, ci − c̄, and
a parameter s, that captures the weight that the society gives to deviations from the social
norm. We assume that there is a social preference for conformity so the larger the difference
between a person’s decisions and the decisions of others is, c̄, the larger is the cost of deviating
from the social norm. The parameter s captures the importance that the social norms have;
for unimportant norms, s = 0, reflecting no social cost of deviating. Increases in s would
reflect more importance of the social norm and a higher cost of deviating. We assume that the
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parameter s is not fixed over time but can be shaped by cohesion within a social group. The
higher the sense of identification with the group, the more importance given to conformity.
One implication of this extension is that participants’ investments would depend on the expected
investment of others. In a repeated game, participants will converge towards the accepted social
norm. If FGB beneficiaries invest less than those who are not beneficiaries, it is expected that
groups formed by only FGB beneficiaries will invest less in coca over time than groups of
only non-beneficiaries. Another channel that can affect behavior is that participation in FGB
increases the sense of cohesion, making the norm of conformity more important.
Hypothesis 2
Only-FGB groups create norms of low investments in coca and show lower levels
of coca investment over time than mixed groups and all non-FGB groups. Pres-
ence of FGB in mixed groups will spill over positively to non-FGB group members
resulting in intermediate levels of coca investments.
In the case of positive moral and social costs of investing in coca, the marginal incentive to
cultivate coca would be lower, so given the incentives in the game, for sufficiently moral and
social concerned participants the effect of the introduction of external sanctions would be to
deter coca investments, as long as the expected marginal incentive is negative (1−a− b−M ′−
S′ − pf < 0).
Hypothesis 3
External control disciplines participants and leads to less coca investments with
respect to the control treatment.
So far we have assumed that the cost of sanctioning peers is positive. If individuals care about
relative investments in coca, they could derive a positive utility from using sanctions. Assume
that the net cost of imposing a sanction is given by rFsR(ci−cj, r), where, R is a function that
captures the sense of civic responsibility and depends on the relative investment of participant
i in comparison with participant j, and r is a parameter that indicates how important this
relation is. In this case, if the individual invests more than the other participants, R is positive
so individually it would be optimal not to impose sanctions on others. However if cj is higher
than ci, R is negative, indicating that the participant derives positive utility of sanctioning the
other, so in this situation social sanctions would be observed. We assume that r is not fixed
and can be changed with participation in the FGB Program. We expect that the Program will
increase r, making it more costly for subjects not to sanction anti-social behavior.
Hypothesis 4
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When internal social control is available, participants from FGB veredas are
more likely to use it compared to non-beneficiaries.
The use of social sanctions increases the marginal incentive of cultivating coca, so it is expected
that when external and social sanctions are present, these mechanisms will reinforce each other.
Hypothesis 5
Coca investments are lowest in treatments in which both external and endoge-
nous internal control are implemented.
Participants have procedural justice preferences and consider the fairness of the procedures
used. Participants who have not cultivated coca would perceive it as unfair to be sanctioned,
as would be the case when there is joint liability. This can lead to a crowding-out effect on the
motivation to comply with the law and result in relatively larger coca investments, compared
with treatments that impose individual liability.
Experimental procedures
The department of Cordoba was considered a suitable place to carry out the study as this is a
coca producing nucleus, concentrating about 40 percent of the areas with coca in the country
in 2011. The main coca producing municipalities in the department are Tierralta, Puerto Lib-
ertador and Montelibano. Human occupation of this municipalities started in the late 1940’s
by landless farmers and intensified in the 1970’s, when colonizers from the neighboring depart-
ment, Antioquia, started illegal logging on national lands. The poverty and marginalization of
this region favored the emergence of illicit crops in the late 1990’s. By 2005 more than three
thousand hectares were cultivated with coca in the department. This triggered an aggressive
spraying campaign over the following years. For each hectare cultivated, 3.3 to 4.6 hectares
were sprayed. The FGB program was implemented in the region in 2005 covering two thousand
families. Since then, the program has expanded and in total about 5000 families have benefited.
We selected Tierralta and Puerto Libertador as our areas of study. Table 4.4 presents the
descriptives of these two municipalities when the targeting index was created in 2003, and
compares them with the national average for other municipalities where coca is cultivated.
We see that Puerto Libertador and Tierralta have a high density of forest compared with the
national average in municipalities with coca. For every hectare of land in the municipality 0.8
and 0.7 hectares are covered by forest, compared to 0.56 in the rest of the country. This could be
due to the presence of a Natural Park in the area, which also prevents many communities that
live within park boundaries to enter the Program.14 These two municipalities have been affected
by illicit crops with 408 and 847 hectares cultivated with coca on average, since satellite pictures
14The Paramillo Natural Park covers 460.000 hectares and was established in 1977 when towns and human
settlements were already there.
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became available in 2001. Compared with other municipalities that grow coca in the country, the
density of coca is relatively high in Puerto Libertador, while Tierralta is similar to the average
coca-growing municipality. The population density is comparable to other municipalities with
coca with about 1.6 inhabitants in 10 hectares of land (the national average is 1.4). Both
municipalities are classified as having a high priority to enter the FGB program with a score
of 29 points in a 1 to 44 scale. These two municipalities have benefited from two and three
waves of the FGB program respectively. In 2012, at the moment of the study, 91 families were
beneficiaries in Puerto Libertador and 206 in Tierralta.
Table 4.4: Descriptive characteristics of study municipalities and other coca-growing areas
Puerto Libertador Tierralta Coca Municipalities
Municipality Area (Ha) 138745.7 506536.4 340308.3
Coca (Ha) 408.9 847.14 382.1463
Coca Density 0.0029471 0.0016724 0.0016331
Forest Density 0.7976673 0.68481 0.5772568
Population 22601 45888 11023.73
Population Density 0.16 0.09 0.14095
Total Points 29 29 27.09
Priority 1 1 1.45
Waves II,III,VII V, VII .
Source: SIG, UNODC.
The next step was to select veredas suitable for our study. We used secondary and primary in-
formation obtained directly from program officials and community leaders to select the relevant
veredas. We obtained information on FGB status of each vereda within the two municipalities
of our study. For those that had not received the program, we also dwelled into the reasons for
its absence to make sure that the control group was in fact comparable and had not selected
itself out of the program. Although we already know that the municipalities where both types
of communities live have been targeted by the Program, we made sure that those veredas that
were invited to our experiment were similar to each other on basic characteristics, and ensured
that the control veredas had expressed their will to be part of the Program when it was offered
to the region.
According to Program officials, there are several reasons why some veredas within targeted
municipalities have not received the Program so far. The main reason is that the Program has
been rolled-out progressively in time, as there are more eligible communities than resources.
Since resources were not enough, program officials prioritize eligible veredas according to the
exogenous criteria previously discussed. So municipalities that are more dispersed, or that have
areas inside national parks are not included in a process that is as if random.
In our analysis, we made an effort to select veredas that are similar in observable characteristics.
In cooperation with local Program officials, we identified specific characteristics that our control
communities needed to have, namely, having expressed a will of participating in the Program,
having similar socioeconomic and productive characteristics, and being close to the treatment
villages so that our activity could be held with members of treatment and control communities
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at the same time. Most importantly, since our local contact was the person assigned by the
Program to coordinate the selection process for the next years, we could ask him to match the
treated communities with those that he thought would most likely join the Program in its next
wave or version of the Program (now called post-eradication).
Once the local experts found the best possible control communities, we matched each treated
vereda with its best possible match and then randomized the experimental treatments among
them. We did this process independently for Tierralta and Puerto Libertador. When a vereda
was chosen, the vereda’s president15 was contacted and was asked to give us a list with the
number of households and names of all of the vereda’s residents. From this list we randomly
invited 36. As other people from the community knew about the process, together with the
president they ensured that only those invited participated.
The experiment was presented as a “workshop” for a university research project regarding
the needs and behaviors of people in coca growing areas, and the FGB program was never
mentioned. Since we are not evaluating the Program, and our workshop has no relationship to
FGB itself or to how it will develop in the future, mentioning the Program to participants was
not necessary. This prevented FGB beneficiaries to act according to what they think Program
officials expect, which would bias the analysis. Moreover, the fact that half of the participants
had benefited from the Program and the other half had not and were put together in the same
room, made it clear that we were not carrying out a Program-related activity that would affect
their probability of receiving its benefits in the future.
The experiment had four stages. First, people were seated and given a number that identified
them for the whole session and which ensured anonymity of the answers at all times and
allowed to merge the experimental choices with the post-experimental survey. Treatments were
randomized over sessions. Second, instructions were read out loud and a trial round was played,
after which the experiment took place. Each person was given a sheet for every round with 10
$10,000 COP bills that they could invest in either coca or cocoa. After crossing out how much
they wanted to invest in cocoa (whatever was left blank was invested in coca) their responses
were recorded in a computer, and feedback sheets were returned to them, where they knew
how much coca other group members had invested in. Depending on the treatment, they were
told whether they had been punished and the amount of sad faces that they had received from
other group members. Participants were paid over decisions in all rounds, but we explained to
them at the beginning that we could not pay them the full amount of what they received, but
that we would pay 0.1% of what they had obtained (See Instructions in the Appendix). The
average payment for the game was around $6.6 USD ($13,200 COP), which at the time was
more than a half-day’s wage. They received additionally 3 USD in order to cover transportation
costs. Third, people answered an exit survey so that they could receive the money earned in
the game. We closed the experiment with a final discussion.
15Communities elect their leaders and they represent them in both formal and informal situations. Presidents




In December 2012 we conducted 28 experimental sessions with 867 participants in two munic-
ipalities in Cordoba: Tierralta and Puerto Libertador. Almost half of the participants (401
participants or 47%) live in veredas where the Program had operated or currently operates,
and 461 (53%) live in veredas without Program intervention, due to the exogenous reasons
mentioned above.
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics for both FGB and non-FGB and also for each exper-
imental treatment employed, regarding the questions collected in the exit survey. As most of
them were not altered by the Program or happened before it, they serve as a balance test
between treatments. We find that the randomization worked well, as groups are very similar
in their secondary characteristics. There are a few variables where the randomization did not
work as expected: cost to the closest urban center (directly related with the time it takes to get
there, so these two variables are a reflection of each other), years of household in the “vereda”
and belonging to a non-catholic church. For this reason we will control for these variables in
the regressions to come.
Even though there are some differences between T4 and T6 with respect to the control treatment
in the amount of years people have grown coca, these differences disappear when we look at
whether people have grown coca at all, probably a more important variable, since what we need
is that people have had exposure to coca growing at all.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for beneficiary and control groups and experimental treatments
Variable
Treatment vs. Control Experimental Treatments
Non-FGB FGB T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Prop. Male 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.47 0.48 0.63* 0.57
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Age 39.44 38.71 38.35 40.08 37.75 39.98 38.98 39.25
(0.72) (0.72) (1.28) (1.30) (1.16) (1.22) (1.12) (1.32)
Over primary 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.36
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cost to center 8,463 8,869 7,650 9,498*** 10,220*** 7,671 8,653* 8,101
(261.35) (235.94) (445.95) (383.19) (374.13) (467.53) (399.09) (474.36)
Hours to center 1.08 1.06 0.91 1.04 1.47*** 0.79** 1.27*** 0.98
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07)
HH Size 5.34 5.18 5.20 5.06 5.21 5.55 5.30 5.24
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22)
Prop. Minors 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Years in HH 10.02 11.54** 12.51 9.35** 9.79* 9.91* 9.19** 14.38
(0.47) (0.58) (1.15) (0.70) (0.83) (0.68) (0.86) (1.19)
Years coca 2.01 2.50 3.07 3.18 1.91 1.54** 2.46 1.18***
(0.25) (0.30) (0.55) (0.58) (0.46) (0.33) (0.53) (0.29)
Any coca 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.27 0.36 0.32
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Non-catholic(a) 0.46 0.42*** 0.38 0.44** 0.44** 0.56*** 0.48*** 0.32**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 461 406 143 160 150 168 126 120
Significance levels: p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.1*.
Notes: Differences are drawn between groups with respect to the base level: non-beneficiaries in the treatment-
vs-control, and with respect to T0 in experimental treatment columns. (a) People that report following a religion
different than catholicism (mostly new christian, protestant and evangelical churches).
Descriptive results
A first look at the coca investment behavior of people from FGB veredas and non-FGB veredas
shows that both groups are different in their levels of investment, even though they follow similar
patterns. Non-FGB participants tend to opt into coca more than their FGB counterparts and
also to choose higher amounts, as can be seen in Figure 4.1.
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As described above, participants were anonymously placed in groups of three. The first group
type only had participants that came from FGB veredas; the second group type had participants
that lived in communities with no FGB beneficiaries and the third group type mixed people
from FGB veredas and non-FGB veredas. We can see in Figure 4.2 that all-FGB groups opt less
into coca and invest less in it than the other groups. It is interesting to see that mixed groups
behave more similar to non-FGB groups than to FGB groups, and even end up with higher coca
levels than the rest. This could point to emerging norms of social control only when everyone
has been part of a Program that fosters these types of behaviors, but, once people are taken
out of this framework and mixed with others who do not follow the same pattern, negative
externalities from non-FGB to FGB participants emerge. This speaks against our hypothesis
that FGB presence in a group would have positive externalities on other group members.
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Effect of different coca reducing policies and their interactions
To investigate the impact of FGB on culture of lawfulness we estimate two separate models.
The first one looks at the willingness to invest in coca and on the amount of coca invested.
The second model captures the decision to use internal social control mechanisms in order to
reduce coca among other community members.
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We model the willingness to invest in coca with a linear probability random effects panel model,
where investing any positive amount of money in coca indicates willingness to invest, and model
the amount of coca invested with a linear random effects panel regression.16 Since both veredas
and participants are randomly selected and assigned into our experimental treatments, we can
be sure that we do not have self-selection into the experiment, which means that our regressors
should not be correlated with the individual effects, and therefore can use a random effects
model. The random effects model is particularly useful when some people play the same
strategy in every round, which would be considered “constant” in a fixed-effects model and
dropped from the analysis. Additionally, the variables that interest us the most, namely being
part of the FGB Program and the experimental treatment that people received do not change
throughout the experiment, and thus would be lost in the fixed effects model. Each round is
one time period, so we take into account correlations within individuals over time. We also
cluster the standard errors at the vereda level, to account for correlations between members
of the same community.17 We also control for the individual level variables that despite the
randomization were by chance not balanced between treatments. We add session fixed effects
to account for possible factors that might have altered the way people played the game that we
could not control or observe. For instance, we were aware that members of illegal armed groups
were present in some of the sessions, but we could not recognize their presence. We take this
into account by adding session fixed effects. We run all regressions with the same observations
(we make sure include observations that have all the control variables complete even in the
specifications that do not include these variables).
The first two columns in Table 4.6 present the estimated coefficients for the willingness to invest
and the amount of coca invested exclusively in terms of the experimental treatments. The third
and fourth columns include interactions between the treatments and being part of the FGB
program, as well as the type of group they were randomly assigned to during the experiment.
The last two columns include control variables.
When only the experimental treatments are taken into account (Columns 1 and 2), willingness
to engage in coca investments is reduced when farmers are exposed to individual punishment
(at the 1% significance level) or a combination of external punishment with internal community
control (at the 5% significance level when external punishment is aimed at the whole group
and at the 10% significance level when it is aimed only at guilty individuals). In the absence of
external punishment, internal control could increase people’s engagement with coca crops. The
amount of coca investments decreases when people are exposed to group punishment (at the
1% significance level), individual punishment (at the 1% significance level) or a combination of
individual and community control (at the 5% significance level). In terms of the size of coca
investments, internal control has a significant and decreasing effect.
16As robustness check we run a negative binomial panel model to account for the count nature of the
dependent variable that goes from 0 to 10 and the results hold. We opt for a linear panel specification because
interpretation of the results is more straightforward.
17The treatments were randomized at a session level. However, correlation among participants is likely to
arise within a vereda and not within a session. In order to capture factors that might have risen at a session
level we include session dummies.
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Once the experimental treatments are interacted with living in a FGB alternative development
vereda, a very interesting story emerges. Those who have not taken part in the Program react
to both individual and group external punishment strategies, but do not react to a policy where
internal control is introduced. In fact, non-beneficiaries engage in larger amounts of coca invest-
ments when only internal control is introduced, and this is significant (at the 5% significance
level). For their part, FGB beneficiaries react to policies where community control is introduced
and interacted with group and internal punishment, by reducing their coca investments, at the
1% and 5% significance levels respectively. Furthermore, internal control by itself also reduces
coca investments at the 10% significance level. This result makes sense since FGB beneficiaries
have had to create their own internal community control groups in order to keep their whole
vereda free of coca to prevent being dropped from the Program. Once community control is a
reality for them, it becomes an efficient instrument to reducing engagement in coca and overall
coca investments, especially when combined with external punishment policies.
After introducing the variables that were not balanced among the treatments in the random-
ization checks, such as the transportation cost to the closest urban center, being part of a
non-Catholic church, the amount of years growing coca and the years in the vereda, most ef-
fects on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries remain: beneficiaries reduce their engagement with
coca when internal control is combined with external individual punishment and reduce the
amount of coca grown when internal control is present, and when it is interacted with any
type of external control. It is interesting to note that being part of a non-Catholic church
also reduces engagement with coca, influencing the decision of whether to opt-in at all into
investing in something illegal. The influence of these new churches in the decision to cultivate
coca or not was first evidenced by Ibanez and Carlsson (2010) and Ibanez (2010) and received
further support by testimonies from the field, whereby communities that accept the presence of
these churches reduce their involvement with illegal crops greatly. We have first-hand evidence
from conversations with members of christian churches and christian leaders that preaching
against coca crops is common. It is interesting to note that these churches have a very strong
community control element in themselves, as they preach that people should be examples of
“righteousness” for others, and indirectly impose large non-economic sanctions, such as shame
or guilt, on those that deviate from what is being preached.
A variable that is not included in the table due to great loss of observations is the lagged
amount of coca that others invest in. Including this variable is equivalent to dropping all the
observations from the first round where this variable is not observed, but the results can be
seen in Table A4.1 in the Annex. People get feedback on what others are doing on every round,
and thus can take this into account when deciding how much coca to grow in the next round.
What is interesting to note is that people do react to what others are investing and follow
their example: When other group members invested in coca, people were more willing to invest
positive and larger amounts in the subsequent round.
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Table 4.6: Experimental coca investments by treatment and program type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dcoca Coca dcoca Coca dcoca Coca
Experimental Treatments
T1 Group Punish -0.045 -0.698∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.649∗∗ -0.085 -0.798∗∗
(0.059) (0.234) (0.081) (0.315) (0.083) (0.349)
T2 Int. Control 0.046∗∗ -0.301∗∗ 0.071∗∗ -0.044 0.065 -0.062
(0.019) (0.129) (0.031) (0.125) (0.040) (0.173)
T3 Individual Punish -0.186∗∗∗ -0.974∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.767∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.172) (0.046) (0.184) (0.051) (0.209)
T4 IntCont+GroupPunish -0.086∗∗ -0.362 -0.064 -0.151 -0.066 -0.144
(0.041) (0.288) (0.050) (0.232) (0.056) (0.262)
T5 IntCont+IndPunish -0.134∗ -0.896∗∗ -0.032 -0.464 -0.076 -0.614∗
(0.075) (0.376) (0.060) (0.314) (0.082) (0.364)
Program Treatment and Interactions
FGB 0.083 0.502∗ 0.077 0.478∗
(0.066) (0.279) (0.063) (0.268)
T1 GP X FGB 0.003 -0.034 0.006 -0.009
(0.081) (0.292) (0.081) (0.285)
T2 IC X FGB -0.035 -0.438∗ -0.035 -0.428∗
(0.057) (0.223) (0.055) (0.219)
T3 IP X FGB -0.040 -0.163 -0.055 -0.203
(0.066) (0.294) (0.067) (0.296)
T4 ICGP X FGB -0.028 -0.496∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.449∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.157) (0.036) (0.152)
T5 ICIP X FGB -0.140∗∗ -0.600∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.616∗∗
(0.067) (0.271) (0.067) (0.275)
Group Types
All FGB -0.075 -0.408 -0.075 -0.414
(0.059) (0.286) (0.058) (0.280)
Mixed -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.007
(0.036) (0.191) (0.038) (0.192)
Controls
Cost to urban center 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Other non-Catholic religion -0.051∗∗ -0.151
(0.025) (0.128)
Years growing coca 0.003 0.013
(0.002) (0.013)
Years in vereda -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.005)
Experimental Round -0.016∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.023)
Constant 0.437∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 1.662∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.119) (0.032) (0.129) (0.040) (0.201)
Observations 4174 4174 4174 4174 4174 4174
Veredas 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 Overall 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.09
R2 Within 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
R2 Between 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.13
Vereda level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Session fixed effects included.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The self-reported number of years growing coca increased the willingness of a person to invest in
coca, but did not raise the invested amount significantly. This was expected, as the experiment
reflects real life situations and we expect people to bring their own background and experiences
to the game.
We did not find significant effects of being placed in an all-FGB group or a mixed group versus
non-FGB groups, although the signs went in the right directions of reducing coca in the former
and increasing it in the latter (as can be seen in the descriptive graphs at the beginning).
However, including FGB status in the regression already accounts for these differences, and we
do not want to highlight an insignificant pattern.
As explained in the experimental set-up, there was a 30% chance of having coca investments
caught in every round. A natural question is whether being caught in one round reduces
coca investments in the next round. As expected, 28.3% of the rounds in the treatments that
included external punishment were punished. However, this did not lead to a reduction in coca
investments (see Table A4.2 in the Annex). We also tested whether cumulative punishment (i.e.,
the sum of times punishment had been in place) played a role in discouraging coca investments,
and this also does not seem to be the case. One possible explanation is that people had already
internalized the punishment even before it happened; people decided on less coca because of
the possibility of punishments, but did not change their strategy once it materialized because
they had already taken it into account.
Use of social control mechanisms
Table 4.7 explores the drivers of the use of internal control mechanisms (sad faces) and the
intensity of their use (amount of sad faces sent to others).
This table tests our hypotheses on the efficiency of interactions of external punishment strategies
with internal control vis-a-vis internal control alone, and on a more intensive use by FGB
beneficiaries versus non-beneficiaries. Only the experimental treatments that include internal
control come into play, making the base category the internal control treatment without any
interactions with external punishment.
Moreover, since we are interested in what triggers the use of costly internal control mechanisms
and on how group norms of control evolve, we interact the amount of coca that other people
are investing with the type of group they are in. We square the coca investments made by
others to capture non-linearities or inflection points. We also include a variable that compares
people with the rest of the group they are in to see what happens when people are below or
above their peers in terms of coca investments, which would capture conformity with a social
norm. The last two columns include the control variables that were also included in the coca
investment regression.
We find a crowding-out and a crowding-in effect of internal control mechanisms depending on
the type of external punishment used. When external punishment makes the whole group liable
for the actions of any of its members, crowding out occurs and people are around 10% less likely
to punish their group members with sad faces. On the other hand, when individual liability
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external punishment is used, internal control is further enhanced, and people are between 20%
and 23% more likely to send faces, and send one more face compared to those that only have
the internal control treatment. It is important to note that this variable has the largest effect of
all included variables on the use of sad faces and on the amount of faces used. This result could
be linked to the legitimacy of the external control mechanism itself. Most people know that
growing coca is illegal and would concede that it can bring negative effects to the community.
Thus, an external punishment that makes individuals liable for their actions could be seen as
legitimate, whereas external punishment that extends the consequences to the whole community
might seem unjust. Although the crowding-in effect of individual punishment is larger than
the crowding-out effect of group punishment in the probability of using social control and also
in the amount of control employed, crowding-out is also significant and is a negative side-effect
that external punishment may have.
Groups that only have FGB members start using sad faces when others are behaving badly,
captured by the square of how much coca others in the group are growing. This effect is easier
to see in Figure 4.3, where the marginal effects are presented for all-FGB groups and mixed
groups, compared to the base group-type that does not have any FGB participants. Small levels
of coca do not affect the use of internal control mechanisms, but when others start growing
large amounts, social control is triggered. Being part of the alternative development Program
makes people more willing to use internal control mechanisms, but only when the situation
requires it. This is why members of groups that were composed by only FGB started using
internal punishment mechanisms once others in their group deviated from legality to a large
extent. The maximum amount of coca investments made by other group members is 20 (each
person a maximum of 10, and a group has 3 people). Up to a total of 6 units being invested
in coca by other members, the use of punishing faces is numerically very similar for all group
types. From a total of 7 onwards, the use of sad faces starts to increase in groups with all-FGB
participants; when the total reaches 11 units invested in coca by other group members, all-FGB
groups send a statistically significant higher amount of faces than groups that have no FGB
beneficiaries, and if the total reaches 17 or more units invested in coca the use of sad faces is
statistically higher in all-FGB groups than in mixed groups.
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Table 4.7: Use of social control mechanisms (sad faces)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UsedFaces Num.Faces UsedFaces Num.Faces
Experimental/Program Treatments
T4 IntCont+GroupPunish -0.108∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.052
(0.035) (0.062) (0.040) (0.082)
T5 IntCont+IndPunish 0.201∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.033) (0.043) (0.078)
FGB -0.094∗ -0.340∗ -0.097∗ -0.364∗
(0.052) (0.179) (0.055) (0.190)
Group Types and Interactions
Group: All FGB 0.071 0.187 0.074 0.178
(0.067) (0.185) (0.070) (0.202)
Group: Mixed 0.001 0.045 0.008 0.063
(0.033) (0.121) (0.036) (0.119)
Coca by others 0.017 -0.046 0.019 -0.044
(0.012) (0.036) (0.013) (0.036)
Coca by others (2) -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
AllFGB X coca others -0.047∗∗∗ -0.118∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗
(0.017) (0.062) (0.019) (0.056)
Mixed X coca others -0.010 0.033 -0.014 0.028
(0.017) (0.078) (0.018) (0.079)
AllFGB X coca others (2) 0.007∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
Mixed X coca others (2) -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Controls
Less coca than rest 0.096∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.130) (0.042) (0.132)
More coca than rest 0.062∗ 0.128 0.062∗ 0.126
(0.033) (0.111) (0.033) (0.113)
Cost to urban center 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Other non-Catholic religion 0.003 0.031
(0.029) (0.118)
Years growing coca 0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.008)
Years in vereda -0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.004)
Constant 0.267∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.075) (0.047) (0.127)
Observations 1944 1944 1874 1874
Veredas 24 24 24 24
R2 Overall 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.14
R2 Within 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
R2 Between 0.31 0.23 0.30 0.23
Vereda level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Session fixed effects included.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Treatment base level: T2 Internal Control.
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Interestingly, people punish those who act differently, more so when others invest more in
coca, but also when they invest less. People want others to behave similarly and are willing
to punish deviations from what they expect, even if it is costly for the individual and for the
whole community. Although this has little economic sense, real life situations show that people
are able to justify their own illegal actions if everyone around them is doing the same. When
individuals find themselves investing less in coca than their peers, they use mechanisms of
internal control and employ them more intensively, whereas when they find themselves above
the mean they use sad faces, although they do not send a statistically significant higher amount.
Lastly, none of the control variables explain the use of internal control mechanisms.
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Finally, we checked if having received sad faces led to reductions in coca investments, and find
that this was not the case. Similar to the punishment analysis, it seems that people internalize
the existence of internal control before investing in coca, which is especially true for FGB
beneficiaries that do invest less when this policy is in place. People have beliefs on how far they
can go before they get punished and act accordingly from the beginning.
Final discussion and concluding remarks
This study provides evidence on the feedback effect of policies that provide incentives to comply
with the law. Using the context of the war on drugs, we find that beneficiaries of the Forest
Warden Families Program (FGB), the biggest illegal crop substitution program in Colombia
are significantly less likely to invest in coca than non-beneficiaries, especially when mechanisms
of community control are available. We find that programs that emphasize culture of legal-
ity, state legitimacy and social capital –as FGB does– seem to be an efficient way to enhance
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coca-reducing efforts, especially because they enhance the development of social control mech-
anisms within communities. The mere existence of such mechanisms was enough to bring coca
investments down for people who had been exposed to the program. These mechanisms can
be potentially combined with external governmental control mechanisms that target only those
individuals that break the law and grow coca, instead of the whole communities in order to
become even more efficient.
These internal mechanisms complement governmental efforts that punish those individuals that
deviate from the norm. This complementarity arises when, for instance, the majority of a
community makes up their mind to voluntarily eradicate coca, but lacks the capacity to ensure
that every single community member complies. In this case, they even thank the existence
of individual external control, which avoids internal conflict between community members.
However, when the whole community is punished for the actions of possibly only a few (as
is the case of aerial spraying, which negatively affects cash crops and legal investments in
alternative crops), state legitimacy is decreased. This result is in line with Feldab-Brown’s
(2006) arguments related to “winning the hearts and minds” of farmers, where the author shows
with qualitative-case study evidence that where aerial spraying is undertaken, the legitimacy of
the state decreases and the local population ceases to cooperate with the authorities. For these
reasons, special attention has to be paid to not crowding out mechanisms of internal control
with external punishments that affect whole groups. They might seem too harsh or unjust to
the people who might then decide to not even coordinate among themselves.
In terms of externalities, the program’s effects do not seem to extend outside community bound-
aries, as seen with the mixed group results that did not show any signs of adjusting to lower
levels of coca investments because of FGB presence in the group. Thus, special care of reaching
an entire region might generate stronger internal community controls and might reduce the
need for external control mechanisms. Any policy that aims at reducing coca needs to target
entire communities, since people’ decisions regarding coca cultivation are greatly affected by
what they see others do.
One question that arises with the use of framed field experiments is how well they actually
reflect what happens in real life and how valid the results are outside a lab setting. Although
we can not quantitatively assure that what we observe in the lab is what would happen in the
field, we have qualitative knowledge that leads us to believe that our results would hold outside
the frame of the experiment. After every experiment we held a discussion with the participants
about the experiment and asked them how well they thought the experiment captured real life
and how they thought their experimental behavior reflected their day-to-day decisions. In short,
as the discussion progressed, it was clear that their arguments for investing or not investing
in coca in the experiment are the same ones they use for working or not working with coca in
their life: the violence and fear that it brought and the high risks of being caught. When they
mentioned aerial spraying the first question we asked was what they thought would happen as
soon as the airplanes disappeared. Not surprisingly the answer was that they, or a majority
of people would go back to coca, as it was still more profitable than everything else. Only
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those from the program communities showed more apprehension with going back to coca and
mentioned their will to give alternative legal products a chance and were hopeful for better
times with legal crops. However, the fear of the sustainability of legal crops is still worrisome
for all participants and posits a threat to sustainable coca reductions.
Although the region where we conducted the study was not randomly selected it seems to be
representative of other municipalities with coca in the country. As we conduct the study in
only one region, our conclusions are not valid for all the country, but only for these munici-
palities. Yet, our findings are indicative of what could happen in other areas that have similar
characteristics.
These discussions showed three things that are important for validating our experimental re-
sults: 1) People understood the game and translated it to their own dilemma between coca and
a legal alternative; 2) the treatment group did show more engagement with legal alternatives
and with staying away from illegality when the program ended and also in the face of a present
lower risk of being caught and 3) the sustainability of coca reducing efforts depends not only on
risk or punishment, but also on the provision of legal livelihoods and the strengthening of social
norms within the community that align community members around a goal of being successful
outside illegality.
Despite the fact that the usual limitations of framed field experiments of having high internal
validity but low external validity apply to our study, we are confident that the experiment
mimics reality and brings experimental responses closer to real life behaviors. In particular,
participants are all farmers in coca growing areas that face the decision of growing coca or
cacao (or other legal product) every harvest; and they all face both external deterrence (ei-
ther through areal spraying, manual eradication or both) and alternative development options.
The treatment group has also been exposed to internal mechanisms of social control through
the verification committee that they created for the Program. Nonetheless, once field experi-
ment hypotheses are confirmed, efforts should be undertaken in further research to test these
hypotheses outside the “lab.”
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Appendix
Table A4.1: Coca investments with coca invested by others in group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dcoca Coca dcoca Coca
Experimental Treatments
T1 Group Punish -0.116 -0.728∗ -0.097 -0.636∗
(0.096) (0.382) (0.096) (0.366)
T2 Int. Control 0.032 -0.036 0.040 0.001
(0.044) (0.189) (0.043) (0.182)
T3 Individual Punish -0.151∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.217) (0.052) (0.213)
T4 IntCont+GroupPunish -0.082 -0.125 -0.077 -0.104
(0.067) (0.308) (0.063) (0.287)
T5 IntCont+IndPunish -0.109 -0.681∗ -0.101 -0.638∗
(0.086) (0.378) (0.083) (0.364)
Program Treatment and Interactions
FGB 0.059 0.421 0.055 0.400
(0.067) (0.291) (0.065) (0.279)
T1 GP X FGB 0.012 -0.064 0.012 -0.061
(0.085) (0.298) (0.084) (0.288)
T2 IC X FGB -0.017 -0.354 -0.010 -0.317
(0.058) (0.228) (0.057) (0.223)
T3 IP X FGB -0.039 -0.121 -0.031 -0.083
(0.075) (0.340) (0.073) (0.332)
T4 ICGP X FGB -0.026 -0.565∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.499∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.168) (0.036) (0.153)
T5 ICIP X FGB -0.128∗ -0.554∗ -0.112 -0.477
(0.072) (0.297) (0.069) (0.292)
Group Types
All FGB -0.058 -0.358 -0.057 -0.353
(0.060) (0.301) (0.057) (0.281)
Mixed 0.010 0.081 0.007 0.069
(0.039) (0.212) (0.037) (0.198)
Controls
Cost to urban center 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other non-Catholic religion -0.042 -0.125 -0.041 -0.119
(0.026) (0.132) (0.027) (0.133)
Years growing coca 0.004∗ 0.017 0.004∗ 0.016
(0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014)
Years in vereda -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Experimental Round -0.013∗∗ 0.032 -0.012∗∗ 0.035
(0.006) (0.024) (0.005) (0.022)
Coca by others (t-1) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.015)
Constant 0.454∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 1.353∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.208) (0.042) (0.200)
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3332
Veredas 30 30 30 30
R2 Overall 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.10
R2 Within 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 Between 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.14
Vereda level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Session fixed effects included.
Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01153
Table A4.2: Coca investments after being punished
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dCoca Coca dCoca Coca dCoca Coca dCoca Coca
Punishment
Punishment (t-1) 0.011 0.080 0.019 0.087
(0.016) (0.091) (0.013) (0.094)
Cumm. punishment (t-1) -0.039∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.018 -0.062
(0.015) (0.055) (0.018) (0.089)
Experimental Treatments
T3 Individual Punish -0.107 -0.229 -0.107 -0.229 -0.009 0.131 -0.009 0.131
(0.090) (0.336) (0.090) (0.336) (0.088) (0.362) (0.088) (0.363)
T4 IntCont+GroupPunish -0.035 0.301 0.007 0.343 0.068 0.714 0.091 0.800∗
(0.099) (0.396) (0.101) (0.402) (0.101) (0.444) (0.101) (0.459)
T5 IntCont+IndPunish 0.049 0.145 0.084 0.201 0.172 0.625 0.195∗ 0.716
(0.090) (0.324) (0.090) (0.326) (0.107) (0.470) (0.106) (0.477)
Interactions
FGB 0.100 0.468∗∗ 0.100 0.468∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.505∗∗
(0.067) (0.229) (0.067) (0.229) (0.064) (0.214) (0.064) (0.214)
T3 IP X FGB -0.023 0.038 -0.023 0.038 -0.044 0.003 -0.045 0.003
(0.070) (0.320) (0.070) (0.320) (0.062) (0.302) (0.062) (0.301)
T4 ICGP X FGB -0.065 -0.568∗ -0.065 -0.568∗ -0.045 -0.510∗ -0.045 -0.511∗
(0.078) (0.319) (0.078) (0.319) (0.072) (0.286) (0.072) (0.286)
T5 ICIP X FGB -0.134∗∗ -0.451 -0.134∗∗ -0.451 -0.148∗∗ -0.480 -0.148∗∗ -0.481
(0.059) (0.288) (0.059) (0.288) (0.065) (0.318) (0.065) (0.317)
Group Types
All FGB -0.115∗∗ -0.584∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.584∗ -0.112∗ -0.572∗ -0.112∗ -0.572∗
(0.059) (0.331) (0.059) (0.331) (0.059) (0.313) (0.060) (0.313)
Mixed 0.010 0.091 0.010 0.091 0.017 0.110 0.017 0.111
(0.038) (0.243) (0.038) (0.243) (0.038) (0.230) (0.038) (0.230)
Controls
Coca by others (t-1) 0.005 0.043∗∗∗ 0.005 0.042∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.015)
Constant 0.368∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.455 0.246∗ 0.373
(0.086) (0.323) (0.086) (0.323) (0.132) (0.616) (0.132) (0.636)
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2196 2196 2196 2196
Veredas 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R2 Overall 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09
R2 Within 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
R2 Between 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.12
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Treatment base level: T1 Group punishment. Session fixed effects and controls in last 4 columns included.
Translated english instructions
We translated the instructions from Spanish and present them below. During the experiment
each treatment had an independent instruction manuscript. Because of space considerations the
following instructions will highlight where each treatment entered and what varied depending




Good morning/ good afternoon. My name is ____, welcome to this workshop. Before starting,
we want to thank you for your participation. This workshop was prepared by a group of
university professors for a study about living conditions in areas that have had coca crops or
still have coca crops in Colombia. Throughout the exercise we will not ask your name or any
other question that identifies you or your family. All the information will be analyzed as a
group and we will not look into individual responses.
We will carry out this same exercise in different communities. In order to make it comparable,
we have prepared the instructions that we will read to you now.
For participating in the workshop and answering a final survey you will receive $10.000 pesos
(approx. 5 USD). However, throughout the exercise you can win or lose money, so you can end
up with more than $10.000, less than $10.000 or even lose the $10.000. The amount of money
that you get will depend on the decisions that you make during the workshop, as well as on
the decisions made by other participants in your group.
We start the activity by randomly forming groups of 3 people. The groups will remain the
same during the whole workshop, and you will never know who was in your group.
How long is the workshop?
This activity will last approximately three hours. You will have to make a series of decisions.
It is important that you carefully think about the decisions that you make, as if you were in
the situations that we will present.
What type of decisions will you have to make?
You will decide whether you invest in coca or in cacao, and you have $100.000 pesos to invest
in these products. For every $10.000 pesos that you invest in coca, you will get $160.000. For
each thousand pesos that you invest in cacao you will get $70.000 pesos. You can invest any
amount you want between 0 and $100.000. You are free to choose how much you invest in each
activity, but you will always have to invest the whole $100.000 pesos.
However, coca cultivation generates various negative effects on society. To represent the harm
that it causes to communities, we will deduct $35.000 pesos for each $10.000 pesos invested in
coca by each group member. This discount applies to all the people in the group, independently
of if they invest in coca or not, or of how much they invested. [The next sentence in cursive
appears only for the control group T0] Initially there is no risk of being caught cultivating coca;
this means that there is no eradication, no spraying and not control of the authorities over coca
investments.
In order to facilitate the way in which you invest, each one will receive a sheet of paper with
ten bills of $10.000 that in total sum up to $100.000. You can cross out the amount of bills
that you want to invest in cacao, and everything else will be invested in coca. For example,
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if you want to invest $70.000 in cacao, cross out 7 bills from the sheet, and the $30.000 that
are left will be invested in coca. If you want to invest $20.000 in cacao, cross out two bills in
the sheet that says cacao, and the $80.000 left (8 bills) will be invested in coca. If you want to
invest all the $100.000 in coca, you should not cross any bill.
When you are done, fold your paper in half so that no one sees your decision, raise your hand
and an assistant will go to your seat and take your sheet. Please do not stand up. Wait patiently
and we will get your paper. After every round you will be able to know how much you got
in coca, how much for cacao, how much the other group members invested in coca and how
much of your profits were discounted for coca investments in your group. [The treatments that
include external punishment, T1, T3, T4 and T5, include the following statement in cursive]
We will also inform you on whether a green or red ball was drawn, and how much was the value
of the fine.
You will receive a paper like this for each round that we play. You will receive all the pages at
the beginning. However, you should only mark the sheet that corresponds to the round that
we are playing. Please, do not mark all the sheets at the same time! We will let you know
when you can answer the next round. In each sheet the participant number that we gave you
at the beginning of the game should be visible. Please verify that all your sheets have your
participating number.
[The treatments that include external group liability punishment, T1, T3, T4 and T5, include
the following statement in cursive depending on whether they have group or individual liability]
[Group liability T1, :] There exists a risk that authorities do an inspection and find the coca
crops. If the authorities find that any person of the group has coca, every person from the group
has to pay $90.000 pesos for every $10.000 pesos invested in coca by the group. The punishment
applies to all group members independently of if they grew coca or not. [Individual liability:]
There exists a risk that authorities do an inspection and find the coca crops. If the authorities
find that you have coca, you will have to pay $90.000 as punishment for each $10.000 invested
in coca. The punishment applies for those that invested in coca. [All external punishment
treatments:] In order to determine if there is an inspection or not, the workshop assistants will
have a bag with 10 balls (show the balls and the empty bag). Seven will be green and three will
be red. In each round they will take out a ball. If the ball is green, the group will be not be
monitored. If the ball is red, the group will be monitored, and if any of its members invested
in coca in that round. [Group liability external punishment] each person will be discounted
$90.000 pesos for every $10.000 (one bill) invested in coca by the group. [Individual liability:]
the persons who invested in coca will have a punishment of $90.000 for every $10.000 (one bill)
invested in coca by yourself.
This procedure will repeat itself for many rounds. However, the amount of rounds that we will
play is a surprise. When we are done we will calculate the total sum of your payments from
all the rounds. Since we come from the university, we are not able to pay you all the money
that you would make with coca or with cacao, so we will pay a fraction of what you make (we
will take 3 zeroes out), and we will add the $10.000 that you initially had from participating in
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the activity. For example, if after all the rounds you gained $3.000.000 (approx.. 1500 USD)
for your decisions, you will receive $13.000, which is equal to 3.000.000 with three zeroes less:
3.000+10.000. If after all the rounds you lost $2.000.000, and $2.000.000 without three zeroes is
2.000, then you will receive 10.000-2000=$8.000 in total. [All numerical explanations are being
written down in the board].
[For the treatments with internal control, T2, T4 and T5, the following statement was included]
As we told you, when each round ends you will know how other people from your group invested.
If you disagree with their investments you can show your dissatisfaction by sending a “sad face.”
Each “sad face” has a cost of $50 pesos for the person that buys it, which represents the costs of
having to tell another person that you don’t agree with what they do, like for example generating
problems in a friendship, start a disagreement with a community member, etc. Each sad face
that you send reduces the income of the person that receives it in $100 pesos. You can buy the
faces with the income that you received from coca and cacao in the round that you are playing.
You can send as many sad faces as you want as long as you don’t exceed the amount that you
have in your budget. The profit from each round will be given in its true form, which means
without the three zeroes, and from this real profit you can decide how many sad faces you can
send. You will see the sad faces that were sent to you by other group members in the next
round. This means that in the information that we give you in the second round, the faces that
were sent to you in round 1 will appear. However, the amount of sad faces that you send and
that you receive affect the payments only in the round in which they were sent. This means, the
faces sent and received in round 1 only affect the payments in round 1.
How do you calculate your payments? Let’s do an example
Initially you have $100.000 pesos to invest, and you can invest them in coca or in cacao. Let’s
say that I decide to invest $70.000 (7 bills) in coca and $30.000 (3 bills) in cacao. So in the
decision sheet I cross out 3 bills for cacao (show). How do we calculate the profits made from
coca? If I invested 3 bills in cacao I have 7 left for coca and 7*160.000=1.120.000. What is
my income for investing in cacao? Since I crossed out 3 bills for caca and each bill gives me
$70.000, 3 bills give me 3*70.000=210.000. The total income for my investments is the sum
of what I receive from coca, which is 1.120.000 pesos, plus what I receive from cacao, 210.000
pesos, in total, 1.330.000.
Given the negative effects of coca, here is a reduction in the payoffs for all group members.
Let’s suppose that one person from the group invests in coca and the other one doesn’t. In our
example I invested 7 bills and the others invested one bill in total. Each bill invested in coca
generates a discount of 35.000 pesos. Thus, the reduction for investing in coca for each group
member from this group is 8*35.000. This gives $280.000 pesos. My total income in pesos is
then 1.120.000+210.00-280.000=1’050.000 for this round.
[The treatments that include external punishment, T1, T3, T4 and T5, include the following
statement in cursive] However, you will not always get the green ball. Since three of the10 balls
in the bag are red, and I could get one of them, what would be my payment in this case?
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[The treatments with group liability external punishment have the following statement] In the
case of monitoring, since group members invested in coca they need to pay a fine. How much
would the fine be for everyone? In total there are 8 bills invested in coca in my group. For each
bill there is a fine of $90.000, which means that the fine for the group is 90.000*8=$720.000.
My final payment would be 1.050.000-720.000=330.000.
[The treatments with individual liability external punishment have the following statement] In
the case of monitoring, since group members invested in coca they need to pay a fine. How
much would the fine be for everyone? In total I invested 7 bills in coca. For each bill there is
a fine of $90.000, which means that the fine for me is 90.000*7=$630.000. My final payment
would be 1.050.000-630.000=420.000.
[The treatments with internal control heard this statement:] After your first investment you
will know what happened in the round, how much you got from coca, form cacao and how much
was taken because of coca’s social costs. From the payment that you obtained you can buy sad
faces to send other group members. In order to buy the sad faces we will give you a sheet with
sad faces. In the upper part of this sheet, you will cross the amount of sad faces that you want
to send participant A from your group, and in the lower part the amount you want to send to
the second participant. You will fold the sheet and we will collect it. In the information we give
you in the next round you will know how many faces were sent to you by other group members.
The acquisition of sad faces comes out of your “real” profit and not from the initial $100.000!
Let’s say that you want to tell other group members that you don’t agree with the investments
that they did, and you decide to send them sad faces. In total, you buy 1 sad face. Because
each sad face costs $50, you send 1*50=$50 in sad faces. Let’s say that the other people in the
group were also not happy with how you made your decisions, and each sends you one sad face;
in total you received two sad faces. Since each sad face generates a punishment of $100, your
income is reduced by 2*100=$200 pesos. In order to know what your payment is after the sad
faces, we will need to take out the 3 zeroes that we spoke about out of your income form cacao
and coca. In the example we will understand it better. The payment that you receive without
the three zeroes is $1.050. You buy 1 sad face at 50 pesos, 1*50, and since it’s a loss it is -50.
You receive two faces, each punishes 100, 2*100=200, since it’s a loss, -200. Your net income
you be: 1.050-50-200=800
[The treatments with internal control and external group punishment heard this statement:]
My final payment would be 330-250=80.
[The treatments with internal control and individual external punishment heard this statement:]
My final payment would be 420-250=170
Now let’s look at another example. This time, I decide to invest 3 bills ($30.000) in coca and
7 bills ($70.000) in cacao. If in my group one person invested one bill in coca and the other
invested two bills, in this case how would my payments look like?
1 bill in coca gives $160.000 and I invest 3 I get 160.000*3=$480.000
1 bill in cacao gives $70.000 and I invest 7, I get $70.000*7=490.000
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My total income from my investments would then be 480.000+490.000=970.000
Due to negative effects of coca I get a reduction of 35.000 pesos per bill: 3+2+1=6, so
6*35.000=210.000 pesos in reduction.
My net profit is then 970.000-210.000=760.000
[The treatments with group liability external punishment have the following statement] And in
case of getting the red ball, what would be my payments? 1 bill in coca reduces income in $90.000,
so 3+2+1=6 bills, 6*90.000=-540.000. So total income would be: 760.000-540.000=220.000.
[The treatments with individual liability external punishment have the following statement]
And in case of getting the red ball, what would be my payments? 1 bill in coca reduces income
in $90.000, so 3*90.000=-270.000. So total income would be: 760.000-270.000=490.000.
[The treatments with internal control mechanisms hear:] Let’s say that again you are not
happy with what other did, and you sent one sad face to one of them. In this case you also only
received one sad faces. What would your payments be like now? You buy one sad face, 1*50,
since it’s a loss -50, and send a face, 1*100, since it’s a loss -100. Your net income would be
760-150=$610. [The treatments with external group punishment hear] Your net income would
be 220-150=$70. [The treatments with external individual punishment hear] Your net income
would be 490-150=$340.
Do you have any questions until now?
Once we start you cannot talk to anyone in the room. If anyone talks he/she will be excluded
from the workshop and from the payments. If you have any questions please raise your hand
and one of us will come and answer. When you are already sitting, the pages with the $100.000
in bills of $10.000 will be given to you to so you can invest.
Before we start with the investment decisions, we want to do one practice round. The idea is
to be sure that we have been able to explain to you clearly what we are going to do. These
decisions will not affect your pay.
(After finishing crossing out) Now we will pick up your marked sheets. The next thing we will
do is to enter them in the computer to see how you did in this round. When we are done we will
give you a little sheet that has the following information information (show sheet and explain)
: what you got from coca, what you got from cacao, the cost of the group’s coca investments,
what each person invested in coca, [for treatments with external punishment] if there was or
not a fine, the size of the fine [again for all] and the final round payment. The payment is
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